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Introduction 
1. The Need for Regulation  
 The importance of banks and financial markets relies on the fact that they promote 
economic efficiency by allocating savings efficiently to profitable investment opportunities. 
Banks intermediate funds from people who do not have a productive use for them to those 
who can achieve a higher expected return, hence facilitating financial intermediation in an 
economy. A well-functioning financial system contributes to the economic growth of a 
country. More importantly and as this dissertation emphasizes, other than contributing to 
economic growth, an efficient banking system is a key determinant for the financial stability. 
 A stable banking system is capable of withstanding financial shocks and imbalances, 
thereby alleviating the disruptions in the financial intermediation process. The importance of 
financial stability became evident during the 2007-2009 global financial crises. The financial 
crisis that started in the U.S. subprime mortgage market in 2007 spread quickly to Europe and 
became a global crisis. It led to a global recession in the world economy with a higher 
detriment in some countries than others. Among the advanced economies, the GDP growth 
rate of the U.S. economy was -2.8% in 2009 and -0.05 in 2010. In the E.U. this ratio was on 
average -4% in 2009 and -0.3% in 2010. Compared to advanced countries, emerging market 
economies displayed remarkable resilience and maintained robust rates of economic growth. 
The GDP growth rates in Emerging Market Economies1 have remained positive in the same 
years; 0.01% in 2009 and 3.2 in 2010 (IMF, 2009). Given the lessons from the crises of the 
past 15 years, developing countries have adopted measures to become less vulnerable to 
external shocks that are likely to emerge from more developed countries. 
 The theory of market failure forms the basis for understanding financial regulation. 
Following the detrimental economic and financial consequences in the aftermath of the crisis, 
academics and policymakers started to focus their attention on the construction of an 
appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework of the banking sector. During the 2007-
2009 global crisis, banks were engaging in excessive risk-taking. Prudential banking 
regulation and supervision aim to curb excessive risk-taking of banks because engaging in 
                                                 
1 Emerging Market Economies are grouped as such: Emerging Asia, Emerging South Asia, Emerging Europe, 
Emerging Americas, Emerging Middle East, Emerging Africa, newly Industrialized Asia, Developing Asia, 
China and India. Among these groupings, Turkey and Russia belong to the “Emerging Europe” classification 
(IMF, 2009) 
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excessively risky transactions is the ultimate source of instability. Hence, banking regulation 
is needed to deal with the failure of markets to police banks’ risky behaviours. 
2. Research Question and the Relevance of this Thesis 
 This dissertation aims to understand the impact of regulations and supervision on 
banks’ performance focusing on two emerging market economies, Turkey and Russia. The 
goal is to examine the way in which regulations matter for financial stability and banking 
performance from a law and economics perspective. A review of the theory of banking 
regulation, particularly as applied to emerging economies, shows that the efficiency of certain 
solutions regarding banking regulation is open to debate. Therefore, in the context of 
emerging countries, whether a certain approach is efficient or not will be presented as an 
empirical question to which this dissertation will try to find an answer. 
 The research question of this dissertation is whether stricter banking regulation leads 
to better performance by banks. The relevancy of this question arises from the fact that 
banking regulation and supervision has been the subject of discussion due to the global 
financial crisis. Since the start of the global financial crisis, numerous papers and studies, as 
well as many academics, journalists and policymakers drew attention to the weaknesses in 
regulation and supervision, pointing to examples such as lax regulation, insufficient capital 
and poor supervision as factors that contributed to the crisis. More importantly, the global 
crisis urged regulators all around the world to consider changes in regulation and supervision 
(Čihák et al., 2012; Beltratti & Stulz, 2011). 
 In order to answer the research question, the dissertation will first start with a 
theoretical discussion of banking regulation and discuss the efficiency of certain solutions in 
this context. This part will be followed by an empirical analysis where a comparison of the 
performance of Turkish and Russian banks will be made. I chose these emerging countries as 
they both experienced severe banking crises at the end of the 1990s, followed by major 
restructuring and regulatory reform in their respective banking sectors. However, Turkish 
banks have been resilient during the 2007-2009 global crisis, experiencing no bank failure 
whereas Russian banks were strongly influenced by the global financial crisis in terms of 
major bank failures. 
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 After having derived the efficiency scores2 of both countries’ banks, a regression 
analysis will be carried out to investigate the regulatory determinants of these banks’ 
performances. Lastly, the regulatory variables that make the difference in my empirical 
analysis will be explored across the two geographical dimensions of variability, namely 
Turkey and Russia between 1999 and 2010. 
 To my best knowledge, the literature on banks’ efficiency analysis is in its infancy 
regarding the regulatory environment. Most of the studies (e.g. Pastor et al., 2007; Dietsch & 
Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Carvallo & Kasman, 2005) use economic environment variables, 
industry concentration levels, or simple banking profitability ratios. Besides, several studies 
that study the impact of regulations focus on individual countries rather than providing 
international evidence (e.g. Drake et al., 2006; Berger & Merster, 2003). In recent years, a 
smaller but growing number of studies (e.g. Pasiouras, 2008; Pasiouras et al., 2007; 2009; 
2011; Beltratti & Stulz, 2011; Čihák et al., 2012) started to investigate different banking 
regulatory and supervisory regimes around the world using “The Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey” carried out by the World Bank (WB) in order to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis on the impact of regulations. This survey is a unique source of 
comparable world-wide data permitting international comparisons of a wide range of issues 
related to banking regulation and supervision. It was conducted by Barth, Caprio and Levine 
in several years. Specifically, the survey was updated and released by the World Bank in 
2001, 2003, and 2007.3 
 This dissertation provides evidence on the regulatory factors that influence banks’ 
efficiency using the “The Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey” carried out by the World 
Bank (WB). With the help of this survey’s questions, this dissertation will examine the 
impact of several regulatory variables on banks’ performance. These regulatory variables are: 
a) Capital Adequacy Requirements: Capital adequacy requirement is the 
amount of capital banks must hold as a cushion against losses and 
insolvency. In order to account for the risk profile of banks’ assets in 
                                                 
2 For the purpose of this dissertation, technical efficiency measures the ability of a bank to perform financial 
intermediation. 
3 These surveys captured information as of 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2005. The 2007 survey was 
updated in 2008. The current 2012 survey (which is the fourth version of this survey covering the period 2008- 
2010) was not available at the time of writing this dissertation. The first survey (2001) had 117 country 
respondents between 1998 and 2000. The 2003 survey characterized the regulatory situation at the end of 2002. 
It was updated in early 2004 with data from 2003. The third survey was posted on the World Bank website in 
the summer of 2007 with responses from 142 countries and it was updated in 2008. 
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determining the required level of capital, banks have been made subject to 
risk-based capital requirements. 
b) Official Disciplinary Power: This variable stands for the ability of 
supervisors to have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and 
correct problems 
c) Private Monitoring: This variable indicates the degree of information 
released to officials and the public, auditing-related requirements and 
whether credit ratings are required. 
d) Deposit Insurance: This variable indicates whether a country has an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme or not. 
e) Entry Requirements: This regulation discusses the requirements to obtain a 
banking licence. 
3. Research Methodology 
 This dissertation analyses the impact of regulations on banks’ performances in Turkey 
and Russia. The research is divided into three parts: theoretical, empirical, and policy 
analysis. To start, I discuss the theoretical rationales for banking regulation and the 
alternative predictions that theory generates on this basis. 
 The second part of the analysis is an empirical investigation of what implications 
banking regulation has on two comparable emerging economies (Turkey and Russia), using a 
two-stage regression analysis. In the first stage, the efficiency levels of both countries’ banks 
will be estimated by applying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which employs linear 
programming4 to obtain the relative technical efficiency of both countries’ banks. Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is one of the most popular linear programming methods 
examining the relationships between inputs and outputs of a production process. Since its 
introduction, the DEA model has been extensively applied in empirical studies to analyse 
both cross-section and panel data.5 One advantage of DEA that attracts researchers is its 
ability to identify the potential improvement for inefficient units. In contrast to regression 
methods, DEA focuses on individual observations and optimizes the performance measure of 
each unit. 
                                                 
4 A linear programming problem is the problem of maximizing or minimizing a linear function subject to linear 
constraints. This is a typical problem for a firm that wants to maximize its profits. 
5 In a panel data set, the behaviour of several entities is observed across several points in time. 
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 At the second stage of the empirical analysis, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression will be used for the identification of the regulatory variables that are significantly 
correlated with the Turkish and the Russian banks’ efficiency conditional on other bank 
specific factors, market environment and economic conditions. Using regression analysis the 
efficiency scores from step one will be regressed on bank-specific and country-specific 
factors. 
 After having detected the regulatory variables that turn out to be significant on the 
empirical analysis, the third and last part of the thesis illustrates the empirical findings in a 
legal-economic perspective. The aim of this part is to tease out the policy implications of the 
empirical analysis. I will describe the regulatory variables that seem to make the difference 
between the two countries’ banking sectors, from the legal perspective. 
 The regulatory database used in this dissertation, “The Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey” provides a dataset that allows the international comparison of various 
features of the bank regulatory environment. However, the authors of this survey (Barth, 
Caprio and Levine, 20086) express some concern about the accuracy of the responses7 
obtained from the regulatory authorities. Even though the principal contacts to whom the 
survey was sent in each country should know the regulatory environment, the survey’s scope 
is such that for any country a number of people usually are involved in its completion, and 
some or all of the members of this group might change over time. This circumstance raises 
the issue of differences in the interpretation of questions over time (in addition to changes in 
the wording). Hence Barth, Caprio and Levine (2008) make the remark that they did not 
always receive clear responses from the authorities and that the survey might suffer from a 
survey fatigue. Being aware of these problems, for the Turkish regulatory environment, I 
integrated the survey with information retrieved directly from an official at the national 
regulatory agency of Turkey. Regarding the regulatory data for the Russian banks, I used the 
database of the World Bank (WB) developed by Barth, Caprio and Levine over several years. 
To complete the missing years for the time period between 2008 and 2010, the survey was 
sent to the officials of the national regulatory agency of Russia and completed by them.8 
                                                 
6 James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr., and Ross Levine (2008): “Bank Regulations Are Changing: For Better or 
Worse?” 
7 See Appendix A for the questions and other details of the survey 
8 This database is available at four points in time, specifically: 1998-2000; 2001, 2003 and 2007. Following 
Pasiouras (2011), I was able to use information from Version I for bank observations over the period 1998–
2000, from Version II for bank observations over the period 2001–2003, and from Version III for bank 
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4.  Structure of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation is organized in three chapters. 
 Chapter I provides a theoretical discussion on the efficiency of certain solutions 
regarding banking regulations. It will first present the general features of banking and the 
theories of financial intermediation. This will be followed by the economic rationale of 
banking regulation and its role for financial stability. The final section of Chapter I will 
analyse the overall regulatory framework based on the objectives of different regulatory and 
policy measures. The aim of Chapter I is to explain the function of banking regulation in 
supporting financial stability. It presents the basic concepts necessary to understand the 
mechanism of banking regulation in dealing with market failures responsible for financial 
instability. Therefore, it will form the basis for the subsequent chapters’ analyses. Very often 
the predictions of the theory regarding the impact of certain regulations on the efficiency of a 
banking system are ambiguous. This is particularly the case for emerging countries, justifying 
the analysis in the second chapter. 
 In order to understand the impact of certain banking regulations, whether a certain 
approach is more or less efficient in the context of two selected emerging countries -Turkey 
and Russia- will be presented as an empirical question in Chapter II. The impact of 
regulations related to capital adequacy requirements, extent of power of regulatory bodies, 
information disclosure requirements, deposit insurance and entry regulations on banks’ 
performances will be analysed. Chapter II will introduce the concept of technical efficiency 
as a performance indicator in order to establish the technical foundation for the methodology 
of this chapter. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as a non-parametric measurement 
technique will be introduced as a performance measurement technique which will be used for 
calculating the efficiency scores of Turkish and Russian banks during 1999 and 2010. This 
chapter then explains the Ordinary Least Squares regression technique, which will be used to 
investigate the regulatory determinants of banks’ efficiency scores. The chapter will end with 
a discussion of the empirical findings. 
 Chapter III analyses the regulatory variables that make the difference according to the 
empirical analysis of Chapter II. Regulations will be described across the two dimensions of 
                                                                                                                                                        
observations for 2004–2005. Other studies using this database made the same assumption (Focarelli & Pozzolo, 
2001; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 2002; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Fernandez and Gonzalez, 2005; Beck 
et al., 2006), have implicitly made the same assumption. For more on this, see Pasiouras et al. (2007). 
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variability, Turkey and Russia from 1999 until 2010. The empirical findings will be analysed 
from a legal perspective, explaining in-depth how the regulatory frameworks in these two 
countries differ. 
 Finally, the main findings of this dissertation will be summarized and some general 
policy implications will be drawn. Based on the findings of this study, policymakers can be 
informed about which regulations they can improve the banking performance in emerging 
countries. Recommendations and possible areas for future research will be also highlighted. 
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Chapter I – The Economics of Banking and Banking 
Regulation 
1. Introduction 
 A healthy and efficient banking system together with a well-managed macroeconomic 
policy is the key determinant of financial stability. The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 is 
one of the most dramatic crises in the current century. Its origins and causes have led many 
academics, practitioners and policy makers to seek an understanding of the deep roots of the 
new forms of banking. Secondly, and more importantly, the search for a new banking 
regulatory regime has been undertaken. 
  The aim of this chapter is to explain the function of banking regulation in supporting 
financial stability. It will present the basic concepts necessary to understand the mechanism 
of banking regulation in dealing with the market failures responsible for financial instability. 
Therefore, this chapter will form the basis for the subsequent chapters’ analysis. Emphasis 
will be placed on the impact of banking regulation on banks’ risk-taking attitudes, including 
the manner in which such behaviour adversely affects financial stability. 
 The literature is endowed with a vast amount of detailed analyses of how the 2007-
2009 subprime9 crisis that started in the U.S. transformed into a global crisis.10 It became 
obvious that financial crises are not confined to developing countries; developed countries’ 
economies with relatively mature financial systems are also vulnerable to adverse shocks, 
systemic banking crises, cycles of booms and busts, and financial volatility.11 Many 
developing countries experienced financial crises throughout the 1990s. Developing countries 
generally suffer larger exogenous shocks than advanced countries. Their domestic policies 
are a source of volatility and more importantly they have weaker macroeconomic and 
financial shock absorbers than developed countries (World Bank Development Research 
Group, 2008). The 1998 Russian crisis, the 1999 Brazil crisis, the 2000/2001 Turkey crises, 
the 2001 Argentina crisis, and the 1997-1998 Asian financial crises (which quickly spread to 
other emerging markets), are some well-known examples. However, especially after the 
                                                 
9 The term “subprime” refers to the credit characteristics of particular borrowers who have weak credit histories 
and a higher risk of loan default than do prime borrowers. These subprime borrowers are risky borrowers 
(Gorton, 2008). 
10The 2007-2009 global crisis is also called “the Subprime Crisis”. See Hellwig, (2008) and Calomiris, (2008). 
11 For more on this, see Schmukler (2008). 
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1997/1998 Asian financial crises, emerging market economies have been strengthened 
through various macroeconomic and financial reforms. Exposures to cross-border risks and 
risky sovereign debt have been limited. High-leverage strategies, heavy reliance on wholesale 
short-term funding and the risky expansion of off-balance sheet exposures, which are among 
the determinants of the global crisis, have been absent from banking in most emerging 
countries (Beltratti & Stulz, 2011; Boorman, 2009). 
 Given the lessons from the crises of the past 15 years, developing countries12 have 
adopted measures to become less vulnerable to external shocks, isolating themselves from the 
turbulence in other parts of the world (World Bank, 2008). This time emerging markets were 
affected by the global crisis to some extent, but compared to their histories of previous crises, 
they displayed remarkable resilience and maintained robust growth rates. Although the 
financial institutions in emerging markets did not engage in the popular and complex 
financial practices seen in major industrial countries, transmission of the crisis from the U.S. 
to Europe, and then from Europe to the rest of the world, came through several channels as a 
consequence of financial interconnectedness (BIS Study Group, 2011).13 The crucial starting 
point of this dissertation is that the magnitude of contagion from developed economies has 
been smaller in emerging countries with stronger institutions and sounder policies. The Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) report of May 2011 on financial stability indicates that 
emerging markets have been more inclined than advanced countries to employ regulatory 
instruments for the stability of the financial system (BIS Study Group, 2011). Among the 
emerging markets that are members of the G-20,14 only Turkey did not introduce any special 
stimulus package or require any rescue packages or other forms of government support. After 
the 2000/2001 crises,15 the Turkish banking sector has developed a substantial amount of 
prudential and structural measures in banking regulations. The Russian banking system, on 
the other hand, has been strongly affected by the global financial crisis, resulting in major 
                                                 
12 Although some authors distinguish between developing countries and emerging countries, these terms are 
used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
13 For a detailed discussion on the transmission channels of the global crisis to emerging markets, see Boorman, 
2009; and World Bank Policy Research Paper, 2008. 
14 The Group of Twenty (G-20) is the premier forum for international cooperation on the most important aspects 
of the international economic and financial agenda. It brings together the world’s major advanced and emerging 
economies. It includes Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and the European Union. 
15 In November 2000, the Turkish economy was hit by a severe liquidity crisis. The situation was normalized for 
a while by an IMF-led emergency package. However, Turkish currency came under heavy attack in February 
2001 and this turned into the most serious financial and economic crisis Turkey has experienced in its post-war 
history (Özkan, 2003). 
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bank failures. In fact, Russia was affected much more strongly by the global crisis than the 
majority of emerging economies (Dreger & Fidrmuc, 2009; Fidrmuc & Süss, 2009). The 
Russian government and the Central Bank implemented a number of regulatory measures to 
support the Russian banking sector with liquidity in order to mitigate the effects of the 
financial crisis. 
 Regulatory intervention in financial markets, particularly banking, was in place all 
over the world when the global financial crisis began. This prompted a variety of proposals 
for reforming the banking system. There is still an on-going debate about the optimal 
structure of regulation. Regulation in the banking sector is more important than in other 
sectors because the externalities arising from an individual bank failure might lead to a 
systemic failure in the whole sector, hence affecting the economy and society as a whole.16 
 In order to place the subsequent analysis into an appropriate context, this chapter aims 
to provide the reader with a good grasp of the basics of banking and the behaviour of banks 
when they are subject to certain regulations. 
 Section 2 of this chapter sets out the general pattern for banking theory. To this end, 
general features of banking and theories of financial intermediation such as liquidity 
insurance, delegated monitoring, risk management and resource allocation will be highlighted 
as they appear in economic theory. These can be framed also as the services banks provide to 
the public. 
 Section 3 describes the changing nature of banks in the world due to financial 
innovation which began in the 1970s. Under the traditional model of banking, banks fund 
their operations primarily through deposits, which they transform into loans. However, 
through deregulation accompanied by financial innovation, banks began to rely on wholesale 
money markets rather than deposits for funding; and on securitization which enabled them to 
change the structure of their asset portfolios and risk profiles. This part provides the basis for 
understanding the banking structures and operations taking place in two emerging markets: 
Turkey and Russia. The following chapter of this thesis will be concerned with these two 
countries. 
 Section 4 explains the economic rationale for banking regulation based on market 
failures, systemic risk factors and the concept of financial stability. Examination of economic 
                                                 
16 Systemic Risk will be discussed in detail in Section 4.2 of this chapter. 
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theory may build a helpful basis for understanding the necessity of banking regulation. After 
identifying the sources of instability in the financial system and why these are a problem for 
the welfare of society, Section 5 analyses the two main approaches to banking regulation that 
exist in the literature which deal with the role of government intervention. The role of 
regulation is explained in two dimensions: the public interest dimension and the private 
interest dimension of the regulatory process. 
 Section 6 discusses the structure of banking regulation. The overall regulatory 
framework is analysed based on the objectives of different regulatory and policy measures. 
The emphasis is on their impacts on financial stability. This section builds the basis for 
understanding the impact of regulations on Turkish and Russian banks’ performance, which 
will be dealt with more specifically in Chapter II. Section 7 concludes the thesis. 
2. Economics of Banking 
 Financial intermediaries such as banks, insurance companies, finance companies, 
securities firms, mutual funds and pension funds have an important function in the economy. 
They take funds from firms and individuals that have surplus savings, and then allocate them 
to other firms and individuals who need to borrow. This is the basic meaning of financial 
intermediation. A well-functioning financial system contributes to the economic growth of a 
country. Various empirical and theoretical studies prove the positive relationship between a 
well-functioning financial system and economic growth.17 
 Whereas all the intermediaries mentioned above perform this function, banks have 
two other features that distinguish them from other types of intermediaries. Firstly, they 
commit to return the savers’ funds at any time, on short-notice or on demand. Secondly, 
banks issue money in terms of demand deposits, savings deposits and short-term deposits 
(Schooner & Taylor, 2009:2-17; Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994:13). Banks borrow money from 
their customers as deposits, and then invest (or lend out) that borrowed money in loans and 
other types of financial instruments. In simple terms, a bank intermediates its customer’s 
investments into its loan portfolio. These two core activities of deposit-taking and lending 
form the traditional model of banking. Banks provide a link between creditors and borrowers, 
                                                 
17 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between finance and economic development, see: Gurely & Shaw 
(1955). For a literature review, see Levine (1997) and Gertler (1988). For empirical works on the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth, see: Demirgüc-Kunt & Maksimovic (1998), Levine & 
Zervos (1998), Rajan & Zingales (1998), Levine, Beck & Loayza (2000). 
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affecting the functioning of capital markets and financial markets and therefore the growth of 
economies. 
 Banks’ liabilities, parts of which are in the form of deposits, constitute a large part of 
the supply of money in a country’s economy. However, the rate of money supply that the 
banks can generate by making loans is limited by the reserve requirements that force banks to 
hold a portion of each deposit as a reserve, for instance in the form of deposits at a central 
bank. This maximum amount of money that banks are allowed to create (lend out) is 
determined by a measure called the money multiplier. If a bank receives a deposit, it is 
required to set aside a fraction of that deposit as a reserve.18 It then lends out its excess 
reserves, creating new deposits in the banking system. As banks expand their depositing and 
lending activities, this multiplier process leads to an increase in the rate of reserves that banks 
are required to hold. Hence, the central banks have the power to control the amount of money 
that can be created by banks through the lending process (Keister & McAndrews, 2009; Platt, 
2010). The proper functioning of financial intermediation is essential for the health of a 
country’s economy because when this mechanism works well, it provides the most efficient 
allocation of resources between lenders and borrowers in a society (Merton, 1993). The 
importance of a healthy banking system for the economy is also stressed in the works of 
Gurley and Shaw (1955), and more recently by Bernanke and Gertler (1987) and Levine 
(1997). 
 However, economies are prone to banking crises as shown most recently by the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009. This is due to the fragility of the banking system 
caused by short-term debt and interconnectedness.19 When the banking system stops 
functioning, the ability of firms and individuals to obtain funds for their investments becomes 
constrained, hence curtailing economic growth (Gibson, 1995; Rosengreen & Peek 1995). 
Before starting with the analysis of banking regulation, it would first be useful to understand 
banks’ unique features and functions, which will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
                                                 
18 Reserves are funds that are held by a bank in order to meet the bank’s legal reserve requirement. These funds 
are held either as cash in the bank’s vault or as balances on deposit at the central banks (Keister & McAndrews, 
2009). 
19 Banks produce liquidity by financing illiquid assets such as long-term investments with liquid and short-term 
liabilities. This maturity mismatch (borrowing short and lending long) in the operations of banks creates a 
fragile balance sheet since deposits have a shorter maturity than assets. 
If a bank is concerned about its counterparty’s risk exposure, it will be reluctant to lend to other financial 
institutions. A temporary stop in the payment mechanism might distort banks’ confidence in each other, namely 
the interbank trust market. Hence the failure of only one large participant can cause a big distortion in the 
system in terms of liquidity shortage. 
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 The traditional theories of financial intermediation emphasize the role of banks as 
reducing asymmetric information and transaction costs. Asymmetric information refers to a 
transaction where one party has more relevant information than the other about the object 
being traded or the transaction itself. Banks transform deposits of lenders into credit 
portfolios demanded by the borrowers. Firms finance their projects with long-term credit 
whereas households prefer short-term and liquid deposits since they want to be able to 
withdraw their money whenever they want.20 Hence, banks enable contact between these 
parties by arranging the transformation of each other’s’ resources through issuing demand 
deposits or savings contracts. Banks help each party obtain information about the 
counterparty of the transaction. These kinds of debt contracts are complex agreements and 
preparing them in accordance with the best possible risk diversification method would 
increase transaction costs as well as search costs. It would be expensive for a firm to write 
these contracts; however, a bank can write and enforce these debt contracts in a less costly 
way (Tirole & Dewatripont, 1994).21 
 The contemporary theory of banking explains the existence of banks in terms of the 
valuable services they provide and justifies their existence on liquidity creation, risk 
transformation and acting as delegated monitors of depositors (Bhattacharya & Thakor 1993; 
Bouwman & Berger 2008).22 The following sections explain these roles of banks in detail. 
2.1. Balance Sheet and Income Statement of Banks 
 In order to describe the banking activities and performance of banks, it is useful to 
start with a presentation of a typical balance sheet and income statement. A typical balance 
sheet of a bank consists of the assets side and the liabilities side (see Table 1). Basically, a 
bank obtains funds by borrowing and by issuing (selling) liabilities such as deposits. 
Interbank deposits, retail and wholesale deposits (which are basically funds collected from 
households and companies), as well as subordinated debt23 are on the liabilities side. Equity 
is the final category on the liabilities side of the balance sheet and is referred to as the banks’ 
net worth or capital. It can be thought of as the difference between the value of the banks’ 
assets and liabilities since total assets = total liabilities + equity. A bank may raise its own 
                                                 
20 Investors and depositors face an uncertain horizon in holding their assets because they don’t know at which 
date they will need to consume (Diamond, 2007). 
21 For a more detailed discussion of transaction costs in financial intermediation theory, see Benston & Smith 
(1976). 
22 Developed by Diamond, (1984) 
23 If a bank falls into liquidation or bankruptcy, the more senior debt-holders are reimbursed first. Holders of 
subordinated debt are then repaid if enough is left (Tirole, 2006:76). 
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funds by selling new equity (stock) or from retained earnings which naturally increase the 
equity. 
 The funds that a bank has acquired by issuing liabilities are used to obtain income-
earning assets (Mishkin, 2004:201-205). On the assets side, banks have cash reserves, 
financial assets and non-financial assets. Financial assets include short-term assets (such as 
cash, interbank loans24 and money market loans), credits in the form of loans or fixed income 
securities (financing both the public and the private sector), investment loans or real estate 
loans, and credit to households in the form of instalment loans or real estate loans (typically 
mortgages). Equipment and premises belong to non-financial assets. Banks may also hold 
stocks of other companies. Interbank operations normally take place in the form of short-term 
loans between banks on the money market (with maturities from overnight till three months) 
(Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994:13-15). 
Table 1: Balance Sheet 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Cash Interbank deposits 
Interbank loans Retail and other whole-sale deposits (demands, savings and time deposits)  
Credit to the public sector Subordinated debt 
Credit to households EQUITY (stock issues and retained earnings) 
Credit to firms   
Equity holdings   
Equipment and premises   
Source: Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994:14 
 Besides the balance sheet activities of banks, there are also off-balance sheet activities 
that may potentially affect bank profits (Tirole, 2006:86; Mishkin, 2004:223). They involve 
income from fees and loan sales,25 financial guarantees such as standby letters of credit, bank 
loan commitments, and note issuance facilities; and also derivatives such as currency and 
interest rate swaps, over-the-counter options, futures, and forward contracts (Mishkin, 2004).
 The income statement, presented below as Table 2, includes both the effects of on- 
and off-balance sheet activities. Interest income, commissions earned and dividends are the 
revenues of a bank. Operating expenses such as personnel, premises and equipment expenses 
                                                 
24 Banks finance each other through interbank operations. 
25 Loan sales are a recent innovation in banking where a bank makes a loan and then sells the cash stream 
coming from the loan without explicit guarantee, or insurance, to a third party (Gorton & Haubrich, 1989). 
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together with loan loss provisions and depreciation are deducted from the revenue. The after-
tax income is determined by the interest margin (which is the difference between interests 
earned and interest due) and by the income from equity holdings (Dewatripont & Tirole 
1994). The income statement and the balance sheet together describe a bank’s activities. 
Table 2: Income Statement 
DEBIT CREDIT 
Interest and commissions paid Interest and commissions earned 
Operating expenses Income from equity holdings 
Depreciation   
Loan (and equity) loss provisions   
Taxes   
After tax-profit   
Source: Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994 
2.2. Maturity Transformation and Liquidity of Banks 
 Banks’ function as liquidity creators is described as one of the major reasons for 
banks’ existence in contemporary banking theory (Bouwman & Berger, 2008). Besides, 
financial crises and bank liquidity creation are often connected as evidenced in the latest 
global crisis (Berger & Bouwan 2008). Liquidity basically refers to a firm’s ability to meet its 
payment obligations when they come due by having enough liquid assets that the payment of 
debt occurs without any losses. A liquid asset (or security) is an asset that is easily and 
cheaply turned into cash and short-term securities. Liquid assets are bought or sold with little 
or no impact on price.26 The role of banks in liquidity management refers to the provision of 
sufficiently liquid assets to meet banks’ obligations to depositors (Mishkin, 2004). 
 This basic function of banks is described in the famous model of Diamond-Dybvig 
(1983).27 Banks provide financial intermediation between borrowers in need of funds and 
lenders that have surplus savings by transforming the credit portfolio demanded by the 
borrowers into a deposit portfolio desired by the lenders. In doing so, they create credit that 
allows the real economy to grow. In other words, banks produce liquidity by financing 
illiquid assets such as long-term investments with liquid and short-term liabilities. However, 
this maturity mismatch (borrowing short and lending long) in the operations of banks creates 
a fragile balance sheet for banks since deposits have a shorter maturity than the assets. That 
                                                 
26 Cash, money in bank accounts, money market mutual funds, and treasury bills are examples of liquid assets. 
27 Diamond, D. W., and P.H. Dybvig (2000): “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity”. 
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means that the illiquid loans cannot be sold quickly, because firms want to finance their 
projects with long-term credits. At the same time, households prefer short-term deposits for 
liquidity reasons since they want to be able to withdraw their funds whenever they want to 
accommodate their own spending needs. So, this liquidity mismatch subjects banks to runs 
which refer to situations when too many depositors try to withdraw (Freixas & Rochet, 
1999).28 On the other hand, the upside of banking fragility is liquidity generation which 
allows funds to flow to real investments, which, in turn, fuel economic growth (Diamond & 
Dybvig, 1983, 2000; Diamond, 2007). 
 The same mismatch in the operations of banks is reproduced by a new form of 
banking called the shadow banking system, or as Gorton and Metrick (2009) describe it, 
securitized banking. Much of the liquidity production by banks occurs today off the balance 
sheet in the form of loan commitments, credit lines securitization and syndicated lending 
rather than in the form of transaction deposits due to financial innovation (Strahan 2008; 
Gorton 2009).29 Although the functioning mechanism of this new form of banking will be 
discussed in the next section (Section 3.2), it is worth mentioning here in order to illustrate 
some of the implications of this system in terms of the liquidity concept. 
 First of all, there are several definitions of liquidity. The basic meaning refers to 
banking liquidity which is a bank’s ability to fulfil its obligation towards depositors to 
transform their deposits into money. This function also includes maintaining a balance 
between in-coming and out-going cash flows that come from the management of payments 
made through using bank money (Gualandri et al., 2009). In order to meet its liquidity 
shortages, a bank can depend on funding liquidity and market liquidity (Brunnermeier & 
Pederson, 2005). Funding liquidity is defined by the ease and ability with which a bank can 
obtain cash from financiers. Market liquidity on the other hand is the ability to raise money 
by trading assets for cash without discount. With the emergence of a shadow banking system, 
the strategy of off-balance sheet vehicles exposed banks to funding liquidity risk. If funding 
liquidity is high, then it is easy to raise cash on demand. However, even a small and 
unexpected shock can cause the liquidity in the interbank market to dry up suddenly 
(Brunnermeier, 2009). 
                                                 
28 Gorton and Metrick (2009) describe the current global crisis as a system-wide bank run. Normally, in a 
traditional banking system a bank run occurs by the withdrawal of transaction deposits whereas a shadow 
banking run occurs by the withdrawal of repurchase agreements (Gorton & Metrick, 2009).   
29 The new form of banking including the securitization process will be described in the second part of this 
chapter. 
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 A liquidity crisis is defined as the sudden disappearance of both funding liquidity and 
market liquidity, which has a destabilizing effect on financial stability and the real economy 
leading to a systemic crisis as evidenced by the 2007-2009 global financial crisis (Borio, 
2009). In fact, the crisis of 2007-2009 was characterized by a massive illiquidity in the 
markets (Tirole, 2010). Since banks stopped lending to each other, liquidity in the market 
dried up (Berger & Bouwmann, 2008). This absence of liquidity has forced banks to restrict 
lending to households and businesses, thereby fuelling a recession. 
 The financial crisis that began in the U.S. in 2007 spread to the rest of the world. It 
affected both financial systems and economic activity across the globe, including those of 
emerging markets. Especially in Russia, the drying-up of access to international capital 
markets hit some banks hard. There, the banking system was strongly influenced by the 
global financial crisis and experienced major bank failures. The disruption of lending caused 
the interbank liquidity crisis to transform into a more generalised liquidity crunch, where 
companies were forced to suspend investment projects due to a lack of financing. In addition, 
the depositors’ lack of confidence in the Russian banking sector led them to withdraw their 
deposits, which caused a bank run and the resulting financial crisis (Dorbec, 2010). In Russia, 
many banks were transferred to the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA), bailed out by the state, 
merged with other banks, or had their licenses revoked (see, Appendix C). The Russian 
government and the Central Bank implemented a number of measures to support the Russian 
banking sector with liquidity in order to mitigate the effects of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. 
On the other hand, in Turkey, no banks had been transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance 
Fund. There were no changes in the ownership of banks, no bank failures, no liquidation and 
thus no decrease in the number of banks. Besides, there was no dip in the profitability of 
banks (Uygur, 2010). 
2.3. Monitoring and Information Systems in Banks 
 In a lending relationship, asymmetric information on borrower exposes the lender to 
incentive problems, since the borrower has more information than the lender about the project 
for which he has been granted the loan (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1992). Asymmetric 
information between borrower and lender causes moral hazard and adverse selection which 
reduce the efficiency of resource allocation. Banks can solve this problem by acting as 
delegated monitors of borrowers on behalf of the lenders (Matthews & Thompson, 2008). 
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 Matthews and Thompson (2008) define monitoring as the collection of information 
about a firm, its investments and its behaviour before and after the loan application is made. 
Monitoring takes the form of screening loan applications in order to separate the risky 
applications from the good ones, investigating the borrower’s creditworthiness and 
monitoring the borrower’s adherence to the conditions of the agreement (Matthews & 
Thompson, 2008). The banks’ role in overcoming this problem of asymmetric information is 
described by Diamond (1984) as “delegated monitoring”. Processing private information 
about the borrower is costly for a lender. However, a bank that monitors learns the 
customers’ account and payment histories and whether they had any business problems at a 
lower cost than the ultimate lenders (the depositors). By acting as delegated monitors, banks 
reduce the risk of the borrower running a different project than the one agreed upon in the 
loan agreement.30 Besides, the routines designed for acquiring information about a customer 
can be used to process other customers. Hence, as a consequence of specialization banks are 
able to achieve economies of scale (Benston & Smith, 1975). 
2.4. Risk Management 
 Risk is inherent in the banking business because banks make profits by taking and 
managing risks. Risk management is the ability of a bank to isolate its returns against shocks 
which emerge out of the banks’ control.31 There are three major sources of risks that may 
affect banks’ stability through their impact on banks’ balance sheets: credit risk, liquidity risk 
and market risk. 
i. Credit Risk: The economic theory of asymmetric information provides a framework 
for understanding the importance of managing credit risk. Since there are differences 
in the information available to the participants in the market, markets might work 
imperfectly. Adverse selection is an asymmetric information problem in the financial 
markets which occurs when potentially bad credit risks are the ones who are most 
eager to obtain loans. Moral hazard is another asymmetric information problem in the 
loan markets. Once the borrower obtains the loan, the lender is subject to the risk of 
default, since the borrower might engage in risky activities that are undesirable from 
the lender’s perspective. 
                                                 
30Allen et al. (1991) show in their empirical work how banks can use information produced through deposit 
accounts in designing future credit contracts. 
31 Tirole, J. (2010): “Illiquidity and All Its Friends” BIS Working Paper No: 303. 
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 Evaluating credit risk and estimating the risk return of a bank loan are some of the 
major functions of a bank (Pyle, 1997). A borrower may default on the principal or 
the interest payments of the loan. Credit risk is the possibility of failure of the 
counterparties to meet their contractual obligations (Matthews & Thompson, 2008). 
This type of risk is influenced by several factors such as borrower default ratings, 
credit ratings, estimates of loss in case of default on individual assets, measures of 
portfolio size and whether the amount of loans made to borrowers constitutes a large 
proportion of the portfolio (Carey, 2000). Lax credit standards for borrowers and 
counterparties are one of the major causes of serious banking problems such as the 
recent global crisis where relaxed credit standards caused an expansion of lending to 
risky borrowers (e.g. subprime mortgages) (Dell’ Ariccia et al., 2008). Hence, the 
global crisis is also described as a credit crisis. Huge losses and numerous 
bankruptcies of subprime lenders showed that many financial institutions could not 
accurately assess the credit risk of borrowers. 
 There are several ways to minimize the credit risk that is reflected by the price of the 
loan in terms of its interest payment (the so-called risk premium). One way is putting 
credit limits on customers (Matthews & Thompson, 2008:210-212). Collateral 
requirements,32 effective screening of customers and information collections,33 
establishing long-term customer relationships,34 and loan commitments,35 are all tools 
used by banks for credit risk management (Mishkin, 2004:217-220). However, with 
the changing structure of banking, a market for the efficient transfer of credit risk has 
developed. Credit derivatives and collateralized debt obligations (CDO’s) were 
introduced to transfer credit risk. Credit derivatives allow the transfer of credit risk to 
another party without the sale of the loan. A CDO is a structured finance vehicle 
                                                 
32 Collateral is the property promised to the lender as a compensation if the borrower defaults. If the borrower 
defaults on a loan, the lender can sell the collateral and use the proceeds to make up for the losses on the loan. 
That way, the losses of the lender will be reduced if the loan is not paid back. 
33 When a bank provides a loan to a company, it collects information about the company’s profits and losses and 
its assets and liabilities, future plans and sales figures in order to evaluate the likely future success of the 
business. By effectively collecting and screening information from prospective borrowers, the bank is able to 
distinguish between bad credit risks and good ones. 
34 If a borrower has an account at a bank over a long period of time, a loan officer can learn much about the 
borrower by looking at his past activity on the accounts. The balances on these accounts reveal the borrower’s 
suppliers and also how liquid he is, and hence whether he is a good or bad credit risk. That way, the costs of 
monitoring long-term customers are lowered through their previous records of the loan payments. 
35 A loan commitment is the bank’s commitment for a specified time period to provide a firm with a specified 
amount of loans at an interest rate that is tied to the market interest rate. The advantage for the firm is that  it 
has a source of credit for when it is needed. The advantage for the bank is that this loan commitment provides a 
long-term relationship, making information collection easier for the bank and reducing the costs of screening 
and information collection.  
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which buys a portfolio of fixed income assets and finances the purchase of the 
portfolio by issuing different tranches of securities (with different degrees of seniority 
and therefore different risk exposure) in the capital markets. Each tranche offers a 
different degree of risk and return to meet the investors’ demand. In this way, the 
credit risk of a pool of assets is transferred from the originating bank to the investors 
(Fabozzi et al., 2007) 
ii. Liquidity Risk: The second type of risk is liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is basically the 
risk of not being able to immediately liquidate certain assets at current market prices 
(Berivas, 2006). When a bank funds its illiquid long-term assets with short-term liquid 
liabilities, it puts itself in a risky position. Hence, the bank might be unable to honour 
its liquid liabilities if faced with an unexpected and synchronized withdrawal of 
deposits by the customers. This uncertainty about the amount of deposit withdrawals 
increases especially when a bank is suspected of having solvency problems due to 
liquidity shortages or an adverse economic shock. Additionally, there is also some 
uncertainty on the asset side about the volume of new requests for loans, which might 
lead to the loss of profit opportunities. Furthermore, as recently experienced during 
the global crisis, off-balance sheet activities subject banks to liquidity risks due to 
their positions taken on derivative markets.  
iii. A last source of liquidity risk is the large volume of interbank payments. When a bank 
has concerns about a counterparty’s risk exposure, it will be reluctant to lend to other 
financial institutions. A temporary stop in the payment mechanism might negatively 
affect the interbank trust market. Therefore the failure of only one large participant 
can create a large distortion of the system in terms of liquidity shortage (Rochet, 
2008). If banks stop lending to each other, liquidity in the market dries up, forcing 
banks to restrict credit to households and businesses. This is also what happened in 
the global crisis. The failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008 created fear in the interbank 
market about the risk exposure of other banks. Following that, once the liquidity crisis 
became systemic, even institutions with little fundamental risk exposure found 
themselves at risk, such as the two major investment banks in the U.S.: Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley (Calomiris, 2008). 
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 Cash reserves and government securities (used as collateral for borrowing liquidity) 
are instruments of liquidity management for banks (Rochet, 2008).36 
iv. Market Risk: The third type of risk banks are exposed to is market risk, which is the 
possibility of loss due to changes in asset value caused by possible changes in interest 
rates, exchange rates and equity prices (Freixas & Rochet, 1999). Interest rate risk is 
the main factor of market risk. It is caused by the volatility of interest rates and the 
mismatch in the maturity of assets and liabilities. Banks have long-term assets and 
short-term liabilities on their balance sheets. If the interest rates increase, then the 
market value of their assets will decrease more than the market value of their 
liabilities due to the shorter maturity of liabilities. Unexpected changes in interest 
rates subject banks to interest rate risks, which means that a rise in interest rates will 
reduce the net market value of banks (Matthews & Thompson, 2008:211-213). 
 Banks are affected in terms of their net interest income, which is the difference 
between what banks obtain in interest receipts and what they pay in interest costs. In 
the 1980s, the U.S. savings and loan industry was exposed to a massive interest rate 
risk because they provided mortgage loans at fixed rates with a long maturity whereas 
most of their deposits were paying short-term variable interest rates. When the 
Federal Reserve increased the interest rates as a monetary tool to decrease inflation, 
banks had to pay their depositors higher interest rates while at the same time the 
interest income on loan assets remained fixed. Over a period of time, this mismatch in 
the interest rates between the two sides of the banks’ balance sheets resulted in huge 
losses for banks (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1999:93-95; Schooner & Taylor, 2010:178). 
 Interest rate risk was generally assumed to be a less important risk. Therefore, Basel 
I37 primarily focused on credit risk and classified the assets of banks according to 
their credit risk. However, focusing only on credit risk provides an imperfect measure 
                                                 
36 Under the assumption that the liquidity risk is policed by the market discipline, liquidity management was 
essentially unregulated before the crisis. But this is going to change with the overhaul of international banking 
regulation. The Basel Committee decided to establish a new set of standards, called Basel III, in response to the 
deficiencies in financial regulation that were revealed by the global crisis. This new set of measures not only 
strengthens capital adequacy ratios, but also introduces global liquidity requirements on banks. The Basel 
Accords and their evolution will be discussed in detail in Section 6.1.1 of this chapter. 
37 In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision under the auspices of the Bank for International 
Settlements imposed a set of requirements to account for the different credit risks of banks and also to establish 
the international harmonization of banking regulation. The first and second versions of these reform measures 
are called Basel I and Basel II, respectively. These reforms will be explained in detail in Section 6 of this 
chapter. 
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of a bank’s riskiness. To account for this discrepancy, the Basel II Accord included 
the measurement of a bank’s exposure to market risks (interest rate risk, exchange rate 
risk etc.) in the calculation of the regulatory capital that banks have to maintain 
(Dewatripont & Tirole, 1999:93-95).38 
 One of the sources of banking crises in emerging markets is the exchange  rate risk 
that occurs as a result of excessive currency mismatches. Due to their direct exposure to 
foreign exchange risk, when large devaluations occurred in the home country (weakening the 
ability of the banking sector to service foreign currency loans), banks were suddenly faced 
with huge credit risks (Hawkins & Mihaljek, 2001). In Turkey and  in Russia, the pre-crisis 
environments were suffering from huge exposures to foreign exchange rate risk and liquidity 
risk. 
3. Financial Innovation and the Changing Structure of Banking 
3.1. Institutional Setting of the Traditional Banking System 
 In traditional banking, banks simply provide the services of accepting deposits and 
making loans to individuals and small businesses. It is also called retail banking. Basically, 
the cash raised is lent out and these loans are held on balance sheets. Banks are required to 
hold a certain fraction of deposits in reserves at the central bank to promote bank liquidity. In 
cases of shortages, they can borrow from the central bank. Demand deposits are the main 
source of funds, and the interest rates on deposits can be raised to attract depositors when 
reserves are low. Demand deposits at banks are typically insured. Deposit insurance is an 
insurance mechanism designed by the government to pay depositors in the event of default 
(Gorton & Metrick, 2009). Under a deposit insurance system, depositors get their payments if 
the bank experiences a failure, in which case depositors are guaranteed to get at least the 
minimum insured amount of their deposits within a short time of the triggering event. The 
first formal national deposit insurance mechanism was introduced in the United States by the 
Federal Reserve in 1934 with the purpose of ending traditional bank runs. After the Post-War 
period and especially in the 1980s, many countries began to adopt this mechanism. In 1994, 
the European Union adopted deposit insurance as the standard for their banking system. 
                                                 
38 The Basel Accords and their evolutions will be discussed in detail in Section 6.1.1 of this chapter. 
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Although it was mostly used in high-income countries until the mid-1990s, since 1995 lower-
income countries also started to introduce deposit insurance to their banking systems.39 40 
 The goal of deposit insurance is to protect banking systems from traditional bank runs 
(which supports the stability of the system) as well as to protect small, uninformed depositors 
(Laeven et al., 2005). It also shields bank depositors from losses in case a bank is unable to 
meet its obligations when they come due. However, the desirability of the implementation of 
this mechanism is a controversial issue. On one hand, as Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue 
in their classic work, deposit insurance contributes to bank stability by preventing self-
fulfilling depositor runs since depositors would have little incentive to withdraw their funds if 
they know that their deposits are insured by the government. On the other hand, deposit 
insurance might have a negative effect on bank stability by encouraging risk-taking on the 
part of banks. In the existence of such an insurance mechanism, depositors are not 
disciplining banks by requiring higher interests for risk-taking, because they know that any 
possible failure will be backed up by the deposit insurance and ultimately by the government. 
Banks thus have the incentive to engage in riskier activities for higher returns (Detragiache & 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2002). This is known as the moral hazard problem in banking. 
 Before explaining the institutional setting of securitized banking, it would be useful to 
start with the basic differences between the two forms of banking systems. In securitized 
banking, repo haircuts play the role of reserves in traditional banking. A repo (= sale and 
repurchase agreement) is the sale of a security combined with an agreement to repurchase the 
same security at a specified price at the end of the contract. Effectively, a repo is a form of 
lending against the collateral being sold and repurchased. The “haircut” is a percentage that is 
deducted from the market value of the asset that is being used as collateral. The size of the 
haircut reflects the perceived risk associated with holding that asset. The repo haircut is the 
percentage difference between the market value of the pledged collateral (security) and the 
amount of funds the bank gets in exchange for that security. Repo haircuts force banks to 
limit their leverage when borrowing in repo markets. Although there are no official statistics 
on the size of the repo market worldwide, it is estimated to be around $12 trillion, which is 
                                                 
39 Laeven, Karacaovali, and Demirgüç-Kunt (2005) show that most countries provide deposit insurance. 
Furthermore, during the global crisis, there has been a surge in the number of countries such as Australia and 
New Zealand that are adopting deposit insurance for the first time while some other countries increased their 
insurance coverage (Laeven et al., 2005; Santos et al., 2010). 
40 In Turkey, a deposit insurance scheme was introduced in 1983. In Russia, it was introduced in 2003. 
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huge when compared to the total assets of the U.S. banking system - $10 trillion (Gorton & 
Metrick, 2009).41 
 Repo agreements have a special status under the U.S Bankruptcy Code. They are 
exempted from the automatic stay.42 According to the standard documentation, the non-
defaulting party to a repo agreement is allowed to unilaterally enforce the termination 
provisions of the agreement as a result of a bankruptcy filing by the other party and keep the 
cash or the bond (Gorton & Metrick, 2009).43 In securitized banking, creditors’ rights are 
protected by the collateral used in repo markets, while in traditional banking creditors’ rights 
are protected by deposit insurance. In traditional banking, the banks’ cost of funding is 
covered by the interest rate at which depositors are rewarded, which increases with the 
intensity of competition. A bank in need of cash can increase the deposit rates to attract 
depositors whereas in securitized banking this is analogous to repo rates. Lastly, as opposed 
to loans that are held on a balance sheet in traditional banking, loans in securitized banking 
are repackaged and sold as securitized bonds (Gorton & Metrick, 2009). Table 3 below 
summarizes these differences briefly. 
 According to Gorton (2010b), the two banking systems are intimately connected 
meaning that the traditional banking system wouldn’t be able to function without the 
securitization markets. Loans made to consumers and corporations correspond to the credit 
creation provided by the traditional banks. These traditional banks obtain the sources for 
lending to their customers by selling portfolios of loans as bonds to various securitization 
vehicles such as the collateralized debt obligations (CDO’s) which are in turn financed by the 
investors (Gorton, 2010b).44 
                                                 
41 For more on the size of the repo market, see Gorton & Metrick (2009; 2010). 
42 Automatic stay prevents creditors from seizing the assets of a firm in bankruptcy (Edwards & Morrison, 
2004). 
43 In fact, Gorton & Metrick (2010) argue that the evolution of a bankruptcy safe harbour for repo has been a 
key feature in the growth of shadow banking. 
44 For details on how traditional banking funding works via the securitized banking system, see Gorton (2010b). 
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Table 3: Traditional Banking vs. Securitized Banking  
TRADITIONAL BANKING vs. SECURITIZED BANKING 
Traditional Banking Securitized Banking 
Reserve Rates Repo Haircuts 
Deposit Insurance Collateral 
Interest rates on Deposits Repo Rates 
Loans are held on Balance Sheet Loans are packaged and sold = securitized 
Source: Gorton & Metrick, 2009 
3.2. Institutional Setting of Securitized (Shadow) Banking System 
 The Great Depression in the 1930s created a heavy-handed regulation environment 
for the banking sector characterized by deposit insurance, interest-rate regulations, entry 
restrictions, constraints on bank size and activities. The Banking Act of 1933 in the U.S. - 
also called the Glass-Steagall Act - banned banks from engaging in non-banking activities 
such as securities activities. This created a stable banking sector even though it was 
accompanied by a gradual decline in efficiency and innovation (Tirole et al., 2010). However, 
within time, the financial environment in which the regulatory environment continues to exist 
has changed due to globalization and technology. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a trend 
towards deregulation. Especially in the 1980s, traditional banking started to become 
unprofitable since the commercial banks were faced with competition from other less- 
regulated financial institutions such as money market mutual funds, hedge funds and 
investment banks. Hence, the banking system started to change. Markets began to play a 
much bigger role in the financial system and deregulation contributed to the innovation in the 
supply of new financial products. This process reached its peak in the United States with the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, which allowed commercial banks to enter into trading of 
securities and insurance businesses (Schooner & Taylor, 2010). Basically, by the end of 
1990s, a new model of banking emerged, based mainly on a European-style model of 
universal banking and the originate-to-distribute-model (OTD) rather than on the U.S. model 
of strict sectorial separation between investment banking and commercial banking.45 Adrian 
and Shin emphasize this transformation of banking as such: “The rapid move toward a 
                                                 
45 Some developed countries such as Germany and Japan have bank-dominated financial systems where firms 
rely primarily on bank loans as the source of funding for their operations. Other countries like the U.K. and the 
U.S. have a market-dominated system where firms rely on securities markets to fund their operations. 
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market-based financial system in recent years has accelerated the trend toward greater 
reliance on non-traditional, non-deposit based funding and toward greater use of the 
interbank market, the market for commercial paper, and asset-backed securities”. (Adrian & 
Shin, 2008). 
 This new model of banking can be characterized by three distinctive features. The 
first characteristic of this new form of banking is a greater reliance on wholesale money 
markets for funding. In the traditional model of banking, banks rely on deposits for funding 
which is considered a more stable form of funding. However, in the 1980s, with the 
emergence of money market mutual funds - a competitor to traditional bank deposits- banks 
started to fund themselves by borrowing funds from these funds. This wholesale funding 
provided banks with greater flexibility in borrowing because they could raise funds quickly 
and easily. In case of sudden deposit withdrawals, a bank could easily fund itself in the 
money market, thereby reducing its exposure to a liquidity risk (Taylor & Schooner, 2010). 
However, the stability of this funding is questionable since during the global crisis of 2007-
2009, banks that relied on wholesale funding became exposed to sudden losses of funding. 
Towards the end of 2007, when all banks tried to fund themselves from the markets to cope 
with their shortage in liquidity, they had difficulty accessing the funds they needed (funding 
liquidity risk) since the global interbank and other financial markets were frozen due to the 
fear of a system-wide bank run.46 
 Secondly, as the competition between commercial banks and investment banks for 
securities increased in the 1990s, a new mechanism called securitization was developed as a 
product of financial innovation. Whereas the wholesale markets changed the way in which 
banks manage their liabilities, securitization changed the way banks managed their assets 
(Taylor & Schooner, 2010). As mentioned before, traditional banking is the business of 
making and holding loans on the balance sheet while insured demand deposits are the main 
source of funds. However, as Gorton (2010b) argues, holding loans on the balance sheets is 
not profitable for banks. Securitization is the process of transforming existing or predictable 
cash flows emerging from a pool of assets into a tradable security. In the first place, the assets 
(or receivables) originated by the banks are pooled together and sold to a bankruptcy-remote 
                                                 
46 This was not a traditional run by the depositors, but rather a silent run by the wholesale investors who refused 
to roll over their lending positions. 
27 
 
Special-Purpose Vehicle (SPV).47 The SPV finances the purchase of these assets through the 
issuance of debt securities into capital markets. This pool of cash flows is tranched, meaning 
that securities with different seniorities are designed. These securities are called Asset-
Backed-Securities (ABS) because payment to the investors depends on the cash flows coming 
from the underlying assets. Credit card receivables, auto loans, student loans, leases and any 
other kind of receivables are included in this set of securitized assets (Fabozzi et al., 2006). 
 There are several motivations for banks to securitize part of their balance sheets. As 
Fabozzi et al. (2006:75-85) argue, the driving force behind securitization has been the need 
for banks to realize value from the assets that existed on their balance sheets. Banks use 
securitization to support asset growth. A bank can expand its loans faster through having 
access to the asset-backed securities (ABS) market than if it relied on traditional funding 
sources alone, since the market for ABS is large. If a bank were dependent on only a single or 
a few sources of funding, it can be risky if a market difficulty emerges. As a result, 
securitization would help banks to optimize their funding through having access to a mix of 
retail, interbank and wholesale resources where securities are accepted as collateral. 
 Another advantage of securitization is that, once the assets have been securitized, the 
credit risk exposure on these assets for the banks is reduced because the assets are sold to a 
SPV. By doing so, banks can also remove non-performing loans from their balance sheets, 
which would again decrease the credit risk exposure of the bank. Banks use securitization 
also to improve their balance sheet capital management since it provides regulatory capital 
relief. According to the Basel Rules, banks must hold a minimum capital level for their assets 
in relation to the risk amount of these assets. Since a SPV is not a bank, it is not subject to 
these rules. It only needs to hold the amount of capital that is economically required to 
support the assets it contains. Hence, the regulatory capital relief for banks is significantly 
reduced after securitization (Fabozzi et al., 2006:76-77). The regulatory capital relief 
provided by the securitization process helps the bank to improve its return-on-equity (ROE) 
since the amount of capital that has to be used to support the asset pool is reduced (Fabozzi et 
al., 2006:78). 
 Thirdly, in the traditional model of banking, banks originated loans and owned them 
until maturity (originate and hold). The loan is funded with deposits and the bank itself is 
                                                 
47 A SPV is a specialized legal entity created by a firm (also known as the originator or sponsor) by transferring 
assets to the SPV in order to accomplish some specific transactions. They have no other purpose and they don’t 
have any physical location. 
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responsible for any borrower default. However, in the securitization process, banks originate 
loans and then sell them to third party investors. This is called the originate-to distribute 
(OTD) model.48 
 The early episodes of banking panics were prevented by way of deposit insurance 
which brought considerable stability to the financial system. The deposit insurance system 
works well in traditional banking since it protects retail investors. However, it is not useful 
for large financial institutions because the protection provided by deposit insurance is limited. 
On the contrary, institutional investors want to deposit large amounts of money in a safe 
place for a short period of time rather than depositing them as demand deposits where their 
money will not be insured. This need for saving large amounts of money for a short period in 
a safe place by large firms, hedge funds and so forth led to the growth of the repo market. 
With the development of securitization (or securitized banking), sale and repurchase (repo) 
markets have developed where institutional investors can put their money. 
 A repo market is efficient in the sense that it provides the intermediation of funding 
where one side (= borrower/bank) needs to borrow money and the other side (lenders such as 
hedge funds, insurance companies etc.) wants to save money by depositing it somewhere 
safe, collateralized with bonds. Repo financing is a very liquid form of financing, and it 
doesn’t cause speculators to take advantage of the less-informed in the trade by having 
private information about the value of debt in comparison to an equity market. These features 
contributed to the increase in the demand for such debt, which in turn increased the demand 
for collateral in the repo market. This growing need for collateral led to the inclusion of 
securitized products for use in repo markets. Repos, like demand deposits, are also short-term 
and can be withdrawn at any time. However, contrary to insured deposits, repo markets are 
not insured and the resulting global crisis was a liquidity crisis caused by the run on the repo 
market. A traditional banking run happens by the withdrawal of demand deposits whereas a 
securitized banking run is driven by the withdrawal from repo agreements in the form of 
requesting higher haircuts and/or the termination of repo lending on some forms of collateral 
(Gorton & Metrick, 2009; Gorton, 2009). 
                                                 
48 Goodhart (2009) defines this model as the “originate and pretend to distribute” model. Vehicles such as 
SPV’s where banks were transferring their assets to, were in fact closely related to these banks either by legal 
commitment or by reputational risk. Hence, whenever financial conditions became worse causing a shortage in 
the funding for these vehicles, banks had to support them (Goodhart, 2009). 
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3.3. Banking in Emerging Markets 
 Banks are the dominant financial intermediaries in emerging markets (Caner et al., 
2007). Whereas the structure of banking in developed countries has changed dramatically, the 
traditional role of banks remained key in emerging markets. Considering the fact that 
financial markets in emerging countries are less developed and asymmetric information 
problems are more acute, the traditional function of banks is essential for these countries 
(Vives, 2006). 
 The banking systems in emerging markets were traditionally a highly protected 
industry, based on depository banking and pervasive restrictions on domestic and foreign 
entry. However, with the changing environment in global markets accompanied by the 
developments in technology, macroeconomic pressures and the banking crises in the 1990s 
have forced the banking sector and the regulators of emerging countries to change the old 
ways of doing business as well as deregulate the banking industry. With this financial 
liberalization, financial markets were opened up to foreign competition. As they became 
integrated into the global financial markets, their banking systems have been transformed by 
three major trends: privatisation of state-owned banks, mergers and consolidation and the 
entry of foreign banks on a large scale (Turner, 2006; Mihaljek & Hawkins, 2001). 
 The 1990’s were a highly volatile period in developing countries, characterized by 
successive banking crises. Goldstein and Turner (1996) identify the origins of these crises as 
the following: i) Macro-economic volatility, ii) lending booms, iii) increasing bank liabilities 
with large maturity mismatches, iv) inadequate preparation with financial liberalization, v) 
heavy government intervention and loose control on connected lending,49 and vi) a weak 
legal framework. The process of bank supervision was not being implemented properly and 
was lagging behind the pace of financial liberalization. The Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS)50 organized several meetings with the governors of developing countries 
starting in 1995 to focus on strengthening the banking systems and supervision in these 
countries. However, these attempts to establish more cautionary policies in bank lending 
proved inadequate. Accompanied by the persistent macroeconomic imbalances, the crisis in 
Thailand in 1997 set the stage for successive banking crises throughout emerging markets. 
                                                 
49 Connected lending refers to the loans provided to banks’ owners, managers and to their related businesses 
50 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is an international organization established in 1930 acting as the 
principal centre for international central bank cooperation. Its aim is to serve central banks in their pursuit of 
monetary and financial stability, to foster international cooperation in those areas and to act as a bank for central 
banks. (See: http://www.bis.org/) 
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This led to a contraction in bank intermediation, which lasted longer than expected. More 
importantly, this made bankers in these emerging market countries more risk-averse and 
caused them to tighten the supervisory oversight of the banking sector. Following these 
restructuring reforms, bank credit started to increase again in 2004. Furthermore, the 
international agreements on prudential regulation on banking supervisory regimes such as the 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision of 1997 published by the BIS and the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are 
intended not only for developed countries but also for emerging markets (Turner, 2006). 
  The reforms that had their roots in the late 1990s led to a significant overhaul of 
financial regulation in many emerging countries. Domestic financial markets have been 
further developed. Financial firms have become subject to market discipline and financial 
services and capital markets have become internationalized. This reform programme seems to 
have contributed to substantial structural strengthening of the banking system in emerging 
economies (BIS Monetary and Economic Department, August 2006). The financial crisis that 
began in the United States in 2007 and quickly spread to Europe has become a global crisis 
affecting the financial systems and economies across the world. Emerging market economies 
were also affected by this crisis. However, compared to their previous experiences in the 
1990s and early 2000s, they showed remarkable resilience with robust rates of growth as the 
crisis was developing in advanced countries (BIS Monetary and Economic Department, 
December 2010) (see Table 4). The effects of stress of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy have 
been limited in emerging markets, which started to recover immediately in the second-quarter 
of 2009, showing improving signs of stability whereas the U.S and the European markets 
were trapped by recession and declining rates of growth followed by a sovereign debt crisis 
(BIS Monetary and Economic Department, December 2010). 
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Table 4: GDP Growth Projections 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
Advanced Economies 0.8 -3.8 0.01 2.6 
U.S. 1.1 -2.8 -0.05 3.5 
EU 1.1 -4 -0.3 1.7 
Japan -0.6 -6.2 0.5 2.2 
Emerging Market Economies 5.2 0.01 3.2 5.7 
Emerging Asia 6.3 2.5 5 7.6 
Emerging Europe 4 -4.8 0.7 3.6 
Emerging Americas 4 -1.7 1.6 3.5 
Developing Asia 7.7 4.8 6.1 8.3 
China 9 6.5 7.5 10.2 
India 7.3 4.5 5.6 6.9 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (2009); Boorman (2009) 
 The resilience of real credit growth in emerging markets during the global crisis was 
closely related to prudential policies, measures and reforms implemented in the pre-crisis 
period (Montoro & Rojas-Suarez, 2012). The financial institutions in most emerging markets 
did not engage in the popular activities practised in advanced countries. Their balance sheets 
were not exposed to the ‘toxic assets’ that dominated the financial positions of major 
institutions in developed countries. Derivatives were used less frequently and were mostly 
limited to the traditional instruments that are employed to hedge trade risks (such as currency 
risk). However, due to financial channels that connect countries worldwide, many developing 
countries are connected to the world economy. Any slowdown or recession in advanced 
countries may adversely affect developing countries’ growth prospects. Besides, since crises 
are contagious, it is difficult to benefit from the opportunities of economic and financial 
integration without being exposed to the contagious effects of these integrations regarding 
trade (through declining demand for developing-country exports or a declining export 
process, including commodities), investment (as external finance contracts) and remittances 
(stemming from the recession in advanced economies) (World Bank Development Research 
Group, 2008). 
 Although the systemic weaknesses in the banking systems of emerging markets have 
been reduced compared to the 1990s, cautionary policies must be in place since the 
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macroeconomic environment is more unstable in developing countries compared to the rest of 
the world. Additionally, they suffer larger exogenous shocks than developed countries, 
possess weaker financial shock absorbers and their domestic policies often represent an 
additional source of volatility (World Bank Development Research Group, 2008). 
4. The Economic Rationale for Banking Regulation 
 In the legal and economic literature, the term regulation has varying definitions (den 
Hertog, 1999). In general terms, regulation is the employment of legal instruments for the 
achievement of policy objectives. These legal instruments are compulsory, publicly enforced 
and also backed by criminal and administrative sanctions (Pacces & Van den Bergh, 2012). 
Through these legal rules, governments can force individuals and institutions to adhere to 
certain regulations under penalty of sanctions such as fines, imprisonment or closing down 
the business (den Hertog, 1999). There are two approaches investigating the theory of 
economic regulation. The normative approach explains regulation in terms of its economic 
justification. It is based on the assumption that efficient regulation is desirable for the well-
being of a society. The other variant, the positive approach, discusses regulation based on its 
causes and effects, regardless of how it should be. Economic efficiency in providing resource 
allocation in society, including the costs of certain policies, is the normative criterion in 
analysing regulation (Pacces & Van den Bergh, 2012). Following this normative perspective 
of economic efficiency, regulation is justified due to the market failures which distort 
efficient resource allocation. 
4.1. Market Failure in Financial Markets 
 The theory of market failure forms the basis for understanding financial regulation. 
From the traditional perspective, the explanation of regulation is based on the welfare 
economics assumptions of neo-classic economic theory about the market system (Dragomir, 
2010:39). The central theorem of welfare economics asserts that under certain strong 
assumptions regarding technology, tastes and producers’ motivations, the equilibrium 
conditions of competitive markets will provide a Pareto-efficient (economically efficient) 
allocation of resources (Bator, 1958). If there are no missing markets (including negative 
externalities and public goods), if producers and consumers behave competitively, and if 
there are no information problems in the market, then the allocation of resources will be 
efficient (Ogus, 1994:23; Pacces & Van den Bergh, 2012). Market failure arises when the 
allocations achieved in markets are not efficient due to the lack of fulfilment of these 
33 
 
assumptions. According to contemporary economic theory, financial markets are inherently 
imperfect (Heremans & Pacces, 2012). The global crisis is a good example of the fact that 
financial markets are not always functioning well. Market failure in finance depends on the 
existence of negative externalities and information asymmetries between buyers and sellers. 
These two fundamental problems inherent in financial markets form the justification for 
financial regulation since they may result in the failure of a competitive market to produce a 
socially optimal outcome (Taylor & Schooner, 2010). Market failures may be overcome by 
the financial intermediaries or they may require government intervention. 
4.1.1. Asymmetric Information 
 Information problems refer to information asymmetries between buyers and sellers 
such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Any financial transaction in the market is prone 
to the asymmetric information problem. A financial contract starts with the transaction of 
money between the lender and borrower, followed by subsequent repayments. However, 
during this time interval, the borrower’s conditions might change in terms of his ability to 
make the repayments. In the meantime, the lender might not be able to access information 
about the risk being transacted and thereby evaluate the progress of these repayments 
(Dragomir, 2010:42). This would distort the functioning of the market in two ways. Firstly, 
due to incomplete information, the lender cannot distinguish between good borrowers and 
unreliable borrowers. The possible risk premium will increase the loan rate and adverse 
selection may occur where only risky projects would be funded (Heremans, 1999).51 
Secondly, a lender would be subject to moral hazard if the borrower has incentives to engage 
in risky activities after he receives the loan that is undesirable from the lender’s point of 
view. 
 The role of financial intermediaries, particularly banks, in alleviating these 
information problems reveals their important role in the economy with regard to their 
competitive advantage in collecting and communicating information about the 
creditworthiness of borrowers. However, although economic theory explains the underlying 
reason for banks’ existence as ameliorating these information problems in the market, the 
relationship of the bank itself with its customers is also subject to similar information 
problems. This problem might emerge from the depositors’ side since they don’t have 
                                                 
51 This problem of the possibility of making the wrong choice of business opportunities where the good ones are 
ignored refers to the lemon-market problem introduced by Akerlof in 1970. 
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information about a bank’s riskiness, which would affect the banks’ ability to get funding by 
attracting deposits. Before concluding a deposit contract, the depositor wouldn’t have enough 
information and understanding about the bank’s creditworthiness since the proper evaluation 
of a bank’s soundness requires sophisticated knowledge. The bank would best know its own 
risk characteristics, but not the depositor. In this case, the banks would be willing to risk 
offering high interest rates to attract depositors. In this case, adverse selection arises when the 
less risky banks find it difficult to attract funding from the depositors (Dragomir, 2010:42). 
 Moral hazard occurs after a transaction takes place because each party might choose 
to behave opportunistically to maximise its own utility, thus placing the other party in a 
vulnerable position. Due to the profitable and risky opportunities provided by financial 
innovation, banks most probably will engage in sophisticated risky policies after the contract 
takes place. Depositors and other creditors cannot identify the deterioration of the quality of 
their funds in case the bank has engaged in a risky investment, which subjects the bank to a 
credit risk. Besides, they won’t be able to distinguish between secure and risky banks. This 
will lead to a sub-optimal resource allocation in the economy (Baltensperger 1988:56 in 
Dragomir, 2010:43). This fact leads us to the other rationale for bank regulation, which is the 
need to represent small depositors by providing a safety net to protect them from the default 
risk of a bank (Freixas & Rochet 1999; Tirole & Dewatripont 1994). This argument is most 
famously formulated by Dewatripont & Tirole (1994) and Tirole et al. (2010) as the 
representation hypothesis. Due to the mere existence of the asymmetric information problems 
explained above, banks must be monitored. However, investors, depositors and other kinds of 
debt-holders do not have the sophisticated knowledge to be able to understand and evaluate 
the on- and off-balance sheet activities of banks. These activities are complex, time-
consuming and expensive, and depositors do not have access to the necessary information. 
Hence, people have little incentive to monitor banks regularly since most of the depositors 
hold only a small amount of deposit. These depositors and other debt-holders therefore 
should be represented by a prudential supervisor that would replicate the control and 
monitoring function depositors would do if they could fulfil all the requirements mentioned 
above (Santos, 2000; Koehn & Santomero, 1980).52 
                                                 
52 In addition to the asymmetric information problem between banks and their depositors, the other problem 
with depositors’ presentation considers the corporate governance framework. Separation of ownership from 
management creates conflict of interest problems. Conflicts of interest are likely to arise between a bank’s 
manager and its outside financiers, such as depositors. Managers may tend to choose risky projects which are 
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 Safety net mechanisms should protect depositors. Diamond-Dybvig (1983)53 show in 
their model that deposit insurance is the optimal policy to protect depositors since banks are 
prone to runs caused by a depositor’s self-fulfilling prophecy. The aim of this mechanism is 
to reassure depositors that in the face of a bank failure, they are guaranteed to receive back at 
least the minimum insured amount of their deposits, thus insuring that a negative event does 
not create a panic and turn into a bank run. However, this insurance exacerbates the moral 
hazard problem. Insurance exacerbates moral hazard because if the insured depositors know 
that the third party is going to pay the bill, they allow banks to incur greater losses. Knowing 
that the presence of a financial safety net is behind them in case of a failure, banks might tend 
to engage in riskier activities than they otherwise might do. 
  There is much cross-country evidence suggesting that the more generous deposit 
insurance amounts are, the more likely banking crises are (Detragiache et al., 2002). In a 
study of the determinants of banking crises by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), it is 
found that deposit insurance is positively correlated with the probability of a banking crisis. 
Another study conducted by the same authors in 2000 found again that this insurance scheme 
is detrimental to banking stability, especially when the coverage offered to depositors is 
extensive. Barth et al. (2006a) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) find that whereas 
deposit insurance contributes to depositors’ safety, it reduces market discipline by the bank 
creditors. Barth, et al. (2004) and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) investigate the 
relationship between deposit insurance and banking stability and find that deposit insurance is 
detrimental to bank stability. In their earlier study conducted in 1999, they also found that 
deposit insurance increases banking system fragility in countries with weak institutions. A 
substantial amount of literature in economic theory supports the idea that the deposit 
insurance mechanism may increase banking stability by preventing a depositor run, but at the 
same time it may decrease bank stability by encouraging banks’ risk-taking activities (moral 
hazard). Hence, to counteract these incentives caused by the existence of a financial safety 
net, governments introduce regulations to limit the moral hazard of banks. 
 To sum up, in the presence of these problems, regulation is needed firstly to the extent 
that banks cannot provide any solutions to information failures between borrowers and 
lenders. Secondly, although banks’ existence is explained as correcting the market failures 
                                                                                                                                                        
not in the best interest of risk-averse depositors. Since depositors are unable to monitor a bank’s management 
due to their limited knowledge, they need to be represented by a regulatory agency (Santos, 2000). 
53 Diamond, D.W., and P. H. Dybvig (1983): “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity” 
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caused by these information problems, their own operation mechanisms create information 
problems, which call for government regulation and the supervision of banks (Dragomir, 
2010:45; Heremans & Pacces, 2011). 
4.1.2. Negative Externalities 
 The second justification for financial regulation is the existence of negative 
externalities in financial markets. Negative externalities arise when the economic activity of 
some units generates cost to units for which the latter are not compensated (Schooner & 
Taylor, 2010). Banking is subject to systemic negative externalities. The nature of banks’ 
operations caused by the maturity mismatch in intermediating funds between lenders and 
borrowers in the market subject them to fragility. The failure of one bank might raise 
concerns about the solvency of other banks. Depositors and other creditors of that bank may 
not be able to differentiate between solvent and insolvent banks. A run on deposits on one 
bank can cause a run on otherwise solvent banks and hence endanger the overall stability of 
the financial system (Heremans & Bosquet, 2011). The owners of that failed bank put the 
owners of otherwise well-run banks under distress and impose costs on them. This externality 
produced through the mismanagement of the failed banks might cause runs on otherwise 
solvent banks. 
 One of the ways this contagion arises is through information channels. Gorton and 
Penacchi (1990) argue that banks create a special kind of debt. Its specialty relies on the fact 
that it is immune to adverse selection caused by inside traders. Demand deposits of banks 
belong to this category of informationally-insensitive debt, as defined by Gorton (2009). 
Since the deposits are insured by the deposit insurance mechanism, the value of deposits is 
not sensitive to information and not subject to adverse selection, so speculation on the value 
of these deposits is not profitable (Gorton, 2009). However, in the new form of banking, 
banks obtain their funds in the form of repos on the money-market, which, like demand 
deposits, are short-term. However, unlike demand deposits, repos are not insured. This makes 
securities used in repo transactions vulnerable to private information in the market. Since 
repos are not insured, any suspicion about the value of the underlying collateral will cause 
investors to withdraw from the market. Followed by that, the overall lending in the market 
will stop functioning, and banks won’t be able to refinance their short-term positions. 
 Brunnermeier et al. (2009) discuss that there have been two kinds of externalities that 
played a role in the global crisis. From a social welfare perspective, banks overexposed 
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themselves to risk by holding highly leveraged positions with excessive maturity-
mismatches. The first externality is called fire-sales externality. When banks cannot refinance 
their short-term positions, they have to sell their assets at fire-sale prices, meaning for less 
than the assets are worth. However, no bank takes into account the impact of its fire-sale on 
general asset prices. The losses of each bank worsen the funding liquidity for many other 
banks. Their balance sheets are adversely affected, which forces them to sell even more 
assets. This fire-sale of assets further depresses prices and increases losses. This loss spiral 
causes sharp fluctuations in asset prices, especially in times of crisis. This phenomenon was 
experienced in the global crisis (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). 
 The second externality is called the interconnectedness externality. If a bank fails, it 
does not care about how many others might also fail. The more globalized the financial 
system is, the more interconnected are the financial institutions. As a result, the failure of big 
and interconnected financial institutions in particular would spread these negative spill-over 
effects on others (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). A banking crisis causes a reduction in the 
money supply leading to a credit crunch for the real economy. Under conditions of 
uncertainty, investors hoard cash, which reduces the size of financial intermediation between 
savers and investors, causing a general slowdown in the economy (namely, a recession). The 
costs of the recession for society are, inter alia, reductions in consumption, investment and 
growth rate, as well an increase in the unemployment rate. 
4.2. Systemic Risk Factor 
 The events of the 2007-2009 global crisis have caused regulators to put the phrase 
“systemic risk” into focus. Governments and international organizations were prompted to 
address systemic risk by regulation. Arner (2009) defines systemic risk as follows: “The risk 
that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases 
in uncertainty about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough to 
quite probably have significant adverse effects on the economy. Systemic risk events can be 
sudden and unexpected, or the likelihood of their occurrence can build up through time in the 
absence of appropriate policy responses. The adverse real economic effects from systemic 
problems are generally seen as arising from disruptions to the payment system, to credit 
flows, and from the destruction of asset values” (Arner, 2009). 
 The failure of one bank can cause systemic disruption and negative externalities on 
others since doubts arising in the minds of depositors over the stability and soundness of 
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other banks might lead to a depositors’ run. If a large bank defaults, this will create 
uncertainty about the solvency of its counterparties leading to chaos in the system (Kashyap 
et al., 2008). Systemic risk also includes contagion risk (Dragomir, 2010:45). 
 There are three stages of how a systemic risk occurs. The first stage occurs when the 
failure of one bank triggers the failure of other banks during a banking panic. In that context, 
banks are different from non-financial firms where the failure of one firm would benefit 
another since it means one less competitor. In banking, firms are more intertwined and 
interconnected. The failure of one bank may create a domino effect since the counterparties 
of that failed bank would be put under distress if the bank does not meet its obligations to 
them. This chain would then develop throughout the financial system (Tirole et al., 2010). 
The default of one institution would lead to the default of a second institution which would in 
turn lead to the default of the third one, and so on. At the second stage, through the contagion 
effect, banks’ depositors would conclude from one bank’s failure that other banks might also 
fail since depositors are unable to distinguish between solvent and insolvent banks.54 55 
Hence, depositors would withdraw their funds from that bank and cause a run on funding. At 
the final stage, this contagion effect would lead to the fire sales of assets since the bank has to 
meet the withdrawals. 
 This chain (contagion) effect would distort interbank trust relationships so that the 
banks would stop lending to each other. In order to obtain liquid funds, a failed bank has to 
sell its assets even if that sale would depress the prices of these assets (fire sale). If there are 
too many assets that need to be sold, then the seller has to accept a lower price. This decline 
in asset prices would affect the solvency of all institutions that hold such assets.56 
Consequently, in a scenario where the bank cannot meet its obligations and where there are 
no other agents who would buy those banks’ assets to recapitalize the bank, the bank 
                                                 
54 In early 2008, the nationalization of Northern Rock - a medium sized bank for residential mortgage loans-, 
focused attention on British mortgage markets, which distressed other British banks. Another example is the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the U.S. followed by the crisis of the large insurance company AIG, the fire-
sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan Chase, the failure of Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Washington 
Mutual and Wachovia. 
55 The same logic applies to wholesale lenders as happened in the global crisis. The 2010 European Sovereign 
debt crisis is another example of the systemic risk inherent in the interconnected and globalized financial world. 
In 2010, the sovereign debt crisis of Greece spread to other European countries such as Ireland, Spain, Portugal, 
Iceland, Slovenia, Belgium, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  
56 For a detailed analysis of the nature of systemic risk, see: CEPR Report 2009: “The Fundamental Principles of 
Financial Regulation” pp.13-23.; and its role on the 2008 Crisis see: Hellwig (2008): “Systemic Risk in the 
Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis”. 
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becomes insolvent. Important segments of financial market stop functioning, which has 
significant effects on the real economy (Gorton, 2010a).57 
 Another form of safety net mechanism is provided by the government as a Lender of 
Last Resort, which also leads to a moral hazard problem like deposit insurance. This might 
take the form of liquidity injections to problematic banks by the central banks. The extent of 
providing unsubsidized support to illiquid but solvent banks by the central banks (as the 
Lender of Last Resort) might have an impact on market discipline. Central banks can abuse 
their power by providing open-ended support to banks in difficulties (Barth et al., 2006a:57). 
Therefore, although this mechanism aims to overcome the systemic externalities described 
above, it induces risk-preferring behaviour by banks. This would then endanger the welfare 
of society since the scarce funds available for investment might be allocated into socially 
unproductive projects (Taylor & Schooner, 2010). Being confident in an implicit insurance 
provided by the central bank and ultimately the government, banks will be encouraged to 
invest in risky projects. This provides another rationale for bank regulation. Furthermore, the 
potential prospect of a government bail-out especially makes the institutions that are deemed 
to be “too-big-to fail” and “too-interconnected-to fail” more prone to taking excessive risk. 
Calomiris (2009) argues that this became very apparent in the behaviour of large investment 
banks in the U.S. during 2008. After the rescue of Bear Stearns by the U.S. Government, 
other investment banks such as Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Goldman Sachs did 
little to raise capital and improve their position. However, when the anticipated bailout of 
Lehman Brothers by the government did not materialize, those investment banks were either 
acquired or merged, or they transformed themselves into commercial bank holding 
companies to gain access to government support. 
4.3. Financial Stability 
 The problems inherent in financial markets due to the information problems and 
negative externalities explained above reveals the fragility of the financial system. These 
problems have a detrimental effect on the social welfare of society, caused by the potentially 
inefficient resource allocation of financial resources in the economy. In the general theory of 
economic regulation, the goal of regulation is to protect consumers against market 
imperfections. In banking, this refers to the protection of depositors and other savers whose 
interest and well-being is threatened by banks’ excessive risk-taking activities. In banking 
                                                 
57 For more on the costs of banking crises, see Rogoff & Reinhart (2009) and Hoggarth, Reis & Saporta (2001) 
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regulation, protecting depositors means preventing banks from engaging in unacceptably high 
risks (Heremans & Pacces, 2011). Overall, the big picture of this story of market failure and 
its consequences on society implies that prudential banking regulation and supervision 
mainly target banks’ excessive risk-taking because excessive risk-taking is the ultimate 
source of instability. 
 Stability is the main concern of the financial sector. It can be defined as the condition 
in which the financial system – comprising financial intermediaries, markets and market 
infrastructure – is capable of withstanding shocks and the unravelling of financial 
imbalances, thereby mitigating the likelihood of disruptions in the financial intermediation 
process severe enough to significantly impair the allocation of savings to profitable 
investment opportunities (ECB, 2007). Goodhart (2006) defines a financial crisis as the 
sequence of events that would distort credit intermediation and capital allocation. Referring 
to this definition, he describes financial stability as the absence of financial crises. 
  Financial crises have been an intrinsic feature of the financial sector for hundreds of 
years. Usually, there is the existence of an asset price bubble accompanied by a credit boom 
and large capital inflows to the economy. However, the extent of their impacts on a country 
depends on that country’s financial sector exposure to those conditions (Acharya et al., 2011). 
Emerging markets have been blamed for crisis episodes most of the time due to their 
macroeconomic imbalances, lending booms, exchange rate regimes, destabilizing external 
factors, inadequate prudential supervision, and weaknesses in their legal and institutional 
frameworks (Eichengreen & Arteta, 2000). Goldstein and Turner (1996) argue that the 
banking crises in developing countries have been far more severe than the ones experienced 
in developed countries. However, the global crisis of 2007-2009 showed that not only 
emerging markets but also developed and sophisticated financial markets are exposed to 
financial crises (Pacces & Van den Bergh, 2012). 
 This global crisis showed also that, other than macroeconomic imbalances, financial 
innovation might also have a role in the emergence of a financial crisis. In fact, Vives (2006) 
argues that liberalization, financial innovation and the integration of financial markets have 
been associated with increasing banking crises. As banks enter new and riskier segments of 
financial markets owing to the opportunities provided by globalization and innovation, they 
would increase their risk appetite in the quest for more profit (Hoenig, 1998). 
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 Regulation should address the above  problems of asymmetric information and 
negative externalities by providing the banking and financial systems with stability to avoid 
the negative effects associated with failing institutions and systemic crises (Vives, 2006). 
Consumers should be protected against market imperfections. Other aims of banking 
regulation and supervision should therefore be to protect the interests of depositors by 
preventing banks from engaging in excessively risky activities. Financial regulation addresses 
market failures through the conduct of business rules in financial markets and through 
prudential regulation of the safety and soundness of financial intermediaries, mainly banks. 
Although regulation refers to the process of rulemaking, monitoring and sanctioning the 
application of these rules is also important to achieve the prudential objectives of ensuring the 
soundness of individual financial institutions as well as the stability of the whole financial 
system (Hereman & Bosquet, 2011). 
 To summarize, other than macroeconomic failures, financial instability increasingly 
arises from banks’ excessive risk-taking activities because of moral hazard. The banking 
system suffers from market failures stemming from asymmetric information and negative 
externalities. However, the regulatory safety net mechanism designed to cope with these 
market failures gives rise to the problem of moral hazard by encouraging banks to take on 
greater risks than they otherwise would do. These risky activities expose banks to runs and 
contagion, which endanger the stability of the financial system as a whole. Besides, the losses 
of these bank failures are ultimately borne by the taxpayers, causing a reduction in the well-
being of the society. Hence, the major goal of banking regulation and supervision is to 
prevent banks from engaging in unacceptably high risky activities so that the consumers (= 
depositors and other savers) are protected from market failures. 
 Having these theoretical foundations in mind, Chapter II will carry out an empirical 
investigation of which regulations had an impact on Turkish and Russian banks’ performance 
in their post-crisis period. The regulatory variables that turn out be significant in this 
empirical analysis will be discussed in depth in Chapter III. 
5. Approaches to Bank Regulation 
 So far, I have identified the sources of financial instability and the market failures 
inherent in the banking sector. These problems explain the economic rationale of banking 
regulation and show the need for correction by way of public intervention. This section 
explains two conceptual foundations for bank regulation in terms of the role of government in 
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correcting them. The first theory is called the public interest view according to which 
government regulation is the instrument for overcoming market failures. The second one is 
referred to as the private interest view which basically assumes that regulation will end up 
serving the benefits of certain interest groups such as regulators, financial lobbies or bankers. 
5.1. Public Interest View 
 According to the public interest view, governments regulate banks for the benefit and 
protection of the society at large (Domas, 2003). The aim is to provide socially efficient 
resource allocation to a society by correcting market failures (Barth et al., 2006a). In this 
context, the government’s active role is related to the existence of market failures. According 
to the Coase Theorem (1960), in a world with zero transaction costs and well-defined 
property rights, market failures would be self-correcting and the efficient outcome would be 
achieved. In this case, government regulation of banks might have negative effects on 
society’s welfare. However, the nature of the financial system reveals that markets are prone 
to failures because of substantial transaction costs. Hence, the government may have the 
ability to correct these market failures such as the disadvantages of imperfect competition, 
unbalanced market operation, missing markets and undesirable market results (den Hertog, 
1999). A government with the social efficiency objective is able to overcome these failures, 
thereby protecting society through regulation (La Porta et al., 2002). Following these 
arguments, the role of government in banking regulation is justified mainly by the existence 
of market failures, which the government has the incentives and capabilities to correct. State 
intervention is necessary to reduce consumers’ exposure to the risk of bank failure and 
insolvency (Dragomir, 2010:49). 
 The consultative document “Microfinance Activities and the Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision” of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued on 
7th May 2010 is based on the public interest view approach highlighting the importance of a 
powerful supervisory and regulatory agency (Barth et al., 2006a). These recommendations 
are based on three assumptions: there are market imperfections in financial markets, bank 
supervisors are able to solve these imperfections and their benevolent incentives aim at 
improving the operation of banks (Barth et al., 2006a). Central banks, which in some 
countries act as the bank regulator and supervisor and, in some cases are a separate and 
independent regulatory agency, exercise the authority given to them by law over banks by 
subjecting them to certain rules and regulations. This theory, applied to banking, justifies 
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official supervision of banks, limits on bank activities, restrictions on bank entry and deposit 
insurance mechanisms as appropriate policies that help to ameliorate market failures and 
enhance resource allocation (Barth et al., 2001a). Since it takes market failures as given and 
asserts that the government can correct them, it assumes that stronger and stricter official 
supervision improves bank stability and performance (Barth et al., 2006a). 
 Applied to market failures, the public interest theory seems to justify the existence of 
safety net mechanisms (Dragomir, 2010:49). However, both forms of state intervention in 
terms of “Lender of Last Resort” and “Too-Big-To-Fail”58 suffer from moral hazard problem. 
Like all other forms of insurance, these two mechanisms imply that the bank is not allowed to 
fail and thus all of its creditors are fully protected.59 In fact, Boyd et al. (2009) argue that the 
global crisis was largely due to the wrong incentives created by the U.S. government’s 
reluctance to allow large financial institutions to fail. The unwanted incentive effect of moral 
hazard in banking is inducing risk-preferring behaviour. Banks will be profitable on average 
but also vulnerable to suffering from bad luck and large losses due to their desire to take on 
higher risks and earn more money. Boyd et al. (2009) claim that this is exactly what 
happened to the banks in the U.S. during the global crisis. By studying the performance of a 
sample of Too-Big-To-Fail firms over the last 23 years, they find that this group of banks 
grew much more rapidly than the rest of the industry and experienced high profits. This, 
however, was followed by great difficulties. 
5.2. Private Interest View  
 Although the externalities discussed in the previous section require government 
intervention to be in the form of regulations, the benefits of government intervention must be 
balanced against the costs since the process of regulation may impose substantial costs on the 
economy. More importantly, it is possible that the regulation will fail to promote socially 
desirable results and instead serve the special interests of certain groups. This underpins 
much of the analysis of regulation introduced by George Stigler in 1971 (further developed 
by Posner & Peltzman) called “the Private interest theory of regulation”. Stigler’s theory is 
also known as “Capture Theory”. According to Stigler, regulators are subject to pressure 
from regulated industries to modify regulations to suit their interests. He writes: “Regulation 
is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit,” where he 
                                                 
58 The failure of a very large bank increases the possibility that a major financial disruption will occur. Hence, 
bank regulators are reluctant to allow a big bank to fail and cause losses to its depositors (Mishkin, 2004:263). 
59 See previous section. 
44 
 
regards regulation as socially inefficient compared to public interest theory (Stigler, 1971:3). 
Whereas the public interest theory of regulation supports the role of government and strict 
supervisory authority to correct market failures, the private interest view rather highlights 
political failures based on the desire of politicians and government supervisors to maximize 
their own welfare instead of society’s welfare. Governments would regulate banks only to 
serve the financing needs of government, or provide credit to interest groups (den Hertog, 
1999; Barth et al., 2006a). Regulatory capture is defined as the possibility that the regulated 
institutions exercise influence on the regulator (Hardy, 2006). Within time, regulation would 
end up serving the interests of the industry involved since a captured regulator would act in 
the interests of the regulatees (den Hertog, 1999; Hardy, 2006). 
 According to this approach, regulators have discretionary power in shaping banking 
policies where their private interests will dominate the public interest. Governments intervene 
in financial markets by subsidizing or guaranteeing lending for specific sectors of the 
economy. Some government-sponsored banks provide home mortgages to borrowers or give 
cheap credits to particular sectors of the industry. In doing this, governments influence the 
choice of projects to be financed. However, this influence might lead to unsound borrowing 
or lending policies endangering financial stability. This was experienced in the U.S. as the 
subprime mortgage crisis, the first stage of the global crisis (Heremans & Pacces, 2012). 
 Barth et al. (2006a) argue that politicians might also use banks through supervisory 
agencies for connected lending. If a bank supervisory agency can influence the banks` 
decisions, the government supervisors may put banks under pressure to provide credit to 
satisfy their own needs. At the same time, some powerful banks will induce regulators to act 
for the benefit of these banks’ interests. In the end, these kinds of political failures (rather 
than market failures) will distort the efficiency of banks by causing connected lending and 
corruption. These two phenomena of connected-lending and corruption are two of the 
potential dangers, especially for banks in emerging economies. Politicians in these countries 
have a tendency to use banks either for easy financing of government or are directing credit 
to preferred ends such as their own political supporters (Barth et al., 2006a:41).60 
 Dragomir (2010:50) argues that in banking, it is possible that a group of banks will 
influence the outcome of regulation rather than the larger mass of small depositors. She 
                                                 
60 Connected-lending was a long-standing problem in the banking histories of both Russia and Turkey, both of 
which will be discussed in Chapter III. 
45 
 
points out the national options and discretions in the E.U. legislation reflect the fact that 
interests within a pluralistic banking market might not be aligned. Different groups might try 
to impose their views on the whole market such as national discretions in the EU legislation. 
This argument is supported by Hellwig (2010), who argues that the amendments made to the 
Basel capital accords61 in the first half of the nineties are the result of a regulatory capture 
process. In 1993, when the Basel Committee proposed a procedure to include market risks on 
the calculation of banks’ capital requirements through a standard approach, large and 
internationally active banks opposed this approach. As a result of the intense lobbying by 
these prominent banking institutions, regulators allowed these banks to use their own 
quantitative risk models with “the 1996 Amendment to the Basel Capital Accord to 
Incorporate Market Risks” rather than the standard approach for determining regulatory 
capital requirements (Hellwig, 2010).62 
  In the late 1990s Turkey suffered from a politicised regulatory structure and 
pervasive connected-lending practices, which played a role in the failure of banks during the 
2000/2001 twin crises. One of the key changes in the regulatory system of the Turkish 
banking sector implemented after these twin crises was the introduction of new regulations 
which restricted this practice and at the same time increased the transparency of the practices 
that may result in connected-lending (Steinherr et al., 2004). Practices of connected lending 
and corruption have been a major problem for the Russian banking over a decade as well. 
However, Russia lacks legislation on connected-lending, which is still a pervasive practice in 
Russian banking (IMF, 2011c). 
                                                 
61 Basel Capital Accords refer to the set of rules formulated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
These rules aim to improve the stability of the international banking system and prevent possible distortions 
arising from competition among countries. 
62 Tirole et al., (2010), and Hardy (2006) argue that Basel II offers an arena of regulatory capture, too. The 
discussions on the design of these capital accords have been organized around consultations with banks. The 
complexity of these rules introduces a significant scope for discretion by supervisors. Furthermore, these 
consultations require banks and supervisors to be close contact. Hardy (2006) claims that since the supervisors 
are willing to work in regulated industries due to the high amount of salaries offered, they may be reluctant to 
antagonize bank management. Followed by that, they might rather choose to formulate regulations that are 
advantageous to its banks. Dragomir (2010) adds that the cases of crisis resolution processes of bail-outs and 
liquidity injections are another illustration of capture theory in banking. Referring to the global crisis, Kane 
(2009) suggests that the basis of the defects created by the incentive structure implied by the safety net is the 
corruption of supervisory incentives of poorly monitored safety-net subsidies in the U.S. By demonstrating the 
ratio of lobbying expenses for 2008 by selected large firms that received government help, he shows that during 
the initial stages of the crisis, financial institutions gained extraordinary benefits by trying to advise the federal 
officials on how to avoid crisis pressures. 
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6. Structure of Banking Regulation 
 The stability of the financial system and the protection of consumers are the main 
objectives of banking regulation. Following Heremans and Pacces (2011), regulations can be 
categorized into two groups. The first group refers to protective measures, which include the 
safety net mechanisms of lender of last resort, deposit insurance, liquidity injections and 
public bail-outs, discussed in detail in the previous section. These types of interventions focus 
on remedies to be implemented after a bank failure or crisis has occurred. The second group 
refers to preventive measures where the supervisory authorities aim to control the amount of 
risk assumed by the banks and reduce the probability of illiquidity and insolvency. Preventive 
measures set the framework ex-ante to prevent bank failures or crises from occurring. This 
can be implemented firstly by prudential regulation. By pursuing two objectives of financial 
stability and depositor protection, prudential regulation is designed to ensure the soundness 
and safety of the financial system (Dragomir, 2010). It is based on two rationales. The 
existence of information asymmetries between banks and their customers, and the moral 
hazard problem inherent in the safety net mechanisms underpin the micro- prudential 
rationale. The objective is to provide depositor protection and confidence by keeping the risk-
taking behaviour of banks at reasonable levels so that it is ensured that the bank will meet its 
obligations to its customers. The macro-prudential rationale is laid down by the systemic risk 
concerns that may arise through spill-over effects and endanger the whole financial system 
(Allan & Herring, 2001; Dragomir, 2010:42-48). 
 The second category of preventive measures is aimed at the structural limitations of 
competition and market forces, called structural regulation (Heremans & Pacces, 2011). It 
was mainly after the Great Depression that unrestricted competition was seen as a major 
threat to financial stability. Keeley (1990) argues that increased competition may reduce the 
charter value of a bank (which is defined as the bank’s self-imposed risk discipline 
mechanism). It may reduce its incentives to behave prudently because the risk-taking 
incentives of a bank depend on its charter value (Gonzalez, 2005). Following this argument, 
it was considered necessary to introduce structural restrictions on the scope of permissible 
activities that banks could perform in order to limit competition and restrict the operation of 
market forces. 
 All these categories of regulations are designed to protect the financial stability and 
depositor protection. Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) argue that banking regulations are 
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complements to each other. This reveals the way in which they are interconnected. Protective 
measures alone are not enough to ensure stability and depositor protection since they suffer 
from the moral hazard problem by inducing risk-preferring behaviour. The global crisis 
revealed that banks engaged in transactions with unacceptably high risk levels. Hence, in 
order to maintain financial stability, ex-ante measures of preventing risk-taking behaviours 
should be also in place. 
6.1. Prudential Regulation  
6.1.1. Capital Adequacy Requirements (CAR) 
 One of the central instruments of prudential regulation is the capital adequacy 
requirement. Banks finance their operations with a mixture of debt and equity. Deposits, 
borrowings due to other banks and bonds issued by the bank in the capital markets constitute 
a bank’s debt. Equity is the difference between a bank’s assets (such as loans and other 
investments) and its liabilities. Basically, a bank’s equity is its own capital and it serves two 
important functions. The first function of capital is the buffer effect. Bank capital helps to 
prevent bank failures when the bank cannot meet its obligations to its depositors and other 
creditors (Freixas & Rochet, 1999). If a bank’s assets lose value, this will lead to a 
corresponding decline in its capital. 
 An undercapitalized banking sector may experience serious defaults during times of 
adverse economic shocks. Equity capital works as a buffer protecting the depositors from the 
risk of asset returns. Hence, increasing equity would improve depositor protection (Blum & 
Hellwig, 1995). Bigger losses would cause a bank’s capital to be wiped out, making the bank 
insolvent. Hence, if banks want to be able to absorb losses and meet the obligations of their 
creditors, they need to have an adequate capital amount (Taylor & Schooner, 2010). 
Basically, having excess capital serves as an insurance against the costs that can occur due to 
unexpected loan losses and difficulties in raising new capital (Lindquist, 2003). Additionally, 
a poorly capitalized bank is subject to lose its market confidence and reputation. Holding a 
substantial buffer of additional capital as financial slack would help banks to borrow 
additional funds quickly and cheaply in the event of unexpected profitable investment 
opportunities (Berger et al., 1995). 
 The second and more important effect of capital regulations is the incentive effect 
where the capital should give banks incentives for reducing risky activities that otherwise 
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would end up burdening creditors or the taxpayer (Hellwig, 2010; Heremans & Bosquet, 
2011).63 Banks are subject to agency problems in raising external finance due to incentive 
problems between shareholders and creditors. Banks are highly leveraged64 firms. 
Shareholders’ return-on-equity (ROE)65 increases with leverage, giving banks incentives to 
increase leverage. The imposition of capital requirements is necessary to limit the leverage 
ratios of banks. However, reducing leverage is costly to shareholders because it would 
transfer the value from them to debt-holders, creditors and taxpayers. Share prices decline 
through this value transfer, caused by the reduction in leverage (Admati et al., 2012). Hence, 
shareholders have an incentive to motivate the bank into risky activities since they earn all 
the upside potential and are subject only to a limited loss. The high leverage of banks allows 
for risk-shifting from shareholders to debt-holders. However, high leverage is a source of 
systemic risk as it may encourage banks toward excessive risk-taking.66 As explained before, 
excessive risk-taking is dangerous for financial stability and may lead to systemic failures. 
When a bank is highly leveraged, even a small decrease in its assets’ value can create panic in 
the market and massive insolvency via contagion. 
 Even if a bank is not insolvent, any suspicion of its exposure would stop other banks 
from providing the funding it needs. The fear of contagion mechanisms or any suspicion 
about a bank’s insolvency exacerbates the losses of leveraged institutions by collectively 
inducing more forced sales than necessary to absorb an initially small shock which further 
depresses the values of banks’ assets. Due to the interconnectedness of the financial system, 
this can create negative spill-overs throughout the whole financial system, causing the market 
to freeze and leading to huge losses for the rest of the economy (Admati et al., 2011; 
Heremans & Pacces, 2011). This is also what happened in the global crisis. Banks and their 
special purpose vehicles (SPV) were highly leveraged in securitized transactions. When these 
securities became illiquid and lost value, banks became insolvent. This led to a contagion in 
the whole system. However, if these banks had been better capitalized, there would have been 
less risk of this kind of systemic failure (Admati et al., 2011). 
 Increased equity requirements would also have positive effects on the lending 
decisions of banks. Less-leveraged banks would have fewer incentives to provide too many 
                                                 
63 The incentive of shareholders to resist the reduction in leverage is explained in detail in Admati et al. (2012). 
64 Leverage (= assets/equity) increases the expected rate of return on the equity because leveraged investments 
are riskier than unleveraged ones. 
65 Return on Equity (ROE) is a basic measure of bank profitability. It is the net profit after taxes per dollar of the 
equity capital.  
66 The effects of leverage on the risk-taking behaviour of banks are analysed in detail in Admati et al. (2012). 
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risky loans and better-capitalized banks would make better lending decisions. Shareholders 
would only have incentives to monitor the financial soundness of banks that are well-
capitalized because shareholders themselves are subject to losing their equities in the case of 
a failure. Hence, less leverage caused by higher equity requirements would reduce the 
conflicts of interest. Admati et al. (2011) add other benefits of imposing higher capital 
requirements. One of them refers to corrective measures after the failures. When the bank 
loses capital due to losses, it either has to recapitalize or deleverage by selling assets. 
Deleveraging might put the market under pressure as explained in the above paragraph. The 
extent of this process depends on the equity of the bank. The higher the equity of banks, the 
lower would be the possibilities of chain reactions caused by systemic failures. Concerning 
the social costs in terms of reducing the burden on taxpayers, equity cushions established by 
higher equity requirements would be able to absorb substantial losses in asset values without 
prompting a systemic default. This would reduce the probability of a bailout in the first place. 
Even if the bailout were inevitable, again the equity cushion would be able to absorb a large 
part of the losses so that the amount of support demanded from the government would be 
lower (Admati et al., 2011). 
 After the financial crisis of 2007-2009, capital regulation became more important for 
regulators. As financial innovation, globalization of capital markets and developments in 
technology changed the structure of the banking sector; the focus of banking regulation has 
also changed from interest rates or asset diversification rules to capital regulation (Hellwig, 
2010). Bank capital requirements can take different forms. A traditional one is the leverage 
ratio (gearing ratio) which is calculated as a fixed percentage of the assets. It aims to limit the 
leverage ratio by imposing an upper limit to a bank’s debt to equity ratio. 
 However, the simplicity of this ratio causes some limitations on the overall risk 
profile of a bank. Since it ignores the risk level of a bank’s assets by considering only the 
leverage component of a bank’s risk profile, it ends up imposing a capital requirement that is 
too high for safe assets and too low for very risky assets (Koehn & Santomero, 1980). Banks 
will tend to shift to riskier assets due to their lower costs in terms of required capital. Besides, 
high-risk assets provide higher profits for banks. So, the overall effect of a leverage ratio on a 
bank’s balance sheet is not clear. It reduces the probability of a failure by imposing a greater 
amount of capital as a buffer, but it also induces more risk-taking from banks. 
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 Due to banking problems in the 1980s in the U.S., regulators became concerned about 
the amount of risky assets and off-balance sheet activities of banks. In order to account for 
the risk profile of banks’ assets in determining the required level of capital, banks have been 
made subject to risk-based capital requirements. In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision,67 under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), imposed 
minimum capital requirements to account for the different credit risks of banks and also to 
establish the international harmonization of banking regulation. This regulatory instrument is 
called the risk-weighted capital requirements. 
 With the emphasis on incorporating risk-adjusted assets to the measurement of 
capital, banks were required to hold at least 8% of capital against their risk-weighted assets. 
The objective of the first 1988 Basel Capital Accords (known as Basel I) was first to 
strengthen the stability of the international banking system by encouraging banks to increase 
their capital positions and secondly, to eliminate competitive inequalities by providing a 
standard approach applicable to internationally active banks in different countries and to 
provide an adequate amount of capital for credit risks. The Basel Accords define capital as 
follows (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994):68 
1. Tier 1 capital or core capital (equity tier one ratio): This includes stock issues and 
disclosed reserves without any limit. Stock issues include common stock and 
noncumulative perpetual preferred stock, which must be paid before any dividend 
distribution. Disclosed reserves are retained earnings, share premiums and other 
surplus.69 
                                                 
67 The Basel Committee was founded as the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices at 
the end of 1974 after several serious disturbances in the international banking markets. The committee members 
are the senior officials of central banks and supervisory agencies (the authority with formal responsibility for the 
prudential supervision of banking business not involving the central bank) of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. The committee does not have any formal supranational supervisory 
authority. Its mission is instead to formulate the standards and guidelines for supervision and recommend the 
best practice statements. These recommendations and guidelines will be implemented by individual authorities 
in line with their own national systems. In this way, convergence towards common approaches and common 
standards of regulatory and supervisory techniques will be established. (However, the committee’s conclusions 
do not have legal force.) 
68 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf?noframes=1 
69 According to the Committee, equity capital and disclosed reserves are the key element of capital and are the 
only element of capital common to all countries’ banking systems. 
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2. Tier 2 capital or supplementary capital: This includes undisclosed reserves, 
general loan-loss provisions,70 hybrid debt/equity capital instruments, 
subordinated term71 debt and subordinated term debt with minimum maturity of 5 
years. Tier 2 capital cannot exceed 100% of Tier 1 capital.72 
 The Basel Accords provide a harmonized and uniform definition of capital across 
countries. However, each country’s regulator has some discretion in their choice of Tier 2 
capital and also in their supervision of banks’ accounting practices, especially regarding the 
level of provisions for loan losses.73 According to the principles of Basel I, each bank is 
required to maintain a minimum of total capital equal to 8%. The assets and off-balance sheet 
activities are weighted by the coefficients designed to show the credit risk of these assets.74 
6.1.2. Shortcomings of the Basel Accords 
 Although the introduction of the Basel Accords contributed to the recapitalization of 
the sector,75 it concentrated only on credit risk ignoring other types of risk such as 
operational risks, market risks, risks on off-balance-sheet activities, etc. In 1993, the 
Committee proposed a procedure to incorporate market risks on banks’ capital requirements 
through a standard approach that was also used for credit risks under the 1988 Basel Accord 
(Basel I). This approach was based on rigid capital ratios and was criticised by the banking 
industry as being a step back from the sophisticated risk management procedures that banks 
had started to develop. Hence, the 1996 Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate 
Market Risks allowed banks to calculate their capital, held against market risks by using their 
own internal quantitative models (Hellwig, 2010). 
 However, this new amendment caused the amount of capital banks need to hold 
against any given asset to diminish (Hellwig, 2008). Banks misused the freedom given them 
through the risk-calibrated approach to determine the capital requirements in order to increase 
their activities supported by the equity they had. They presented themselves as sufficiently 
                                                 
70 Provisions/Loan Loss Reserves ratio represents the amount of money set aside against presently unidentified 
losses that might materialize. 
71 Subordinated debt has a lower priority than other firm debt and therefore, is paid after other claims. 
72 For more details and explanations, see: BIS Publications, 06/1988: “International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards” 
73 BIS Publications, 06/1988: “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (page 
4,article 14, article 19) 
74 These risk-weighted assets measure the total credit risk taken by the bank. The weights were allocated into 
four categories: 0%, 25%, 50% and 100% depending on the nature of the borrower or the issuer of the security. 
75 Following the introduction of the Basel Accords in 1988, an increase in the average ratio of capital to risk-
weighted assets of G-10 banks has been observed (from 9.3% in 1988 to 11.2% in 1996); see Jackson (1999). 
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capitalized. The risk-weighting they used in their models was flawed and their leveraged 
positions were masked through accounting tricks (Hellwig, 2008; 2011).76 The adverse effect 
of this new amendment was exacerbated with financial innovation and securitization 
practices that further created opportunities for banks to mask their actual risk exposure. In 
that way, they could substantially reduce their regulatory capital amount with no actual 
corresponding reduction to their risk exposures. This regulatory arbitrage creates two 
consequences. It distorts competition between financial and non-financial institutions and 
more importantly, the reported capital ratios may disguise deteriorations in the balance sheets 
and the actual financial positions of banks. As a result, accompanied by the on-going 
financial innovations aimed at reducing the cost of regulatory arbitrage,77 the function of 
capital regulations as a prudential policy tool is undermined (Jason, 2000).78 
 With the recognition of these failures, the series of influential documents adopted by 
the Basel Committee79 set the stage to the adoption of the second Basel Accords - Basel II 
(also known as the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standard) in June 2004. Basel II came into force in 2008. This document was embedded in 
the E.U. law through the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) (Dragomir, 2010:83-97). 
The Basel II Capital Accord consists of three pillars.80 The first pillar considers the 
methodology of determining the minimum capital requirements for credit, market and 
operational risks. The second pillar of Basel II addresses the supervisory review process and 
the third pillar deals with the effective use of market discipline. 
                                                 
76 The first Basel Accord was also accused of causing a reduction in lending to individuals and firms since banks 
preferred to buy government bonds (whose capital requirement was zero) rather than making loans to 
households and firms (whose risk weight was 100%) (Benston, 2007; Blanchard et al., 2009; Buiter, 2007). This 
way banks could reduce their required capital ratios and increase their returns on assets. Besides, a risk weight 
of 100% (meaning 8% capital requirement) attached to a very safe loan given to an AAA-rated company was 
given to a very risky loan of a CCC-rated company. Hence, banks preferred choosing to substitute riskier assets 
in their portfolio for safer assets that have the same risk weight. This resulting regulatory arbitrage is a 
consequence of setting imperfect weights that are not able to differentiate between the risk profiles of different 
types of assets, encouraging banks to riskier activities rather than preventing them. 
77 Regulatory arbitrage involves transferring risks through the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV). Banks were able 
to invest in asset-backed-securities through these vehicles. Since these were off-balance-sheet activities, banks 
were able to invest in these securities without putting up the equity that would otherwise be required if these 
investments were held on their trading books (Hellwig, 2010). 
78 Banks see this capital requirement as a form of regulatory taxation since they have to hold equity cushions 
(that are higher than what they would otherwise hold) in order to meet the required ratio. The reason why banks 
are unwilling to do this is that the cost of equity is higher than the cost of debt and deposits. When banks can 
substitute debt for equity, investors get greater returns because payments to the government are reduced. This is 
due to the fact that interest payments are tax deductible but dividends are not. For more on the issue of 
regulatory arbitrage caused within the Basel Accords, see: Jones, (2000). 
79 Such as the first Basel Accord (BCBS 1988), the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCBS 
1997), and their subsequent amendments. 
80 Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Publications: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf 
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 Although the definition of capital and the 8% ratio for the minimum requirement 
remain the same in Basel II, there is one difference concerning the methodology for the 
measurement of capital requirement in the new Basel II Capital Accord. In order to prevent 
incentives for regulatory arbitrage, a more risk-sensitive approach for the calculation of 
capital requirements was introduced. This approach adds capital charges for interest rate 
risks and operational risks81 through which a bank’s actual risk position would be 
represented more clearly. 
 Another difference is that Basel II allows banks to use two different options to 
calculate credit risk. As an extended and modified version of Basel I, banks can use the 
standardized approach, which uses risk weightings based on the ratings assigned by external 
credit rating agencies. The other option for the calculation of credit risk is the Internal 
Ratings- Based Approach82 that relies on banks’ internal models for estimating the risk 
elements in determining the required capital. Incidentally, this option was already introduced 
by the 1996 Amendment to Basel I. So, basically banks were allowed to apply their own risk 
measurement methods and internal ratings with the permission of the regulatory authority 
(Hellwig, 2010).83 
 The second pillar of Basel II addresses the supervisory review process with a 
comprehensive assessment of capital adequacy, risk management processes and risk profiles. 
Supervisors should ensure that a bank is sufficiently capitalized and consistent with its risk 
profile. It enables supervisors with early intervention to prevent capital from falling below 
prudent levels. According to the Principle 2 of Basel II, national regulatory authorities have 
regulatory discretion in tailoring regulatory capital levels where they can require banks to 
operate with capital in excess of the regulatory minimum to consider the risks not captured 
under Pillar 184 (Basel II, Article 745). Finally, the third pillar of Basel II deals with the 
effective use of market discipline via public disclosures of the capital structure, capital 
adequacy, risks covered in Pillar 1 and interest rate risk by banks. The aim is to encourage 
                                                 
81 Operational risk is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate internal processes, systems and other external 
events. 
82 It has two variants, called the foundation internal ratings-based (IRB) approach and the advanced internal 
ratings-based approach. In the Foundation IRB approach, risk weights are determined by supervisory 
authorities. In the advanced IRB approach, risk-weights are determined through sophisticated risk models based 
on the history of credit defaults in loan portfolios. 
83 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf and Tirole et al., (2010:2) 
84 BASEL II, Article 745: Principle 2: Supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy 
assessments and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor and ensure their compliance with regulatory 
capital ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate supervisory action if they are not satisfied with the result of 
this process. 
54 
 
banks to disclose information in order to increase the role of market participants in 
monitoring banks (Basel II, Article 809).85  
 Basel II was developed due to some shortcomings from which Basel I was suffering. 
However, during the 2007-2008 crises it was also accused of several criticisms.86 Firstly, the 
Basel II Accord allowed banks to use their internal rating methodologies for the assessment 
of credit risk. However, these models were too complex, which made it very hard for 
supervisors to verify the computations. Through these internal models banks could again 
show that their risks were limited.87 These models were also blamed for failing to account for 
the dynamic aspects of a banking environment88 and for neglecting the risk of illiquidity. 
Secondly, Basel II caused heavy reliance on credit rating agencies to assess the amount of 
regulatory capital a financial institution must hold. The quality and reliability of their rating 
methodologies, which were also subject to conflicts of interest, are seen as one of the causes 
of the financial crisis. Thirdly, these rating methodologies are blamed for being pro-cyclical 
(and providing insufficient capital during economic downturns) meaning that they have a 
tendency to reinforce business cycle fluctuations because of the interaction of fair value 
accounting with risk-sensitive capital requirements.89   
                                                 
85 BASEL II, Article 809: The purpose of Pillar 3 ─ market discipline is to complement the minimum capital 
requirements (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2). The Committee aims to encourage market 
discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements which will allow market participants to assess key 
pieces of information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and hence 
the capital adequacy of the institution. The Committee believes that such disclosures have particular relevance 
under the framework, where reliance on internal methodologies gives banks more discretion in assessing 
capital requirements. 
86 See also next paragraph. 
87 For more on this issue see Tirole et al. (2010). 
88 This was due to the VaR (Value at Risk) model: VaR is a widely used risk measure representing the potential 
loss of an investor regarding a specific portfolio of financial assets. It is estimated based on historical data. 
89 Under fair value accounting, assets and liabilities are carried on the balance sheet at their market value, in 
other words at fair value or marked-to-market (Enria et al., 2004). When assets are accounted with fair value 
accounting, asset prices interact positively with leverage ratios as increases in asset prices raise the net worth of 
the equity in banks’ balance sheets and create incentives to use that excess capital for taking on additional debt. 
Financial institutions will adjust their balance sheets according to changes in asset prices, so that leverage would 
be pro-cyclical. However, in bad times, the reverse happens and market illiquidity forces the use of distressed 
prices instead of more telling market prices. This is because banks’ balance sheets became more vulnerable to 
fluctuations in asset prices, and then these losses in balance sheets forced banks to increase new capital because 
of minimum capital requirements, and reduce lending activities. This chain of events created an environment 
where there wouldn’t be enough capital in times of bad economic conditions. Once the intermediaries realized 
the high amount of leverage, they tried to sell some of their assets, causing a reduction in the market prices of 
these assets and the amount of lending. The result of this kind of action on the side of intermediaries had a 
destabilising effect on the market where, at the same time, the pro-cyclicality of credit ratings affected the 
minimum amount of capital banks must hold. The interaction of marked-to-market accounting rules with the 
capital requirements worsened the situation leading to “fire sales” in the market because of difficulties in finding 
additional capital in such an economic environment. At the same time, a financial institution which is subject to 
a run stops giving credit to another institution (Blanchard, 2008). This had a big impact on the balance sheets of 
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 Whether the shortcomings of Basel II may have contributed to the crisis is a 
controversial issue in the literature.90 Furthermore, the fact that Basel II was not started to be 
implemented during the crisis, has not reached an agreement. The Basel II Accord came into 
force in 2008, which implies that it could not have had a direct impact on the global crisis 
that started in 2007 (Heremans & Pacces, 2011). On the other hand, Tirole et al. (2010) argue 
that although some countries, including the United States, had not implemented Basel II 
when the crisis started, it cannot be denied that all major international banks that have been 
affected by the crisis had mostly anticipated the principles of Basel II.91 However, as Hellwig 
(2008) points out, it shouldn’t be forgotten that although the regime change tends to be 
associated with the recent replacement of Basel I by Basel II, in fact the change of paradigm 
had already come with the 1996 Amendment to Basel I which allowed banks to use their own 
risk models (Hellwig, 2008). 
 All these facts emphasise the shortcomings of Basel capital regulations up to this point in 
terms of underestimating significant risks and too much reliance on banks’ ability to control 
them. This misunderstanding together with the belief that the securitization mechanism of 
distributing risk would eliminate risk entirely from banks’ balance sheets, led to inadequate 
regulatory capital requirements (E.U. Commission, 2009). These kinds of activities erode 
prudential capital standards and undermine the regulatory discipline that is needed to contain 
systemic risk within the banking system. As a consequence of the inadequacies in the 
regulatory framework revealed by the global crisis, several amendments were made to Basel 
II in 2009.92 In order to reflect the criticism of the risk-based approach in Basel II, and to 
prevent the regulatory arbitrage as a by-product of securitization and sophisticated models, 
these amendments took a more restrictive prudential approach to prevent another systemic 
risk failure caused by excessive risk-taking (Dragomir, 2010:149-152). 
 As an outcome of these reviews, the Basel Committee decided to establish a new set 
of standards called Basel III in response to the deficiencies in financial regulation revealed by 
                                                                                                                                                        
other institutions which held similar assets and that in turn caused further sales and, at the end, state 
intervention. The liquidity problem turned into a solvency problem. 
90 See, Cannata & Quagliariello (2009). 
91 Blundell-Wignall et al. (2008) and Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2008) support this argument by noting 
that these major international banks had obtained a guarantee from the committee that the application of Basel II 
would not involve an increase of average capital requirements for all banks. Besides, as an incentive to adopt the 
internal ratings-based approach, these banks in some cases benefited from a reduction of these requirements. 
They estimate a reduction of £220 billion in regulated capital for all American commercial banks in the 
transition to the internal ratings-based approach. 
92 For the details of these amendments, see Dragomir (2010: Chapter 5). 
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the global crisis. This new set of measures not only strengthens capital adequacy ratios, but 
also introduces global liquidity requirements (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) on banks. It will 
increase the capital adequacy ratios and introduce new global regulatory requirements on 
bank liquidity and bank leverage.93 Basel III will be ultimately phased in by 2018.94 
 The 1988 Basel Capital Accord was originally designed for the members of the Basel 
Committee. Although they were not intended to be included in the Basel I framework, other 
emerging market economies also started to adopt its recommendations from the mid-1990s 
including Turkey and Russia (Balin, 2008; Barrell & Gottschalk, 2006). Regarding the 
Turkish banking system, Turkey acted quickly and the capital adequacy standard ratio (Basel 
I) was put into effect gradually starting from 1989. Following the 2000/2001 crisis, the 
Turkish authorities started to work on strengthening the capital adequacy framework of the 
banking sector. The market risk regulations introduced by the Basel Committee were 
established in 2001 and 2002 (Asarkaya & Ozcan, 2007). The current regulation on the 
“Measurement and Evaluation of Banks Capital Adequacy” dated 2006 is compliant with the 
Basel II Provisions related to market risk. The current Capital Adequacy Regulation is also 
made compliant with Basel II, including operational market risk measurements as of July 
2007 (Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency BRSA, Vice Chairman’s Speech, 2011). 
As of July 2012, Turkey has fully implemented Basel II.95 
 The importance of maintaining a strong capital structure was emphasized in all 
policies carried out in the post-crisis period in Turkey. In 2005, the banking regulatory 
authority in Turkey required banks to hold a target capital adequacy ratio of 12% determined 
as a precondition to open a new branch. This ratio exceeds the capital adequacy ratio of many 
other emerging markets even in the global financial crisis years. In fact, one of the most 
important reasons for the limited effect of the global crisis is the high capital adequacy ratio 
of the Turkish banking sector (Yorukoglu & Aysan, 2011; Atıcı & Gürsoy, 2011). Besides, 
regarding the liquidity ratio in Basel III, the ratio reported by all banks in the Turkish banking 
sector is parallel (even more conservative in some items) to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio of 
the Basel III Framework (BRSA Vice Chairman’s Speech, 2011).96 
                                                 
93 For more details of Basel III arrangements, see: http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf 
94 The implementation will start in 2013. 
95 http://www.bddk.org.tr/WebSitesi/turkce/Basel/11342ilerlemeraporu_06_12.pdf. 
96 Regulation on “the Measurement and Evaluation of Liquidity Adequacy of Banks” has been in place since 
November 2006 (redrafted in June 2007 and January 2009). In Turkey, “Regulation on “Measurement and 
Evaluation of Liquidity Adequacy of Banks” (November 2006, June 2007, January 2009), “Regulation on the 
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 In 1997, in order to co-ordinate its banking supervision, the Central Bank of Russia 
(CBR) signed a series of co-operation agreements with other countries’ supervisory 
authorities to ensure its conformity with international standards in collaboration with the 
international financial organisations, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation 
and Supervisory Practices. Russia implemented the Basel Accord in 1999 and established the 
8% minimum capital adequacy requirement (Balin, 2008). Following the 1998 crisis, a 
banking reform was introduced in 2001 with the introduction of the new Banking Law. 
Pursuant to this new law, the CBR is authorised to introduce various capital adequacy 
requirements (CAR) applicable to banks. In 2000, several Russian banks started to include 
market risk in the evaluation of capital adequacy. 
 In 2005, the CBR started to prepare for the introduction of Basel II by studying the 
nature and scale of the changes that would have to be made to laws and regulations in 
connection with the introduction of these standards. In 2009, in order to introduce the Pillar 1 
of Basel II to its regulatory framework, the CBR issued a regulation97 to implement Basel II 
simplified standardised approach to credit risk assessment. Amendments made to the CBR 
regulations on the procedure for the calculation of required ratios, market risks and 
operational risks became effective as of 1 July, 2010. This allowed the Bank of Russia to use 
a simplified standardised approach to assess credit risk, and a basic indicator approach to 
calculate operational risk, in line with Basel II (CBR Annual Reports; 1999-2011). Although 
the capital adequacy rules in Russia generally meet the Basel II standards, the CBR is still in 
the process of its full implementation (IMF, 2011a). 
 The important question for this dissertation is whether capital adequacy requirements 
are good or bad for an efficient banking system. The empirical literature on the impact of 
capital regulations is mixed. Some studies find that capital requirements increase risk-taking 
behaviour (Koehn & Santomero, 1980; Besanko & Kanatas, 1996), while others argue that 
this happens depending on specific circumstances (Kendall, 1992; Beatty and Gron, 2001; 
Fernandez and Gonzalez, 2005). This thesis importantly contributes to the existing literature 
by providing evidence – which will be discussed in the following Chapter – in favour of more 
stringent capital adequacy requirements. As the last chapter will discuss, such stringent 
                                                                                                                                                        
Internal Systems of Banks (November 2006, June 2007, November 2008), “Regulation on Measurement and 
Evaluation of Capital Adequacy of Banks” (November 2006, October 2007, March 2008) have been 
implemented to bring the Turkish regulatory standards in line with the Basel standards. 
97 “On Amending Bank of Russia Instruction No. 110 I” This regulation replaced the 2004 regulation on 
“Banks’ Required Ratios” (CBR, 2009). 
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requirements were introduced in Turkey at a certain point in time, but not in another 
comparable emerging economy, namely Russia. 
6.1.3. Asset Holding Restrictions 
 Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) argue that regulations are complements to each other, 
which reveals the way in which they are interconnected. Although a sound capital level in the 
financial system is important to deal with the moral hazard problems created by government 
safety net mechanisms, regulators face delays in taking appropriate actions. Hence, other 
regulatory tools are also necessary to support capital adequacy regulation (Heremans & 
Pacces, 2011). 
 The composition of asset portfolios is sometimes used as an instrument to control 
banks. The objective of restrictions on asset holdings is to reduce the proportion of risky 
assets such as real estate and common stocks in the portfolios of banks. Since depositors are 
not able to monitor banks by getting the information about the bank’s risky activities, they 
cannot impose discipline on banks. Due to this asymmetric information problem between a 
depositor and a bank manager, a manager might tend to participate in overly risky 
transactions seeking higher returns. This regulation is thus justified by the goal of preventing 
a bank from taking excessive risks and increasing asset quality (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994; 
Mishkin, 2000). Asset holding restrictions can take the form of requiring banks to have some 
minimum diversification of loans among sectors or setting some sectoral concentration limits 
on loans affecting the asset size of the balance sheet. This regulation additionally promotes 
diversification to reduce risk.98  
 As the last chapter will discuss in detail, low asset quality was a long-standing 
problem both in the Turkish and the Russian banking sector where banks overestimated their 
capital adequacy requirements for a long time. In that way, they were able to hide the actual 
risk-exposure in their balance sheets. Deteriorated asset quality caused the equity capital of 
both countries’ banking sectors to melt down during their financial crises. Hence, the quality 
of capital is also important for a sound balance sheet. 
                                                 
98 Principle 10 under Large Exposure Limits of Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
enforces this regulation as such: “Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have policies and processes that 
enable management to identify and manage concentrations within the portfolio, and supervisors must set 
prudential limits to restrict bank exposures to single counterparties or groups of connected counterparties”. 
(2006:3). 
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6.1.4. Disclosure requirements 
 The objective of disclosure requirements is to mitigate the asymmetric information 
problem in the banking industry. To ensure that depositors and other market participants have 
access to information about a bank’s portfolio and degree of risk exposure, regulators can 
require banks to adhere to certain accounting principles and disclose a wide range of 
information about their financials such as certified audit reports for their financials, ratings 
from international rating agencies, consolidated information about banks’ activities and risk 
management procedures. More public information about the risk profile and the quality of a 
bank’s portfolio is likely to have a deterrent effect on banks’ risk-taking behaviour through 
increased market discipline since depositors and other creditors will be able to monitor and 
evaluate banks’ activities at a lower cost (Tchana, 2008; Mishkin, 2000). 
 “The Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey”99 of the World Bank (WB) used in 
this thesis investigates the adherence of banks to information disclosure requirements mainly 
by looking at the presence of an independent assessment of the banks’ financials by a 
certified audit, the percentage of top banks rated by an international credit rating agency, the 
disclosure of off-balance sheet items to the public, the disclosure of risk management 
procedures, the liability of directors for misleading information, the enforcement of penalties 
in case of presenting misleading or erroneous information, and the existence of consolidated 
accounts.100 However, not all countries apply disclosure requirements. Furthermore, there 
might be differences in the extent of adherence to this regulation. 
 The results of the empirical chapter of this dissertation regarding the impact of private 
monitoring on banks’ efficiency indicate that information disclosure requirements may have a 
negative effect on banks’ efficiency. The literature has mixed results about the impact of 
disclosure requirements on banks’ performance. Barth et al. (2004) find that there is a 
positive relationship between accurate information disclosure and better banking 
performances such as greater bank development, better performance and increased stability. 
A theoretical study done by Vauhkonen (2011) about the impact of disclosure requirements 
on banks’ safety shows that tightening disclosure requirements would improve the safety of 
the banking system. Cordella and Yeyati (2002) show that public disclosure mitigates banks 
risk-taking behaviour. On the other hand, Duarte et al. (2008) and Pasiouras et al. (2007) 
                                                 
99 See Introduction, Section 2. 
100 For details, see World Bank Survey III, June 2008, Survey on Accounting/Information Requirements 
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argue that increased disclosure requirements such as obtaining credit ratings from external 
agencies, disclosure of off-balance sheet items to supervisors and to the public, disclosure of 
risk management procedures to the public as well as auditing by certified auditors, might all 
have a negative impact on banks’ efficiency due to increased costs. Besides, Pasiouras et al. 
(2006) find a negative relationship between disclosure requirements and credit ratings. 
Girardone et al. (2012) find that private monitoring is associated with greater banking system 
inefficiency. 
 This thesis contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence – which will be 
discussed in the next Chapter – on the negative impact of information disclosure 
requirements in Turkey and Russia. Both Turkey and Russia had a weak risk-management 
culture towards the end of the 1990s. Both countries’ regulatory authorities took steps to 
develop their risk management practices, including disclosure requirements in their 
respective post-crisis periods. However, the qualitative analysis of the last chapter suggests 
that these practices have been implemented in Turkey more strictly than in Russia. On the 
other hand, the negative impact of this regulation suggests some limitations in the 
implementation of this regulation in these countries caused by the costs of ineffective 
implementation. 
6.1.5. Bank Examination 
 Bank examination is also one of the regulations that aims to limit the moral hazard 
incentives of bank managers for excessive risk-taking. Other than establishing regulations, 
enforcement of these regulations is also very important. Bank examination is important for 
finding out whether banks are complying with these regulations. It also adds to the quality of 
the financial information disclosed to the public by bank owners and managers and to the 
strengthening of enforcement of existing regulations (Tchana, 2010). The Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision address bank examination under Principle 21.101 
 The purpose of bank examination is to provide safety and soundness for the banking 
system by information acquisition (Berger & Davies, 1998). Horvitz (1980) defines bank 
examination as the on-site evaluation of the assets, liabilities and the procedures of a bank 
conducted by a supervisory agency which has unlimited access to the records of the 
                                                 
101 Principle 21 – Supervisory reporting: Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and analysing 
prudential reports and statistical returns from banks on both a solo and a consolidated basis, and a means of 
independent verification of these reports, through either on-site examinations or use of external experts. 
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institution. Generally, the basic function is an evaluation of assets and particularly loan 
portfolios. The role of examination is not to prevent insolvency but rather the timely 
detection of insolvency. Gunther and Moore (2002) address the importance of bank 
examination in terms of imposing regulatory and market discipline on bank behaviour. 
 As argued before, banks act as delegated monitors of customers and have a substantial 
amount of private information about them created over the course of time through bank-
borrower relationships. This unique feature of banks implies their opaqueness. If regulators 
want to be able to impose discipline on them, they have to obtain information about banks’ 
conditions through the examination process. The examination results convey auditing 
information, regulatory discipline information and private information to the market. 
Auditing information verifies the accuracy of banks’ financial statements while regulatory 
information refers to the regulatory treatment of banks through ratings, and lastly private 
information is the data obtained after the examination process and conveyed to the market 
(Berger & Davies, 1998). 
 Swindle (1995) investigated the regulatory discipline effect of bank examinations. 
Considering the fact that it is costly for banks to raise capital, she found that supervisors had 
an influence on encouraging banks to increase their capital by giving a poor rating to their 
capital component. Gunther and Moore (2002) show also that supervisory examinations point 
to a significant auditing effect through revealing banks’ financial problems. Given the central 
role of loan loss provisions and the allowances for loan losses in accounting that occur while 
determining asset quality -particularly loan quality- problems, they argue that banks have 
incentives to underreport provisions.102 However, bank inspections contribute to the 
recognition of losses. This finding is also supported by Curry et al. (1999) who find that 
banks which have been poorly graded increase their provision expense. 
 In Turkey, following the 2001 crisis, the “Regulation on Internal Audit and Risk 
Management Systems of Banks” was published in 2001. Pursuant to this regulation regarding 
internal audit and risk management systems, banks were required to establish, manage and 
develop internal audit and risk management systems. During the restructuring process, 
“Accounting Practice Regulation” (published in June, 2002) played a significant role in 
resolving the crisis. In January, 2002 “Regulation on External Audit Procedures” was 
                                                 
102 Banks have to add funds to allowances through provisions for loan losses. These provisions are an expense 
item and reduce the bank’s net income. If the allowance for loan losses is found to be low, then the bank has to 
increase its provision expense and the allowance. 
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published to determine the procedures and principles of external audit to comply with the 
international standards. 
 In Russia, the CBR has the authority to establish accounting rules and procedures for 
banks. It also has the right to conduct full or selective audits of any bank at any time and 
inspect all books and records of the bank.103 Regarding external audit, the Banking Law 
requires an independent auditor to certify banks’ annual financial statements. 
6.2. Structural Regulation 
6.2.1. Restrictions on bank entry 
 Entry restrictions are related to capital requirements. The first role of capital 
regulation considers the relationship of banks with the market. Banks need to have sufficient 
equity capital to obtain a license so that they can enter the market (Kashyap et al., 2008).  
 Entry restrictions have been an important issue in the history of the banking structure 
of many countries, especially in emerging countries. Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, 
Turkey, and Central and Eastern European countries (such as Bulgaria, the Slovak Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania) experienced 
significant foreign-entry into their banking systems. There are several types of restrictions on 
entry into the banking sector. They encompass the minimum capital entry requirements that 
the owner should provide to the regulatory agencies, restrictions on foreigners owning or 
investing in banks, qualification of founders, operating permissions, opening domestic 
branches etc.104 Restrictions on foreign entry aims to protect banks from competition, 
reducing the exchange rate and the exposure to capital flight (Mishkin, 2000; Tchana, 2008). 
 Entry restrictions can contribute to the stability of the system by protecting the 
economy from the negative effects of bank failures since the entry of irresponsible or poorly-
qualified bankers may expose the customers to the risk of fraud and bank failure (Hellmann, 
Murdoch, & Stiglitz 1999; Gorton, 2010a). Besides, easier entry could lead banks to behave 
imprudently in terms of granting overly risky loans. Overcrowding in the sector will create a 
scarcity of good quality credits, which will force banks to engage in risky loans. Due to 
excessive competition on deposit rates as explained above, banks will have to incur excessive 
                                                 
103 Under CBR Regulation No. 2332-U dated November 2009, routine reporting is performed by banks on a 
daily, five-day, ten- day, monthly, quarterly, half- yearly and yearly basis, and certain reporting is effected on an 
ad hoc basis. 
104 For more on this issue, see: World Bank Survey 3, June 2008, Survey on Entry Restrictions 
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free services for customers. They will again be tempted to take on risky activities to cover 
these costs (Alhadeff, 1962). Furthermore, Caprio and Summers (1996) and Keeley (1990) 
argue that since entry barriers would increase the franchise value of banks, bank managers 
would behave more prudently to maintain the successful state of their banks and prevent any 
insolvency. Hence, the private goals of bank owners will be aligned with the public goal of 
stability of the banking system (Gorton, 2010a). 
 On the other hand, since bankers may be tempted to opt for an entry restriction to 
limit competition, regulators may choose to help them for rent extraction (La-Porta et al., 
2000). Besides, the regulators and their supporters would gain a monopoly position. In 
contrast, a competitive banking sector would prevent such rent extraction or any kind of 
bribery. Credit would be allocated to a wider group (Barth et al., 2004). Demirguc-Kunt, 
Levine and Min (1998) and Wang and Bayraktar (2006) support the view that the regulatory 
restrictions do have negative effects on competition in banking. Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2004) found that the percentage of entry applications denied is greater for low-income 
countries than for high-income countries and that developing countries place more limitations 
than developed countries on foreign bank ownership of domestic banks and foreign bank 
entry through branching. This dissertation contributes to the existing literature by providing 
evidence –discussed in the next chapter – on the negative impact of entry restrictions on 
banks’ efficiency in Turkey and Russia.  
 Starting in 2000, the establishment of a bank in Turkey or the opening of a branch in 
Turkey by a bank established abroad needs the permission of the BRSA, provided that the 
establishment conditions laid down in the Banking Law are fulfilled. The amount of legal 
submissions required to obtain a licence to operate as a bank increased with the 2005 
Banking Law. In Russia, according to the Banking Law, the Central Bank of Russia is the 
licensing authority. Registration of banks and licensing of their activities is designated 
according to the Bank of Russia Instruction No. 75-I, dated July 23, 1998, “On the Procedure 
for Applying Federal Laws Regulating the Procedure for Registering Credit Institutions and 
Licensing Banking Activities”. Regarding the amount of legal submissions required to obtain 
a licence to operate as a bank, there is no difference between Turkey and Russia. 
7. Conclusion 
 This chapter has reviewed the basic concepts of banking, the economic rationale of 
banking regulation and their role in financial stability. The safety net mechanism aimed at 
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preventing bank runs creates moral hazard and thus may increase instead of decrease 
financial instability by encouraging the risk-taking activities of banks. In order to counteract 
these incentives caused by the existence of a financial safety net, governments introduce 
regulations to limit the risk-taking behaviour of banks. 
 These risky activities expose banks to runs and contagion, which endanger financial 
stability. Due to their role as financial intermediaries in the economy, bank failures are 
viewed as the most serious failures compared to other industries. Contagion of these failures 
occurs fast, spreads more broadly within the industry, results in large losses to depositors of 
these banks and more importantly, a bank failure contagion spreads more beyond the banking 
industry and damages the whole financial system and ultimately, the real economy (Kaufman, 
1994). Not only are the losses of these bank failures ultimately borne by taxpayers, causing a 
reduction in the welfare of the society, but also the deterioration of a country’s economy is 
reflected in the reduction of real income, aggregate wealth and welfare of the society. 
Therefore, the major goal of banking regulation and supervision is to prevent banks from 
engaging in unacceptably high-risk activities so that the depositors and other savers are 
protected from market failures. 
 The main purpose of this chapter was to provide the basis for understanding the 
mechanism of banking regulation and its impact on financial stability. Very often the impact 
of certain regulations on the efficiency of a banking system is ambiguous. This is particularly 
the case for emerging countries. Based on this conclusion, we will now move to the empirical 
analysis of banking regulation in Turkey and Russia. 
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Chapter II – Empirical Analysis of the Impact of 
Regulations and Supervision on Banks’ Performances in 
Turkey and Russia 
1. Introduction 
 The banking sector is the most highly regulated sector in the economy (Walter, 1985). 
Banking crises around the world over the last thirty years, especially the most recent 2007-
2009 Global Financial Crisis, have attracted the attention of policy makers on the 
construction of an appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework. However, as 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006) argue, this task is a complex and difficult process since there is 
no clear answer on what exactly is good regulation and supervision. Nor is it evident how 
specific regulations affect the performance and stability of the banking sector. Additionally, 
economic theory provides conflicting predictions about the impact of regulations and 
supervisory approaches on bank development, performance and stability (Barth et al., 2004). 
 The empirical research presented in this chapter investigates the impact of regulations 
and supervision on banks’ performance at the international level. Most of the known studies 
such as Barth et al. (2004) and Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) primarily use financial ratios as 
performance indicators. Instead, this study uses an efficient frontier technique called Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Berger and Humphrey (1997) highlight the superiority of 
frontier techniques compared to traditional performance measures such as return on assets, 
cost/revenue ratio etc., since they can account for the relevant inputs and outputs of a bank 
simultaneously and provide an objective numerical score, ranking and an efficiency score that 
is based on the criteria of economic optimization. 
 Banks are the dominant financial intermediaries in emerging markets (Caner et al., 
2007). In fact, Cläessens (2002) argues that the emerging markets differ from developed 
countries in terms of the relative importance of their banking, securities and insurance 
markets. As he point outs, banks are likely to be more important in developing-countries 
whereas securities markets and insurance markets are much smaller (Cläessens, 2002; 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2001). This is also true for Turkey and Russia, where the banking 
sector dominates the financial system: most of the transactions in the money market and in 
the capital markets generally are carried out by banks (Caner et al., 2007). The aim of this 
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chapter is to analyse the impact of the regulatory/supervisory frameworks implemented in 
two emerging countries, namely Turkey and Russia, on the performance of their banks. 
 Turkey and Russia share a similar banking history where both of them experienced 
severe banking crises followed by major restructuring and recovery of the banking industry. 
Both countries have undergone major restructuring in terms of mergers, liquidations, and 
improvements in management and consolidation since 2000. In addition to the similar 
structural features of their banking sectors, a comparison of both countries’ banking sectors’ 
performances following their banking reforms would provide evidence to evaluate the 
regulatory policies implemented in both countries. 
 Specifically, the first consideration is how the efficiency of banks in both countries 
evolved over the 1999-2010 period. The reason for choosing this time period relies upon the 
fact that it encompasses the most important breaking points in both countries’ banking 
history. In particular, Russia had experienced a banking crisis first in 1998 and again in 2004, 
both of which were followed by a structural banking reform implemented by the Central 
Bank of Russia.105 However, this attempt at restructuring was not solid enough to prevent the 
emergence of another banking crisis in 2008-2009. The global crisis disrupted the rapid 
expansion of the Russian banking sector where many of the banks failed.106 Profits started to 
decline due to bad loans. The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans was 9.5% in 2009, 
8.2% in 2010 and 8% in 2011.107 As sources of external finance dried up and interbank 
market trust declined, government support became necessary to stabilize the system. 
 Turkey, on the other hand, experienced twin banking crises in 2000 and 2001, 
resulting in serious damage to the financial system and especially to the banking sector. 
These crises were followed by a major Banking Sector Restructuring Program, changes in the 
Banking Law, implementation of several new regulations, and enhancement of the 
supervisory framework. Both countries experienced a similar banking history over the 
analysis period. However, the fact that Russia ended up with major bank failures in 2008 
while the effects of the 2007-2009 Global Crisis on Turkish banks has been limited is an 
issue deserving attention about the role of regulation and supervision on banks’ performance. 
Although the real economy has been affected mostly through international trade channels, the 
                                                 
105 The Turkish economy was affected significantly by the 1998 banking crisis in Russia in terms of capital 
outflows and a slowdown in international trade, leading to a contraction in the Turkish economy in 1999 
(Altunbas et al., 2009:54). 
106 See Appendix C for the List of failed banks in Russia during the global crisis. 
107 This ratio in Turkey was 5.6% in 2009, 3.8% in 2010 and 3.1% in 2011. 
67 
 
Turkish banking and financial sector has been quite robust whereas Turkish financial 
institutions, unlike those of many other economies, did not require any capital support. The 
average capital adequacy ratio of the Turkish banking sector has risen during the crisis, 
fluctuating around 20% - well above the target level of 12% and the legally required level of 
8%. The profitability of Turkish banks also increased in 2008 and 2009. Moreover, Turkey is 
one of the few countries whose credit rating has improved during the crisis (Yorukoglu & 
Atasoy, 2010). 
 This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the banking sectors in 
Turkey and Russia underlining their structural commonalities. Section 3 provides a review of 
the production theory, and it introduces the concept of efficiency as the performance 
indicator. Since performance measurement is used in planning and controlling the activities 
of banks, it has been a primary concern of bank managers. Furthermore, the efficiency and 
productivity of companies are also a matter of concern for investors, lenders and 
shareholders. This section builds the technical foundation for the methodology of this 
chapter. Section 4 presents a literature overview of the empirical applications of DEA on 
Turkish and Russian banks, and includes other cross-country studies. This review assisted in 
identifying applicable methodologies and relevant variables for the purposes of the empirical 
analysis set out in this thesis. Section 5 explains the methodology applied in the empirical 
analysis of this chapter. It first introduces Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as a non-
parametric108 measurement technique which will be used for calculating the efficiency scores 
of Turkish and Russian banks between 1999 and 2010. This section then explains the 
Ordinary Least Squares regression technique which will be used to investigate the regulatory 
determinants of banks’ efficiency scores which is the main aim of my thesis. Section 6 
describes in detail the variables employed in the empirical analysis and presents the definition 
of the sample data and variables. Finally, a discussion of the empirical findings is presented 
in section 7. 
 My results indicate that there is a strong link between various forms of banking 
regulation/supervision and bank efficiency. The results suggest that strengthening capital 
                                                 
108 Parametric and non-parametric methods differ in the assumptions imposed on random errors and the 
functional form of the cost frontier. They primarily differ in how much shape is imposed on the frontier and the 
distributional assumptions imposed on the random error and inefficiency. The DEA model is not able to 
distinguish between inefficiency and random errors. It presumes a particular functional form of the frontier. On 
the other hand, parametric approaches distinguish between random errors and inefficiency while imposing a 
particular functional form. However, if the form is wrongly specified, inefficiency levels would be 
overestimated (Berger & Humphrey, 1997; Hauner, 2005). 
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adequacy requirements and the supervisory powers of regulatory/supervisory authorities can 
improve the efficiency of banks. On the contrary, increasing private monitoring and entry 
restrictions can adversely affect bank efficiency. The results also suggest the negative impact 
of deposit insurance scheme on efficiency. The results of this study are mostly in line with 
the findings of a very recent paper by Girardone et al. (2012), who find that strengthening 
capital restrictions and official supervisory power can improve banks’ efficiency, whereas 
policies such as private monitoring can impede efficiency. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Banking Structures in Turkey and Russia 
 As Caner et al. (2007) argue, the Turkish banking industry makes a good case for 
comparison with the Russian banking industry in terms of the relative importance of banks in 
the economy, aggregate financial ratios, the state-dominant structure and concentration 
levels. The Russian financial system is relatively small compared to the banking sector in 
developed countries. It is dominated by commercial banks. As of the end of 2010, total assets 
of the financial sector were around 80% of GDP and the share of banking sector’s assets to 
total assets in the financial sector was over 90% in Russia (IMF, 2011b). As for Turkey, 
although its financial system deepened following the 2000-2001 crises, the system is also still 
dominated by the banking sector, with the banking sector having the greatest share in the 
Turkish financial system. The banking sector’s share in the Turkish financial system is 77.2 
% as of the end of 2010 (BRSA,109 2010). 
Table 5: Ratio of Banking Sector’s Assets to GDP in Turkey and Russia 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Turkey 69 72 83.5 86.7 67.9 78 87.4 91 
Russia 42.3 42.1 45.1 52.4 61.4 67.5 75.3 75.2 
Source: CBR Banking Supervision Reports (2003-2010). Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (2003-2010), Banks 
Association of Turkey (2003-2010) 
Table 5 shows the size of the transactions in the banking sector in both countries. As 
of 2010, the role of the banking sector in the economy is more than 70% in both countries. 
Banking industries in both countries have experienced continuous growth since 2001. The 
ratio of banking sector assets to GDP in Russia increased from 38.2% in 2002 to 75.2% in 
                                                 
109 Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency in Turkey 
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2010 (CBR, 2002; 2010). Regarding Turkey, following the 2001 crisis, the asset size of the 
banking sector to GDP increased from 77% in 2002 to 91% in 2010. The asset to GDP ratio 
is much higher in Turkey. However, as Caner et al. (2007) explains, this is due to the longer 
period of asset accumulation in Turkey relative to the Russian banking sector. 
 In contrast to the banking industries in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries 
where the banking industry became mainly foreign-owned, the Russian banking sector 
evolved in a different pattern. Its ownership structure of the banking sector differs from those 
in other emerging eastern European markets. In fact, both the Turkish and Russian banking 
sectors are characterized by the dominance of state-owned banks and the relatively small role 
of foreign banks (Caner et al., 2007). Although Russian state-owned banks have a bigger 
share of the banking industry than the state banks in Turkey, Table 6 reveals that state banks’ 
involvement in banking is still very high compared to the presence of foreign-owned banks in 
both countries. 
Table 6: Market Structure of the Banking Sector 
Market Structure of the Banking Sector * 
Presence of government-owned banks in % 
Year/Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TURKEY 34.6 34.2 32.7 39.36 39.27 38.35 33.27 31.00 30.25 30.38 32.20 31.56 
RUSSIA 41.90 68.00 35.50 37.50 36.00 38.10 40.70 37.80 39.20 40.50 43.90 45.80 
Presence of foreign-owned banks in% 
Year/Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TURKEY 5.3 5.2 3.1 3.29 3.01 3.47 6.32 13.07 13.93 16.96 15.72 16.48 
RUSSIA 10.60 9.50 8.80 8.10 7.40 7.60 8.30 12.10 17.20 18.70 18.30 18.00 
Source: Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency of Turkey (BRSA) & Central Bank of Russia (CBR) * Presence of 
government-owned banks: The fraction of the banking system’s assets in banks that is 50% or more government-owned. 
Presence of foreign-owned banks: The fraction of the banking system’s assets in banks that is 50% or more foreign-owned. 
 Table 7 presents the banking sector concentration levels, representing the percentage 
of assets held by the three largest commercial banks in both countries, which is high in both 
countries. The Russian banking market in 2010 is characterized by a high degree of 
concentration, as it has always been. The top 15 banks account for 50-60% of total liabilities 
and claims in the sector (CBR,110 Financial Stability Review 2010). Sberbank is the largest 
bank in the Russian banking sector and it is state-owned. It accounts for 26.9% of the 
aggregate Russian banking assets. As of January 2011, it accounted for 47. 9% of retail 
                                                 
110 Central Bank of Russia 
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deposits, 31% of consumer loans and 31% of corporate loans in Russia. The other two main 
players of the sectors, Vnehstorgbank (VTB) and Gazprombank, are government-owned, too. 
As of 2010, Sberbank, VTB and Gazprombank account for 44% of the total banking sector 
assets in Russia. 
 In Turkey, as of 2010, a government-owned bank, Ziraatbank, was the largest bank in 
Turkey. It accounted for 15.72% of the total banking sector assets and 21% of total deposits 
in the sector as at the end of -2010. It is followed by two privately-owned banks, IsBankası 
and Garanti Bank. As of 2010, these three banks accounted for 42.31% of the Turkish 
banking sector assets. 
Table 7: Banking Sector Concentration Levels 
Banking Sector Concentration Level * 
Year/Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TURKEY 33.39 33.49 37.07 40.38 49.92 42.56 45.63 42.15 40.86 41.21 42.98 42.31 
RUSSIA 47.39 40.35 37.71 35.6 35.95 37.97 41.95 40.44 40.27 43.84 42.33 43.99 
Source: Banking Association of Turkey (BAT); Bankscope * Concentration: Percentage of assets held by the three largest 
commercial banks in the country 
 These data support the fact that Turkish banks and Russian banks make a good case 
for comparison due to their similar structural features. Furthermore, Table 8, Table 9 and 
Table 10 measure the activity in the banking sector for both countries. Table 8 measures the 
banking sector activity by dividing the bank claims to the private sector with GDP. Table 9 
shows domestic credit to private sector as of GDP. It refers to the financial resources 
provided to the private sector through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade credits 
and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. Finally, Table 10 presents 
the growing loan portfolios in the asset structure of both countries’ banking sectors between 
2001 and 2010 showing a similar trend for both countries. 
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Table 8: Activity in the Banking Sector 
Activity in the Banking Sector * 
Year/Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TURKEY 8.02 8.03 5.36 5.90 7.50 9.84 13.75 15.39 19.55 22.29 20.00 20.60 
RUSSIA 2.95 3.45 4.71 5.24 6.75 9.67 11.58 14.35 20.60 23.91 20.18 22.18 
Source: GMID= Global Market Information Database of Euromonitor International * Activity in the Banking Sector= Bank 
claims to the private sector / GDP 
Table 9: Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
Year/Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TURKEY 16.6 17.8 15.4 14.5 14.5 17.3 22.2 25.9 29.5 32.6 36.5 44.2 
RUSSIA 13.1 13.6 16.8 18 21.2 24.3 27.5 32.5 38.8 42.2 46.2 44.9 
Source: World Bank Data (1999-2010)111 
Table 10: Bank Loans as of GDP 
Year/Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
TURKEY 21 17.8 18.6 23.2 30.8 30 35.1 40.2 43 50 
RUSSIA 14.8 16.6 20.3 22.9 25.3 30 43.2 47.9 50.8 49.3 
Source: CBR Banking Supervision Reports (2004-2010), Caner et al. (2007), Banks Association of Turkey (2005-2010) 
 In addition to these structural similarities, Turkey and Russia have a trade relationship 
based on natural gas and oil. Although the 2007-2009 Global Crisis led to a decline in trade, 
gas trade between the two countries reached its highest level in 2008 and was worth 35 
billion USD.  
3. Theory of Performance Measurement 
3.1. Fundamentals of Production Theory 
 The production theory is based on a set of physical technological possibilities which 
are described by a production function. Economic theory regards the production function as a 
concept that describes the technological relationship between the outputs and inputs of factors 
of production. The aim is to explore the substitution possibilities among the factors of 
production, or in other words, among various amounts and combinations of inputs, in order to 
obtain a given level of output (Sato, 1977). Applied to banking, this concept means that the 
                                                 
111 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS/countries 
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bank chooses inputs and outputs in its production structure.112 A bank’s output is defined as 
the bank’s ability to solve asymmetric information problems between lenders and borrowers 
and manage risk. These are the most important components of a bank’s production. These 
abilities affect the incentives of bank managers to produce financial services prudently and 
efficiently. In that sense, a bank is the financial intermediary that produces financial services 
and provides risk diversification combining the theory of financial intermediation with the 
microeconomics of bank production.113 In order to provide the best level of output, banks 
must use their resources efficiently (Hughes & Mester, 2008). 
 Production functions are represented mostly by a mathematical function or by a 
graph. Although there are various functional forms, production relationships have been 
mostly analysed by the Cobb-Douglas production function which is a simple and non-linear 
functional form that assumes a unitary elasticity of substitution (Sato, 1975; Arrow et al., 
1961).114 Graphically, a production frontier is employed to define the relationship between 
the input and output factors. The X-axis refers to inputs and the Y-axis refers to outputs. The 
production frontier, represented by the line OF’ in Figure 1, shows the maximum output that 
can be produced from each input level. In other words, it reflects the current state of 
technology in the industry (Coelli, Rao & Battese, 1998:4). 
Figure 1: Production Frontiers and Technical Efficiency 
Source: Coelli et al. (1998) 
                                                 
112 For example: A bank makes choices about its capital structure and the amount of risk to assume. 
113 The theory of financial intermediation and the economics of banking are explained in detail in Chapter I. 
114 The other widely accepted alternative is the Walras-Leontief- Harrod-Domar assumption of constant input 
coefficients. For a more detailed analysis of the application of different types of production functions see: 
Forsund & Hjalmarson (1979) and Kumbhakar, Ghosh & McGukin (1991). 
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 The frontier line OF’ also shows the production possibility set (PPS) which is the set 
of all input-output combinations that are feasible. The PPS set includes all points between the 
production frontier OF’ and the x-axis, together with the bounds. The points along the 
frontier constitute the efficient subset of this production set. The distance of each individual 
unit from the frontier measures the efficiency differences of individual Decision Making 
Units (DMU’s).115 
 Conventional microeconomic theory as well as theoretical production analysis is 
based on the assumption of optimizing behaviour where the production activity is seen as an 
optimization process (Färe et al., 1994:1-3). According to this behavioural assumption, 
producers prefer to operate somewhere on the boundary of their production possibility sets, 
rather than on the interior, since cost minimization requires producers to operate on rather 
than above their minimum cost frontiers for an efficient resource allocation. The DMU’s 
possess the behavioural assumptions of cost minimization or output maximization since 
various combinations of inputs can produce the same level of output. Hence, a firm (which is 
the DMU under consideration here) would want to choose an input vector that has the lowest 
costs and still produces the optimal output (Färe et al., 1994:2). This cost minimization 
technique –introduced by Samuelson and Swamy (1974) - claims that by changing the 
proportions of input factors, a firm can decrease the total costs without affecting total 
revenue, thereby increasing profits. 
 Another concept in cost minimization regarding optimizing behaviour is the returns to 
scale in performance measurement which shows the degree to which a proportional increase 
in all inputs increases output. A bank is said to be operating at constant returns to scale (CRS) 
when a proportional increase (α) in all inputs results in the same proportional increase in 
output. Increasing returns to scale (IRS) occurs when a proportional increase in outputs 
requires a less than proportionate increase in costs. Lastly, decreasing returns to scale (DRS) 
occurs when some restriction prevents some elements of production from increasing in 
optimal proportions (Morroni, 1992:162).116 
                                                 
115 The efficiency concept regarding decision making units (which are called banks in this thesis) will be 
discussed in the next section. 
For an in-depth analysis of input-output distance functions, see Faere & Primont, 1995. 
116 See Table 11, which explains the algebraic expression of economies of scale. Figure 2 displays the graphical 
representation of economies of scale (Coelli et al., 1998:18). 
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Table 11: Algebraic Expression of Economies of Scale 
Returns to Scale Definition (α>1) 
Constant f(αx1,αx2) = αf(x1,x2) 
Increasing f(αx1,αx2) > αf(x1,x2) 
Decreasing f(αx1,αx2) < αf(x1,x2) 
Source: Coelli et al. (1998) 
Figure 2: Graphical Representation of Economies of Scale 
Source: Coelli et.al, (1998) 
 In Figure 2, the line from the origin through B is the frontier technology associated 
with the assumption of CRS, according to which only bank B would be considered 
technically-efficient. The other banks A, C and D are considered inefficient. The efficient 
frontier, defined by the line Xa, A, B, and C, represents Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) 
under which banks of A, B and C are fully efficient but D is still inefficient.117 Following 
these specifications, a measure of scale efficiency can be calculated from the ratio TECRS/TEVRS. 
For example, bank B is CRS and VRS technically efficient whereas banks A and C are VRS 
efficient but CRS inefficient. Bank D is technically inefficient regarding both efficiency 
frontiers. One shortcoming of this procedure is that it is not able to show whether the DMU 
(the bank) operates under increasing or decreasing returns to scale. This problem can be 
                                                 
117 However, bank D’s efficiency score has changed from the ratio Xj/Xd under CRS to Xw/Xd under VRS. 
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solved by creating a linear programming model called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
(Murillo, 2004).118 
3.2. Performance Indicator: Efficiency 
 As a performance indicator, efficiency is basically a component of productivity. The 
change in efficiency shows the change in how far an observation is from the frontier of 
technology and the technical change is the shifts in the production frontier (Fried, Lovell & 
Schmidt, 1993:160).119 Efficiency measures the success of a bank in converting inputs of the 
production process into outputs of the process according to the behavioural objectives of cost 
minimization or output maximization (Lovell, 1994).120 Efficient usage of resources is the 
main idea in providing the maximum levels of output. Hence, efficiency indicators are also 
important in terms of providing information about a bank’s behaviour. 
 Considering the Figure 1, the points along the frontier are defined as the efficient 
subset of the feasible production set. In Figure 3, Point A represents an inefficient point while 
B and C represent efficient points. By moving to B, A could increase its output to the level of 
B without requiring more input. On the other hand, by moving to C, it could produce the 
same level of output by using less input. 
Figure 3: Technical Efficiency 
Source: Coelli et al. 1998 
                                                 
118 The objective can also be output maximization. Here, the bank has a given level of budget; and the objective 
is to produce the maximum output possible by choosing the best combinations of input factors. 
119 See Coelli et al. (1998) Chapter I for a graphical representation of technical change. 
120 In other words: producing as much output as possible from a given set of inputs (Farrel, 1957). 
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 The efficiency concept started with the analyses of Debreu (1951), Koopmans (1951), 
and Farrell (1957). The measurement of technical efficiency was introduced by Debreu 
(1951). Koopmans (1951)121 provided a formal definition for technical efficiency: an input-
output vector is technically efficient if, and only if, increasing any output or decreasing any 
input is possible only by decreasing some other output or increasing some other input 
(Cooper et al., 2006:46; Färe et al., 1994:7-8). Basically, a DMU is technically efficient when 
it is not possible to generate more output with the same input level. The assumption is that the 
inefficient management of a DMU explains its inability to produce the maximum possible 
amount of output (Segura & Braun, 2004).122 The term “technical efficiency” is taken from 
the literature in economics, where it is used to distinguish the “technological aspects of 
production” from other aspects, generally referred to as the economic efficiency that is of 
interest to economists. The ability of banks to contribute to the welfare of society via cost 
minimization or profit maximization is called economic efficiency; technical efficiency is 
regarded as one component of this (Lovell, 1994). 
 A judgement of economic efficiency, however, requires information on prices and 
costs (Cooper et al., 2006:11). Farrell (1957), drawing upon the work of Koopmans (1951) 
and Debreu (1951), suggested that economic efficiency has a second component called 
allocative (price) efficiency. This shows the ability of producers to choose the right 
technically efficient input-output vector given the input and output prices. It considers the 
information about prices in determining the flow of resources to their best use. If the input 
prices are given, allocative efficiency in input selection involves selecting the combination of 
inputs that produce a given quantity of output at minimum cost. Allocative and technical 
efficiency together provide an overall economic efficiency measure (Coelli et al., 1998:5). 
  Regarding the work of Farrell (1957), frontier estimation techniques were applied by 
the researchers to represent the technology by a bounding function, not by fitting a function 
through observed data. This bounding function may be based on production or input 
requirement and estimated by nonparametric or econometric methods. This methodology, 
which is also considered as a general standard for efficiency measures, is the best-practice 
production technology or frontier production technology of a product, defined as the 
maximum output attainable from given inputs. The technical inefficiency of a DMU is then 
                                                 
121 Koopman efficiency was also called the Pareto-Koopman efficiency criterion. 
122 Technical efficiency is the ability of a DMU to produce maximal output from a given set of inputs. A firm is 
technically efficient if an increase in any output requires a decrease in at least one other output or in at least one 
input. 
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measured by its deviation from the function (Forsund & Hjalmarsson, 1974; Paul-Morrison 
1999:211). Farrel measures efficiency by using graphs involving firms that use two inputs (x1 
and x2) to produce a single output under CRS assumption. In Figure 4, the isoquant123 SS’ 
shows fully efficient banks. Bank P is inefficient. Its technical inefficiency is represented by 
the distance between P and the isoquant SS’, which is the ratio OQ/OP. The distance QP 
measures the technical inefficiency of P and this ratio can take a value between zero and 
one.124 
Figure 4: Farrell’s Input-Oriented Model 
 
Source: Coelli et al. (1998:135) adapted from Farrell (1957:254) 
                                                 
123 An isoquant is the set of all possible combinations of input 1 and input 2 that are just sufficient to produce a 
given amount of output. Isoquants are similar to indifference curves with the difference that the isoquants are 
labelled with the amount of output they can produce, not with a utility level (Varian, 2002:321). 
124 If the ratio is one, then the bank is fully efficient. If it is smaller than 1, it is inefficient. 
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Figure 5: Farrell’s Output-Oriented Model 
Source: Coelli et al. (1998:138) 
 Figure 5 shows another representation and measurement of technical efficiency in 
terms of an output-oriented context. This approach answers how much output can be 
expanded given input use, rather than how much inputs can be contracted and still produce 
the observed output level (Morrison-Paul, 1999:214). The line ZZ′ is the production 
possibility curve and A represents an inefficient bank. Here, OA/OB represents the technical 
efficiency of bank B and OB/OC represents the allocative efficiency of bank B. The overall 
economic efficiency is OA/OC. However, both input and output oriented models define the 
same efficiency frontiers and give the same solutions. 
 Other than graphical representations, efficiency measurements can also be obtained 
with empirical production functions and frontier estimations which are derived with the help 
of parametric and non-parametric techniques respectively. Parametric and non-parametric 
methods differ in the assumptions imposed on the data in terms of 1) the functional form of 
the best-practice frontier (a more restrictive parametric functional form versus a less 
restrictive nonparametric form) 2) whether or not account is taken of random error that may 
temporarily give some production units high or low outputs, inputs, costs, or profits. They 
primarily differ in how much shape is imposed on the frontier and the distributional 
assumptions imposed on the random error and inefficiency (Berger & Humphrey, 1997). The 
following section introduces one of the most widely used non-parametric approaches, called 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) which I will use for the Turkish and Russian banks’ 
efficiency estimations used in this study. In fact, since its introduction, the DEA model has 
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been widely applied in empirical studies that analyse cross-section and panel data (Tavares, 
2002). 
4. Literature Review on DEA Banking Applications 
 Various studies have applied DEA to the measurement of efficiency in banking. The 
empirical analysis conducted in this chapter runs a simple cross-section125 regression with the 
DEA scores as the dependent variable after deriving the DEA efficiency scores.126 This 
section will first provide a summary of the literature on several cross-country studies on bank 
efficiency that have used DEA. This will be followed by a short literature review on DEA 
applications on Turkish banks and Russian banks separately. The review will contribute to 
identifying the applicable methodologies and relevant variables for the purposes of the 
empirical analysis set out in this thesis. Each study presented below considers the following 
four points: types of banks analysed, types of input and output measures used, the results 
from the analysis and conclusions in general relevant to the effects of financial reforms, 
financial crises and environmental variables on efficiency estimates. 
4.1. Cross-country efficiency studies 
 The first studies on comparisons of banking efficiencies across countries using DEA 
were conducted by Berg et al. (1993) and Bergendahl (1998) on Nordic countries. Berg et al. 
(1993) investigated how well banks of different sizes and from different countries perform to 
meet the intense competition of a common European banking market. This study measured 
the average productivity and the spread of efficiency levels of banks in Finland, Norway and 
Sweden in 1990. DEA was applied together with the Malmquist productivity index.127 As the 
first step, separate frontiers were computed for each country to make pair-wise comparisons 
of the countries. A common frontier was then defined and hence, the results across countries 
were compared.128 Their results indicated that the most efficient banks were found to be in 
Sweden. A similar study was conducted by Berg et al. (1995) for the same countries, but 
adding Denmark to the sample. They also found that Swedish banks were the most efficient. 
                                                 
125 A cross-sectional data set refers to a sample of individuals, households, firms, cities, states, countries, or a 
variety of other units taken at a given point in time (Wooldridge, 2000:6). 
126 See Section 3 
127 The Malmquist index is used to identify the productivity differences between banks in different countries. 
See: Malmquist, S., (1953): “Index numbers and indifference surfaces”, Trabajos de Estadistica 4, pp. 209-242. 
For more on this, see Berg et al. (1992); Mohammadi and Ranaei, (2011). For details on the interpretation of the 
Malmquist Productivity Index, see: Berg et al. (1993); Grosskopf (1993) and Bjurek (1996). 
128 They employed two inputs (labour and capital) and three outputs (total loans, total deposits and number of 
branches). 
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Bergendahl (1998) did another follow-up study on the same sample over the years 1992 and 
1993, analysing banks in terms of their efficient risk management and service provision 
where he used credit risk in terms of credit losses (measured in terms of loss provisions), cost 
of personnel and cost of material as inputs. Outputs were defined as gross revenues, lending 
volumes and deposit volumes. Two Finnish, one Norwegian and one Swedish bank that were 
found to be efficient in 1992 remained again efficient in 1993. When they did the analysis 
under Variable Returns to Scale (VRS),129 they found more banks became efficient. 
 After the introduction of the first applications of these cross-country studies, Pastor et 
al. (1997) also applied DEA together with the Malmquist productivity index to measure 
technical efficiency, productivity and differences in technology in the banking systems of the 
U.S. and several European banking systems for the year 1992 following the intensive process 
of financial European integration. By using the valued-added approach,130 non-interest 
expenses and personnel expenses were used as inputs; and loans, productive assets and 
deposits were used as outputs. The highest efficiency in the banking sector was found in 
France and the lowest efficiency level was found in the U.K. 
 Another study conducted by Cockerill et al. (2004) applied DEA to examine the 
impact of financial liberalization on the efficiency of commercial banks in India and Pakistan 
between1988-1998 because this period was characterized by major changes in the banking 
industry, brought about by financial liberalization.131 Two models with two alternative input-
output specifications were employed: a loan-based model where operating expenses and 
interest expenses were used as inputs to produce loans and advances, and investments; and an 
income-based model which used the same inputs to produce interest income and non-interest 
income. Cockerill et al. (2004) found that the overall technical efficiency of banks in both 
countries increased after the implementation of financial liberalization.132 Moreover, the 
efficiency results obtained in the loan-based model are greater than the ones obtained in the 
income-based model, meaning that banks are more efficient in generating earning assets than 
in generating income. 
                                                 
129 See Section 2.1 and Table 7 
130 See Section 4.1.3 
131 Financial liberalization refers to the lifting of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions, deregulation 
of interest rates and state-directed credit policies, the entry of non-bank financial institutions, reduced 
restrictions on entry and the privatization of public sector banks (Cockerill et al., 2004). 
132 This increase in India was due to an increase both in pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency whereas in 
Pakistan this was only due to an increase in scale efficiency. 
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 One other study done by Anayiotos et al. (2010) applied DEA to the emerging 
countries in Europe to investigate the relative efficiency of banks before and after the 2007-
2009 Global Crisis focusing on the years 2004, 2007 and 2009 (before the pre-crisis boom, 
just before the crisis and after the crisis). This study employed the intermediation approach133 
which will also be used in the DEA analysis of this thesis. Total capital, interest expense and 
operating expense were used as inputs while total loans, pre-tax profit and securities portfolio 
were chosen as outputs. After deriving the efficiency scores, a simple cross-section regression 
was run with the DEA scores as the dependent variable. The results suggested that the DEA 
efficiency scores were strongly linked to the countries’ local banks’ development level. 
Foreign-owned banks were found to be more efficient than domestic banks. The findings also 
suggested that as credit expanded before the crisis, bank efficiency suffered.134 Bank 
efficiency increased during the pre-crisis boom, but fell during the crisis. In fact, the seeds of 
the 2007-2009 global crisis were sown in the credit boom in the period leading up to the 
crisis, which was followed by the failure of several banking systems (Scharfstein & Ivashina, 
2008). 
  In the cross-country studies mentioned above, common frontiers were applied in 
order to explain the efficiency differences of banks by country-specific banking technologies. 
Performance differences among banks are attributed to differences in country-specific aspects 
of banking technology. However, cross-country disparities in environmental factors such as 
economic environment and regulatory structures should be also taken into account in doing 
performance comparisons. 
 One of the DEA studies that consider environmental factors during the estimation of 
efficiency is the one by Hauner (2005), who applied DEA to German and Austrian banks for 
the period between 1995 and 1999 to measure cost efficiency, scale efficiency and 
productivity change. These are estimated by DEA by using intermediation approach. At the 
second stage, cost-efficiency is regressed on explanatory variables which include the 
economic environment, the type of ownership, risk management, the structure of funding and 
the quality of staff. Inputs are given by the bank’s aggregate funds (in terms of customer 
deposits, interbank deposits, and securitized liabilities) and labour. Interbank loans, customer 
loans and fixed-income securities are defined as outputs. Hauner (2005) found that Austrian 
                                                 
133 See Section 4.1.2. 
134 Other possible determinants of bank efficiency such as size, EU membership, being in a financial group with 
a presence in more than one country, credit market regulation, interest rate spreads, state ownership, asset 
quality and stock market size do not seem to have a statistically significant impact. 
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banks are less cost-efficient than German banks. No significant differences between the cost-
efficiency of privately- owned banks and cooperative banks were found. Furthermore, the 
study supports a further shift of funding towards interbank deposits and securitized liabilities. 
The methodology employed in this chapter is very similar to Hauner’s (2005) empirical study 
since the efficiency scores of Turkish banks and Russian banks were also pooled in the 
regression analysis. 
 Casu and Molyneux (2003) also follow a two-stage DEA to measure the productive 
efficiency of European banks following the process of EU legislative harmonisation135 for 
the period between 1993 and 1997. Inputs are interest expenses, non-interest expenses, 
personnel expenses and total deposits whereas total loans and other earning assets comprise 
outputs. After deriving the efficiency measures obtained by the DEA estimations, they use 
them as the dependent variable in the Tobit regression136 model to further investigate  the 
determinants of European bank efficiency. Equity to total assets, return on average equity and 
the type of bank are the environmental variables. Their findings support the importance of 
country-specific factors in explaining the differences in bank efficiency levels across the EU. 
They interpret this finding as reflecting the legacy of different banking regulations. 
 The two-stage DEA is also applied by Grigoran and Manole (2002) to a wide-range of 
transition countries (grouped as Central Europe, Southern-eastern Europe and the Baltic, and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States) for the period 1995-1998. Labour, fixed assets and 
interest expenditures are defined as inputs. Regarding outputs, they define two sets of 
outputs: 1) revenues (the sum of interest income and non-interest income), net loans and 
liquid assets as one set of outputs; and 2) deposits, net loans and liquid assets as the second 
set of outputs. At the second-stage, they run the Tobit regression of these efficiency scores on 
variables related to the macro-economic environment, the regulatory environment and bank-
specific variables. One important finding is that the effects of prudential tightening on the 
efficiency of banks vary across different prudential norms due to the different objectives of 
regulatory authorities. 
                                                 
135 This process refers to the creation of the Single Internal Market. One of the major objectives of the European 
Union’s Single Market Programme (SMP) in 1992 was to facilitate the free movement of goods and services 
across Member States and to improve economic efficiency. Harmonising regulations and improving competition 
in the banking sector formed an integral part of this programme. In January, 1993, legislation was introduced in 
order to create a comprehensive framework for regulating all banking businesses in the E.U. This legislation 
established the regulatory requirements across the European banking sectors (Casu & Molyneux, 2003). 
136 See Section 3.2 
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 Although most of the above-mentioned studies incorporate environmental factors in 
the efficiency analysis, this literature is still in its infancy in defining the proxies for the 
regulatory environment and in incorporating the impact of regulatory and supervisory factors 
that influence a bank’s technical efficiency. They mostly deal with the economic 
environment, examining the degree of concentration and industry average capital, 
profitability and intermediation ratios. Another approach is that the regulatory and 
supervisory variables are included in regression analyses, where performance is measured 
with financial ratios rather than with efficiency scores determined via a frontier analysis 
(Pasiouras, 2008).137 
 However, the empirical analysis presented in this thesis is most closely related to the 
study done by Pasiouras (2008), who, by using two-stage DEA, provides international 
evidence on the impact of regulations and supervision approaches on banks’ efficiency with 
which he tries to fill the gap in the literature. First, by employing DEA, Pasiouras (2008) 
estimates technical and scale efficiency. At the second stage, in order to investigate the 
impact of regulations such as capital adequacy, private monitoring, banks’ activities, deposit 
insurance schemes, disciplinary power of the authorities, and entry into banking on banks’ 
technical efficiency, a regression is performed controlling for bank-specific attributes and 
country-level characteristics regarding macro-economic conditions, financial development, 
market structure, overall institutional development, and access to banking services. The 
intermediation approach is adapted to a sample of 95 countries for the year 2003. Inputs are 
total deposits, interest expenses, non-interest expenses and equity. Outputs are loans, other 
earning assets and non-interest income. The results indicate that higher capital stringency 
increases banks’ efficiency. Regulations that improve private monitoring also increase the 
technical efficiency of banks and finally, higher official disciplinary power is also positively 
associated with higher efficiency. However, only the existence of powerful supervisory 
agencies is significant in all Pasiouras’ specifications.138 The present study employs the same 
methodology with the difference that whereas Pasiouras (2008) applies the two-stage DEA 
                                                 
137 Berger and Humphrey (1997), Berger et al. (1998) and Aysan and Ceyhan (2007) support the superiority of 
frontier approaches in measuring performance. For a more detailed discussion about a comparison of frontier 
efficiency methods, see Berger et al. (1998). 
138 Pasiouras (2008) runs several regressions and estimates several specifications of a Tobit model while 
controlling for bank-specific and country-level characteristics accounting for macroeconomic conditions, 
financial development, market structure, overall institutional development, and access to banking services. In 
several cases, the results provide evidence in favour of the adoption of strict capital adequacy standards, the 
development of powerful supervisory agencies, and the creation of market disciplining mechanisms. 
However, only the development of powerful supervisory agencies is significant in all of his specifications. 
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analysis to a sample of 95 countries for the year 2003, this study applies this analysis to two 
countries (Turkey and Russia) over a period of twelve years (1999-2010). 
4.2. Efficiency in Turkish banking 
 There are several studies that applied DEA to the Turkish commercial banking 
industry. Yıldırım (2002) applied DEA to the Turkish banking sector during the period 1988- 
1998 analysing the technical and scale efficiencies of the banks. In 1980, Turkey began to 
transform itself with the financial liberalization programme. However, this process was 
accompanied by an increase in macroeconomic instability. By employing the intermediation 
approach, Yıldırım (2002) uses total deposits, total interest expense and non-interest expense 
as inputs. Total loans, interest income and non-interest income are the outputs. She also 
investigates the relationships between profitability, asset quality, size and the two definitions 
of efficiency. The findings suggest that the Turkish banks did not achieve any sustained 
efficiency gains over the sample period. The performance levels over the period suggest that 
macroeconomic conditions had an important impact on the efficiency scores. 
 Zaim (1995) analyses the effects of post-1980 financial liberalization policies on the 
efficiency of Turkish commercial banks for the years 1981 and 1990. By applying the 
intermediation approach, inputs are defined as number of employees, total interest 
expenditures, depreciation expenditures and expenditures on materials. Outputs are defined as 
the total balance of demand and time deposits, and the total balance of long-term and short-
term loans. Contrary to Yıldırım’s (2002) findings, Zaim (1995) reported that the Turkish 
banks experienced improved efficiency during the post-liberalization era. Another study 
conducted by Denizer et al. (2007) also examines Turkey’s post-1980 financial liberalization 
experience, using data for 25 years from 1970 to 1994. A two-stage DEA analysis is 
conducted first with the production approach in the first stage and then with the 
intermediation approach in the second stage. Contrary to Zaim’s (1995) findings, but in line 
with Yıldırım’s (2002) findings, Denizer’s et al. (2007) study suggests that the financial 
liberalization process did not provide efficiency gains. Furthermore, considering the role of 
environmental factors in determining banks’ efficiency, it is found that the unstable 
macroeconomic environment of high inflation and unstable growth patterns had a negative 
impact on banks’ efficiency during that time period. 
 Aysan and Ceyhan (2007) analyse the productivity change and the technical 
efficiency in the Turkish banking sector between 1990 and 2006. The analysis particularly 
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focuses on the period after the 2001 crisis, when the Turkish banking system underwent 
regulatory reform and a comprehensive restructuring process. The technical efficiency of 
banks is measured by using DEA and productivity change is measured by the Malmquist 
productivity index.139 Inputs are loan, capital and loanable funds while credits, off-balance 
sheet items and other earning assets are used as outputs. The aim of this study was to 
understand how Turkish banks responded to the 2000 and 2001 crises as well as to the 
restructuring process. The results show that all banks experienced efficiency increases after 
2001. Although this thesis follows a different methodology, the finding of the 2007 study is 
very much in line with my findings discussed below. This suggests that the steps taken in the 
regulatory/supervisory framework of the Turkish banking sector following the 2000/2001 
crises had a positive impact on the performance of Turkish banks. 
 Jackson and Fethi (2000) apply DEA to Turkish banks for the year 1998. In 
estimating efficiency, they use the number of employees, and the sum of non-labour 
operating expenses, direct expenditure on buildings and amortisation expenses as inputs. 
Loans and deposits are defined as outputs. At the second stage, the determinants of efficiency 
are investigated with Tobit regression where a set of explanatory variables such as bank size, 
the number of branches, profitability, ownership and capital adequacy ratio are used. The 
study finds that the capital adequacy ratio has a statistically significant adverse impact on the 
performance of banks reflecting a risk-return trade-off in the sector. 
 Tektas and Ozkan-Gunay (2006) apply DEA to Turkish commercial banks during the 
period between 1990-2001 to assess the technical efficiency of commercial banks in the pre-
crisis period and during the 2001 crisis period. Personnel expenses, administrative expenses, 
and interest expenses are defined as inputs while total deposits, total loans, total securities, 
total interest income, and total noninterest income are defined as outputs. The study shows 
that most of the banks that were taken over by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) 
after the 2001 crisis were relatively inefficient in the period up to the 2001 crisis compared to 
banks that did not fail during the 2001 crisis. 
                                                 
139 The Malmquist productivity index is a distance function based technique used for measuring productivity 
scores introduced first by Malmquist in 1953 (del Gatto et al., 2009). For more on this, see Berg et al. (1992); 
Mohammadi and Ranaei, (2011). 
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4.3. Efficiency in Russian banking 
 There are only a few DEA applications to the Russian banking sector in the 
literature.140 Although not directly, Grigorian and Manole (2002) apply two-stage DEA to a 
wide-range of transition countries, including Russia for the period between 1995-1998. 
Labour, fixed assets and interest expenditures are used as inputs. Interest income, non-interest 
income, net loans and liquid assets are used as one set of outputs; and deposits, net loans and 
liquid assets are used as the second set of outputs. At the second-stage, these efficiency 
scores are regressed on variables related to the macro-economic environment, regulatory 
environment and bank-specific variables. The findings are as follows: among the group of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States to which Russia belongs, Russia has the lowest 
efficiency scores in terms of revenue generating and the ability to provide services to their 
clients. 
 Ono (2004) investigates the impact of the 1998 Russian Financial Crisis on the 
technical and scale efficiency of the Russian banks during the period of 1997-2000 using 
DEA. Total interest expense and total non-interest expense are used as inputs. Total interest 
income and total non-interest income are defined as outputs. At the second stage, using 
regression analysis, Ono (2004) investigates the correlation of technical efficiency scores 
with the ratio of income and expense items to the total income. It is found that the average 
overall technical efficiency score is highest in 1997, and then it falls following the 1998 
crisis. 
 In order to understand how the transformation of banking has advanced in post-
communist countries, Fries and Taci (2005) examine the efficiency of banks from 15 Eastern 
European countries over the years 1994-2001, including Russia. Russia is found to belong to 
the group of countries with the least efficient banks on average. 
 Golovan (2006, in Peteresetsky 2010) analyses the factors that contribute to the 
efficiency of Russian banks in issuing loans and attracting deposits. His findings show that 
the average bank efficiency increased over 2003-2005. Banks with a high capitalization are 
the most efficient lenders. Besides, a high ratio of past due loans is negatively related to 
efficiency. 
                                                 
140 Most of the efficiency studies applied to Russian banks employ the stochastic frontier approach, which is a 
parametric method in frontier analysis that considers the performance measurement. 
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5. Methodology 
 Performance measurement is an important concept of the management process for 
banks since it provides them with valuable information for their operations. Considering the 
complex and rapidly changing structure of the financial services industry, it is of interest to 
measure the efficiency of financial institutions and then explain the variation in their 
efficiency measurements. Evaluating the performance of financial institutions requires first to 
separate the production units that by some standard perform well from those that perform 
poorly (Humphrey & Berger, 1997). Ratio analysis is one method to do this, where financial 
ratios are used as benchmarks in comparing several financial units. It calculates the ratio of 
an output variable to an input variable, where the unit with the highest output over input ratio 
or the lowest input over output ratio is evaluated as having the best performance level (Aysan 
& Ceyhan, 2008). However, this method is insufficient for application in banking industries 
since it uses multiple inputs and multiple outputs.141 
 The empirical estimation of the efficient frontier is useful for benchmarking the 
relative performance of production units, in other words, how close financial institutions are 
to a best-practice frontier (Humphrey & Berger, 1997).142 In the non-parametric approach, no 
a priori assumptions are made regarding the form of the production function. A best-practice 
function is built empirically and solely from observed inputs and outputs (Norman & Stoker, 
1991:12). Hence, the possibility of misspecification of the production technology is zero 
(Jemric & Vujcic, 2002). Additionally, it can easily deal with multiple outputs and variable 
returns to scale, and it provides meaningful scalar technical and scale efficiency levels 
without requiring data on input prices (Fukuyama, 1993; Favero & Papi, 1995). 
 On the other hand, one disadvantage of the non-parametric method is that the 
measurement error and statistical noise are assumed to be non-existent (Fukuyama, 1993; 
Fried et.al., 1993:34). As a result, it is necessary to control the sensitivity of results and 
eliminate the outliers so that they are stable and do not vary dramatically when some units are 
excluded from the sample (Resti, 1997). Fukuyama (1993) argues that the limitations of the 
non-parametric approach are usually the strengths of the econometric approach and the 
converse is also true. Resti (1997) indicates that i) the econometric and linear programming 
                                                 
141 For an international survey of the methodologies used in the efficiency measurements of financial 
institutions, see Berger and Humphrey, (1997). 
142 The frontier is the boundary of the production possibility set. The best Decision Making Unit is the accepted 
benchmark bank. 
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results do not differ dramatically when based on the same data and conceptual framework; 
and ii) when differences arise, they can be explained by going back to the intrinsic features of 
the models.143 144 145 
5.1.  Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 One of the widely used non-parametric techniques is the Data Envelopment Analysis. 
Although the theoretical foundation of this method was proposed first by Debreu (1951), 
Koopman (1951) and Farrell (1957), the model was then developed by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978) named as the CCR (Charnes-Cooper-Rhodes) model. Since then, it has 
become a widely used methodology.146 DEA is one of the most popular mathematical 
programming methods analysing the relationship between inputs and outputs of a production 
process by constructing empirical production frontiers and measuring the efficiency of 
decision making units (DMU’s) relative to the constructed frontiers.147 In this way, we are 
able to measure how much a bank departs from efficient management. By determining the 
efficient banks as benchmarks and then measuring the inefficiencies in input combinations 
(slack variables) of other banks relative to the benchmark, it enables us to compare the 
relative efficiency of banks (Jemric & Vujcic, 2002). 
 The technical efficiency of a bank refers to its success in producing a given set of 
outputs with minimal inputs, under the assumption of variable returns to scale. Allocative 
efficiency is the ability of a bank to use the inputs in optimal proportions, given their prices. 
These two measures together combine the total economic efficiency (Coelli, 1996; Hauner, 
2005). The DEA frontier is constructed empirically from observed inputs and outputs as the 
piece-wise linear combination of the best-practice observations in the data set, thereby 
creating a convex Production Possibility Set (PPS). This set envelops the input-output 
combination of all the banks in the sample. DEA identifies reference points. In other words, 
relatively efficient DMUs (banks) and these reference points define the efficient frontier as 
                                                 
143 Resti (1997) also finds high correlations between the efficiency results derived by the application of the DEA 
technique and econometric estimation. 
144 For more on the discussion of the differences that exist between econometric estimation and linear 
programming, see Berger and Humphrey, (1997); and Fried et al. (1993: Chapter I). 
145 Furthermore, regression analysis relies on central tendencies, and DEA is based on observations at the 
extremes. While the regression approach assumes that a single estimated regression equation applies to each 
observation vector, DEA analyses each vector (DMU) separately, producing individual efficiency measures 
relative to the entire set under evaluation (Jemric & Vujcic, 2002). 
146 For a discussion of the evolution of DEA methodology, see Seiford (1996), Seiford and Thrall (1990), Lovell 
(1994) and Norman and Stoker (1991). 
147 In this study, DMU is a bank. One of the most important features of DEA is that it can manage the multiple 
characteristics of a bank since it uses multiple inputs and outputs (Meryem-Fethi & Jackson, 2000). 
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the best practice production technology. The relative inefficiency of other banks situated at 
some interior points that are below that frontier will then be evaluated by these reference 
points. 
 The DEA, specifically the CCR model, allows each DMU to adopt its own set of 
weights that maximises its own efficiency level relative to other DMUs. Hence, efficiency is 
measured as the maximum of the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs. Based on the 
work of Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), 100% efficiency is achieved by a decision-
making-unit when comparisons with other units do not provide any evidence of inferior use 
of output or input (Charnes and Cooper, in Norman and Stoker 1991:15). By generating the 
best units (most efficient), DEA forms a reference bank according to which other banks will 
be evaluated (Bergendahl, 1998). 
The CCR Model (1978) 
 To measure the efficiency of a DMU (bank), Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) 
proposed the use of the maximum of the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs for that 
DMU, subject to the condition that similar ratios for all other DMUs in the sample be less 
than or equal to 1. 
 Consider n number of decision-making units (banks in my case), each producing s 
number of outputs denoted as yj, j=1,……,s using r number of inputs denoted as xi where 
i=1,….,r. The efficiency of a bank is then measured: 
Max eo=  
∑
∑
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Where: 0 is the specific bank to be evaluated 
yj0 is the amount of the jth output produced by the bank0; 
xi0 is the amount of the ith input used by the bank0 
wj is the output weight 
vi is the input weight 
So, the efficiency measure e0 is maximized such that it is subject to: 
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               wj ≥  0   j= 1,…..,s    (2) 
 
               vi ≥   0   i= 1,…..,r    (3) 
Eq. (1) ensures that the efficiency ratios for other banks cannot exceed one. 
Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) ensure that weights are positive. 
These weights wj and vi are then determined, so that each bank maximizes its own efficiency 
ratio.148 The weights are selected to achieve Pareto optimality149 for each DMU. 
However, this fractional problem has an infinite number of solutions since if (w*, v*) is 
optimal then α (αw*, αv*) is also optimal for each positive scalar. Therefore, it will be 
transformed into a linear program by setting ∑
=
r
i
xv ioi
1
 = 1, such that:150  
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                     where      wj ≥  0                j= 1,….,s         and 
                                     vi ≥  0                i=  1,…..r. 
 There are two approaches to estimate the efficient frontier form n observations in the 
DEA literature. Input-oriented models aim to identify technical inefficiency as a proportional 
reduction in input usage while output-oriented models identify technical inefficiency as the 
proportional increase in output production, given a certain amount of input (Fethi & Jackson, 
2000).151 This maximising Linear Programming (LP)152 model assumes constant returns to 
scale (CRS), which is the optimal scale in the long-run (Casu & Girardone, 2006). Since it 
constrains the weighted sum of the inputs to unity as defined by ∑
=
r
i
xv ioi
1
 = 1 and maximises 
                                                 
148 The resulting ratio must lie between zero and unity. 
149 In a Pareto efficient economic allocation, no one can be made better off without making at least one 
individual worse off. 
150 Theorem of the CCR Model: The fractional program (FP0) is equivalent to LP0 (Cooper et al., 2006:23-24). 
151 Alternatively, we can also constrain the sum of the weighted output to unity and minimise inputs. This would 
be an output-based efficiency measurement. 
152 A linear programming problem is the problem of maximizing or minimizing a linear function subject to 
linear constraints. These constraints can be equalities or inequalities. 
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outputs, it is an input-oriented efficiency measurement, meaning that given the output level, 
the bank minimises its inputs. 
Another possible solution to the linear programming is the dual formulation which 
gives the same solution: 
Min z0=ϴ0 
subject to   ∑ ƛ𝑛𝑗=1 y: ≥ yr0 ,  r= 1,….,s   (6) 
ϴ0 xi0 −   ∑ ƛ𝑛𝑗=1 x ≥ 0,  i= 1,….,m   (7) 
ƛj ≥ 0    j= 1,…..,n   (8) 
 Both linear problems give the same optimal solution ϴ⃰   which is called the technical 
efficiency or the CCR efficiency for the particular DMU0  and the efficiency scores for all of 
them are derived by repeating them for each DMUj,  j=1,…….n.  The value of ϴ0 is less than 
or equal to unity. If the    ϴ⃰   < 1 then the DMU is relatively inefficient; and if the ϴ⃰   =1 then 
the DMU is relatively efficient and has its output-input combination points on the efficient 
frontier. 
The BCC Model (1984) 
 The CCR model assumes CRS which is only appropriate if all DMUs are operating at 
an optimal scale. However, this is not realistic in real-life examples due to competition, 
constraints on finance etc. All of this may prevent a DMU from operating at the optimal scale 
(Ray & Desli, 1997; Coelli, 1996). Since the above dual formulation lacks the constraint for 
the weights ƛ, it implies constant returns to scale. Hence, if we add the constraint, ∑ ƛ𝑗 =𝑛𝑗=11, the resulting DEA model will exhibit variable returns to scale. This model is called the 
BCC Model, named after Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984). The scores obtained with the 
BCC model are called the pure technical efficiency scores because they are derived from a 
model that allows variable returns to scale eliminating the scale part of the efficiency from 
the analysis (Jemric & Vujcic, 2002; Cooper et. al., 2006:92-93). 
92 
 
5.2. Second Stage OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) Regression153 
 It is a common practice to analyse efficiency in two stages. In the first stage, Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to calculate the efficiency of banks. In the second 
stage, regression is used to relate the efficiency scores to factors seen to influence efficiency. 
To this end, the efficiency scores from Step 1 are regressed on bank-specific and country-
specific factors using regression analysis (McDonald, 2009). 
 There are different methods that incorporate the influence of efficiency factors in the 
DEA analysis,154 but the two-stage procedure is very practical in terms of its simplicity and 
the way efficiency is described and interpreted (McDonald, 2009). Several studies examined 
the efficiency of banks using parametric or non-parametric efficient frontier techniques.155 
Many of these studies (e.g. Lozano-Vivas, et al., 2000; Dietsch & Lozano-Vivas, 2000) 
considered environmental factors during the estimation of efficiency. Pastor (2002) describes 
the advantages of this two-stage procedure as such: i) easy implementation; (ii) possibility of 
considering many environmental variables simultaneously without increasing the number of 
efficient units; (iii) there is no need to know the orientation of the influence of each 
environmental variable; and (iv) the possibility of using of this process when some (or all) of 
the environmental variables are common to sub-sets of individuals. This study uses the 
banking regulatory environment during the estimation of banks’ efficiency.  
 A simple regression model can be used to study the relationship between two 
variables. Linear regression is a method used to model the relationship between a dependent 
variable and one (or more) explanatory variables. Data is modelled with a linear function and 
the unknown parameters are estimated from these data. Hence, these models are called linear 
models. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is a method in econometrics and statistics used for 
estimating the unknown parameters in a linear regression model. This method minimizes the 
sum of squared residuals which are the vertical distances between the observed data in the 
dataset and the data predicted by the linear approximation (Wooldridge, 2000:27-40). 
                                                 
153 Linear regression is a method used to model the relationship between a dependent variable and one (or more) 
explanatory variables. Data is modelled with a linear function and the unknown parameters are estimated from 
this data. Hence these models are called linear models. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is a method in econometrics and statistics used for estimating the unknown 
parameters in a linear regression model. 
154 For other methods, see Cooper et al. (2000); Coelli et al. (1999). 
155 See Section 3.5 
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 This method of OLS Regression will be used in the second-stage analysis of this 
chapter where I will investigate the determinants of the Turkish and Russian banks’ 
efficiency, conditional on other bank specific factors, market environment and economic 
conditions. Due to the limited nature of the dependent variable as the scores are bounded 
between zero and unity, the literature usually applies a censored156 Tobit regression model.157 
However, contrary to the standard application of Tobit regression in the literature, the 
second-stage analysis of this study uses OLS regression as it is believed to provide unbiased 
results (Angrist & Pischke, 2008:70-80).158 Besides, one advantage of using OLS is that it 
increases the significance of results.159 
6. Description of Data and Selection Criteria 
 As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, the banking crises around the world 
attracted the attention of policy makers on the establishment of an appropriate regulatory and 
supervisory framework. At the global level, the better known examples are the 1988 Capital 
Accord (Basel I), Basel II and the new Basel III regulatory standards agreed upon by the 
members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Whereas Basel I focused on credit 
risk, the three pillars of Basel II, introduced in 2004, focused on minimum capital 
requirements, the disciplinary power of regulatory/supervisory authorities and market 
discipline (= information disclosure requirements). Following the latest 2007-2009 Global 
Crisis, the third of the Basel Accords (Basel III) was developed to strengthen bank capital 
requirements and to introduce new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank 
leverage. 
 Regulations related to capital adequacy requirements, information disclosure 
requirements and the disciplinary power of authorities are the three main pillars of Basel II 
and are the central instruments of prudential banking regulation as was explained in detail in 
                                                 
156 The Tobit model is applied to outcome variables that are continuous over positive values but have a positive 
probability of equalling zero. A model that has a similar statistical structure to the Tobit model is called the 
censored regression model. However, unlike the Tobit model, the censored regression model arises due to data 
censoring. Specifically, the underlying dependent variable is roughly continuous but it is censored below or 
above a certain value due to the way the data is collected or due to institutional constraints (Wooldridge, 
2003:551). 
157 A limited dependent variable is defined as a dependent variable whose range of values is substantively 
restricted. In the DEA efficiency analysis, the efficiency scores are continuous and restricted between 0 and 100 
(Wooldridge, 2000:529- 539). 
158 The literature is divided between the use of Tobit regression and OLS regression. 
159 Following the literature, Tobit regression was also performed in the second-stage. The results were the same 
in terms of the direction of the coefficients; only the significance values decreased. 
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Chapter I.160 Other than these three standards, this study also comments on two other 
measures that have an impact on banks’ efficiency, namely deposit insurance161 and entry 
requirements.162 These have also been discussed in detail in Chapter I. 
 Economic theory provides conflicting results about the effects of this regulatory and 
supervisory approach to banking (Barth et al., 2002). The traditional approach supports the 
fact that higher capital requirements would have a positive effect on the banking sector due to 
its buffer effect and incentive effect163 whereas the empirical literature provides mixed results 
about this issue. Concerning the disciplinary power of supervisory authorities and market 
discipline, there is support for both the official supervision approach and the private 
monitoring approach to bank supervision. The public interest view supports strong official 
supervision of banks.164 This approach claims that the supervisory authorities are capable of 
avoiding market failures by directly supervising, regulating and disciplining banks (Pasiouras 
et al., 2007). On the other hand, the private interest approach claims that the supervisory 
authorities might not have the incentives to fix market failures and instead try to maximize 
their own utility, which would lead to corruption and hence impede banks’ performance 
(Levine, 2004). 
 Haselmann and Wachtel (2006) point out that banks behave differently under 
different institutional settings. This implies that the results obtained for two emerging 
markets (Turkey and Russia) may not apply to advanced countries. As Barth et al. (2004) and 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006) argue, there is no broad cross-country evidence and agreement 
on which of the different regulatory and supervisory theories used around the world would 
work best to enhance banks’ performance. The empirical findings of this chapter will mainly 
have relevance for emerging markets. In addition, Pasiouras et al. (2011) argue that the 
regulatory efforts taken in emerging countries are qualitatively and quantitatively different 
from the ones of developed banking systems. Whereas developed countries aim to increase 
competition and enhance efficiency, developing countries’ first concerns are stability and risk 
reduction. With this in mind, the aim of this study is to understand whether the different 
regulatory practices implemented in Turkey and Russia had any impact on their banking 
                                                 
160 Section 6.1 
161 Chapter I, Section 3.1 
162 Chapter I, Section 6.2.1 
163 See Chapter I, Section 6.1.1 
164 See Chapter I, Section 5.1 
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sectors’ performance during 1999 and 2010. The results will provide general policy 
implications as to why regulations might be important for emerging countries. 
6.1. Variable Selection: Measuring Inputs and Outputs 
 Definition of the outputs and inputs produced by the DMUs165 is critical for efficiency 
measurement (Yıldırım, 2002). The modelling of a bank’s production process is still a 
controversial issue since there is no agreement in the banking literature regarding the proper 
definition of inputs and outputs (Lozano-Vivas et al., 2000; Grigorian & Manole, 2002). 
There are three main approaches in a bank’s production process modelling: the production 
approach, the intermediation approach166 and the value-added approach.167 
6.1.1. Production Approach 
 The “Production Approach”, developed by Sealey and Lindley (1977), accepts banks 
as primarily producing services to depositors and borrowers (Humphrey & Berger, 1997). 
Banks produce deposits and loans using inputs such as capital, labour and materials. The 
number of deposit and loan accounts is used to measure output. The production approach is 
generally used in studies of cost efficiency (Casu & Girardone, 2006). However, this 
approach fails to capture the role of banks as financial intermediaries. Bauer et al. (1993), 
Favero and Papi (1995), Swank (1996), Resti (1997), Berger and DeYoung (1997) are some 
of the most well-known studies that treated banks as firms transforming capital and labour 
into loans and deposits.  
6.1.2. Intermediation Approach 
 The second approach is called the “Intermediation Approach”, which was also 
originally developed by Sealey and Lindley (1977). In this approach, banks are regarded as 
intermediating funds between savers and investors (Berger & Humphrey, 1997). The 
objective of this approach is to examine the bank’s ability to take in deposits and lend the 
money to worthy and profitable borrowers (i.e. banks collect funds, deposits and purchased 
funds, and intermediate these funds into loans and other assets). The intermediation approach 
is generally used when the aim is to analyse the total cost of the whole banking sector and the 
competitive power of banks (Aysan & Ceyhan, 2007). Berger and Humphrey (1997) argue 
                                                 
165 DMU’s (decision making units) refer to banks in this thesis. 
166 This study uses the intermediation approach. 
167 For a detailed comparison of the modelling approaches, see: Berger and Humphrey, (1997:33-35). 
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that the intermediation approach may be more appropriate for evaluating entire financial 
institutions since it concerns the overall costs of banking. Besides, it is preferred when 
studying the economic viability of banks (Yıldırım, 2002).168 
6.1.3. Value Added Approach 
 The third approach in defining bank inputs and outputs is the “Value-Added 
Approach”, developed by Humphrey and Berger (1992). According to this approach, loans 
and deposits should be regarded as outputs because they produce the largest share of value-
added. This approach differs from the intermediation and production approaches in that it 
considers both liability and asset categories as having some output characteristics. However, 
only the categories that have substantial value added are treated as outputs. Others are treated 
as either inputs or intermediate products (Grigorian & Manole, 2002). Pastor et al. (2002) and 
Kumbhakar et al. (2001) are some of the studies which employed this approach for variable 
selection. 
6.2. Data and the specification of variables used in DEA 
 In the banking literature, there is considerable disagreement on the proper 
specification of bank inputs and outputs (Grigorian & Manole, 2002). As mentioned above, 
there are three main approaches in banks’ production process modelling: the production 
approach, the intermediation approach and the value-added approach. The intermediation 
approach169 to banking behaviour was followed in this study since it is the most-commonly 
used approach in cross-country studies (Pasiouras, 2008). The selection of variables is firstly 
guided by the objectives of the Turkish and Russian banking systems, where commercial 
banks dominate the financial system and act as intermediaries between savers and investors 
by collecting deposits and giving out loans (Caner et al., 2008; Fethi & Jackson, 2000). 
Investment and development banks are excluded from the sample because of their different 
structure, their different objective in the sector and also because of the different environment 
in which they operate.170 
                                                 
168 As Isık and Hasan (2003) claim, many studies on banking efficiency adopt this approach. Aly et al. (1990), 
Allen and Rai (1996), Kaparakis et al. (1994), Berger and Mester (1997), Altunbas et al. (1995), Barr et al. 
(1994), DeYoung and Hasan (1998), and Zaim (1995) presented empirical applications of the intermediation 
approach in their studies. 
169 In the intermediation approach, banks perform as intermediaries between money holders and fund receivers. 
170 Commercial banks deal with various deposit accounts such as savings and time deposits and provide loans to 
businesses and individuals. However, contrary to commercial banks, development and investment banks do not 
collect deposits. Instead, investment banks focus on corporate finance, foreign exchange, mergers and initial 
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 The sample includes a total of 869 observations corresponding to the period of 1999-
2010. Panel data171 over the period 1999-2010 is used rather than cross-section data at one 
point in time (e.g. 2009) as it is claimed that efficiency is better studied and modelled with 
panel data since it is able to account for time variations in efficiency (Pasiouras, 2007; 
Pasiouras et al., 2009, Baltagi & Griffin, 1988; Cornwell et al., 1990; Coelli et al., 2005). 
Besides, using panel data provides the opportunity for observing each bank more than once 
over the period of time under analysis which is especially important in a changing economic 
and financial environment (Isık & Hasan, 2002). An efficient bank in one period may not 
achieve the same performance over the following period. There may be also regulatory or 
environmental factors that affect the performance of banks over time (Pasiouras et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, Wheelock and Wilson (2000) indicate a direct link between inefficiency and the 
risk of bank failure. 
 The sample consists of state, private and foreign banks for which the data come from 
the yearly published, consolidated balance sheets and income statements. The primary source 
of data on Russian banks is the Bankscope database produced by the Bureau van Dijk. The 
Bankscope data are supplemented with data and information from the annual reports of banks 
and also from the Central Bank of Russia. Banks with any missing values or insufficient 
report of data were excluded from the sample. The data of Turkish banks in the sample are 
obtained from the Banks Association of Turkey (BAT). However, the number of Turkish 
banks in the sample varies between 2000 and 2003 due to the Banking Sector Restructuring 
Program. The national currency of Russia had to be converted into dollars by means of its 
official exchange rate presented in Bankscope. The balance sheet data of Turkish banks were 
already converted into dollars as they are presented in the BAT. The sample for Turkish 
banks covers all domestic and foreign commercial banks that operate in Turkey.172 
Considering the sample of Russian banks, although there are 969 active commercial banks in 
Russia, more than half of them are very small banks, called pocket banks. Hence, initially 50 
Russian banks were considered in order to have a balanced sample of banks between two 
countries in terms of the number and the asset size. However, the final selection had to be 
based on the data available due to the following reasons: (i) some banks in Russia had no data 
                                                                                                                                                        
public offerings while development banks provide medium-term finance to the industry and give government 
funds to the sectors with priority for the government (Etkin et al., 2000). 
171 In a panel data set, the behaviour of several entities is observed across several points in time. 
172 The sample excludes Adabank for missing values for some years. Arabic Turkish Bank, Bank Mellat and 
Habib Bank Limited are also excluded from the sample due to their different scope of operations. 
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prior to 2005; (ii) some of them had missing or negative values for the required input-output 
selection. 
 The choice of input and output variables is influenced by the selected concept of the 
banking firm, considerations from previous literature as well as by the availability of reliable 
information (Pastor et al., 1997). Following Sealey and Lindley (1977), Casu and Molyneux 
(2003), Pasiouras (2008), Casu, Girardone and Molyneux (2004), Casu and Girardone (2006) 
and Becalli et al. (2006) a variation of the intermediation approach is adopted where a model 
with three inputs and three outputs is estimated by using the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(Computer) Program.173 Total customer deposits,174 interest expenses and fixed assets are 
chosen to serve as inputs.175 The output variables capture both the traditional lending 
activities (total loans, interest income) and the non-lending activities (other earning assets) of 
banks. 
6.3. Variables used for the Second Stage OLS Regression Analysis 
 The banking sector is the most highly regulated sector in the economy (Walter, 1985). 
The objective of international comparisons of banks’ efficiency is to understand the influence 
of different regulatory regimes. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) found that ignoring 
country-specific regulatory characteristics can create biased efficiency results in international 
comparisons. In order to investigate the impact of the regulatory environment on banks’ 
efficiency, the efficiency scores are regressed on the regulatory variables while controlling 
for other country-specific and bank-specific characteristics that are commonly used in the 
literature. The rest of this section outlines the set of regulatory and control variables used. 
Detailed explanations on their calculations and sources of information are provided in 
Appendix A at the end of this thesis. Firstly, the range of the proxies for regulations and 
supervision constructed on the basis of data from Barth et al., (2007)176 177 are presented and 
secondly, the control variables are explained. 
                                                 
173 DEAP Version 2.1. This program is developed by Tim Coelli to construct DEA frontiers for the calculation 
of technical and cost efficiencies (Center for Efficiency and Productivity Analysis-CEPA). 
174 Deposits include time, demand and savings deposits. 
175 Casu and Molyneux (2003) and Pasiouras (2008) use total costs= interest expenses + non-interest expenses. 
However, it was not possible to use this formulation in this research due to the fact that the non-interest expense 
variable was negative in several years for both countries. 
176 Studies such as Pasiouras et al. (2007), Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001), Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2002), Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004), Buch and DeLong (2004), Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005), and Beck et al. 
(2006) that focus on banking regulation and supervision and use World Bank database, have implicitly made the 
assumption that the regulatory policies within each country remained constant over the time period of the 
analysis. As Pasiouras et al. (2007) argues, this does not seem unreasonable, since Barth et al. (2004) point out 
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6.3.1. Regulatory Variables 
 The broad range of regulatory variables used in the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression is collected from the Bank Supervision section of the World Bank database on 
Banking Regulation Survey carried out by Barth et al. (1998-2000; 2003; 2007). These 
variables represent the key aspects of the regulation and supervision framework (Pasiouras et 
al., 2007). The Banking Regulation and Supervision Survey has been carried out by the 
World Bank since 1998. It is a unique source of comparable world-wide data on how banks 
are regulated and supervised around the world.178 The proxies for regulations and supervision 
are constructed following Pasiouras’ (2008) methodology.179 Specifically, several bank 
regulations such as capital adequacy requirements, the disciplinary power of authorities, 
private monitoring, deposit insurance scheme and entry regulations, all of which could have 
an impact on bank efficiency, are discussed. These regulatory variables are selected on the 
basis of data variability in both countries. Different authors use different combinations of 
these regulatory indexes. Pasiouras (2008) uses the above variables, including the regulatory 
variable on banks’ activities. On the other hand, in one of his earlier studies (2007), he 
excludes the entry restriction variable. Beltratti and Stulz (2010)180 choose to use only four 
regulatory variables which are official disciplinary power, capital requirements, activity 
restrictions and private monitoring. 
 This study covers 5 of the regulatory variables used in Pasiouras (2008):181 These are 
the following: 1) Capital adequacy requirements, 2) Official disciplinary power, 3) Private 
monitoring, 4) Deposit insurance and 5) Entry requirements. The indexes constructed with 
the use of answers from the survey questions are usually higher for Turkey than for Russia, 
which is also true for the regulatory quality indexes based on the World Bank governance 
                                                                                                                                                        
that such regulations change very little over time; and control of these influences in their study did not change 
their findings. 
177 “The Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey” of Barth, Caprio and Levine includes the years 1998-2000, 
2001, 2003 and 2007 (2007 survey was updated in 2008). In this thesis, to account for the missing years of 2009 
and 2010 regarding Russian banks, the survey was sent to officials of the national regulatory agency of Russia, 
and completed by them. 
178 It provides information on bank regulation and supervision for 143 jurisdictions. 
 http://econ.worldbank.org/ 
179 See Appendix A. 
180 As mentioned in Beltratti and Stulz (2010), it should be noted that these regulatory variables do not account 
for the stance of regulators. They argue that a country’s regulations can give a lot of flexibility to banks, but 
regulators might prevent banks from using that flexibility. However, this discussion will be analysed in detail in 
the next chapter of this thesis. 
181 The regulatory index on the restrictions on banks’ activities is excluded since the survey answers obtained 
from the national regulatory agencies and the Word Bank data gave conflicting results. 
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database.182 Since there is not much prior empirical evidence on the relationship of such 
regulations and efficiency, following Pasiouras (2008) the discussion is related to the studies 
that analyse risk-taking behaviour, banking sector stability and banks’ performance as 
measured by financial ratios. 
1. CAPTRREQ is an index of capital requirements. It accounts for whether the 
source of funds counted as regulatory capital can include assets other than cash or 
government securities and borrowed funds as well as whether the sources are 
verified by the regulatory or supervisory authorities. It also stands for whether the 
risk elements and value losses are considered while calculating the regulatory 
capital. The first pillar of Basel II and Basel III promotes the adoption of strict 
capital adequacy standards.183 
 The capital adequacy requirement (CAR) is one of the central instruments of 
prudential regulation as explained before in Chapter I of this thesis.184 It serves two 
functions: 1) Buffer effect where bank capital helps in preventing bank failures when the 
bank cannot meet its obligations to its depositors and other creditors, 2) Incentive effect 
where the capital should give banks incentives for reducing risky activities which otherwise 
would end up burdening creditors or the taxpayer. In order to account for the risk profile of 
banks’ assets in determining the required level of capital, banks have been made subject to 
risk-based capital requirements (Freixas & Rochet, 1999; Hellwig, 2010). 
 In Turkey, according to the Banks’ Act No. 4389, the minimum capital adequacy 
requirement ratio was determined as 8% in 1999 in compliance with the Basel Accords. This 
Act was replaced by the Banking Law No. 5411 in 2005. Following this replacement, the 
banking regulatory authority in Turkey required banks to hold a target ratio of 12% 
determined as a precondition to open a new branch. This ratio exceeds the capital adequacy 
ratios of many other emerging markets even in the global financial crisis years. Russia 
implemented a banking reform in 2001 and introduced a new Banking Law. Following this 
reform, capital adequacy requirements were also brought in line with the Basel Accords. 
However, as the analysis will discuss in detail in Chapter III, these requirements have been 
implemented in Turkey more strictly than in Russia. In fact, the Turkish banking sector 
utilizes capital buffer as a precautionary measure against financial crises. The importance of 
                                                 
182 The questions related to each of the regulatory variables are in Appendix A. 
183 For the calculation of this index, see Appendix A. 
184 Section 6.1.1 
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maintaining strong capital structure was emphasized in all policies carried out during its post-
crisis period (Atıcı & Gürsoy, 2011). Hence, I expect a positive impact of capital 
requirements on banks’ efficiency. 
 The effect of this regulation on banks’ risk-taking behaviour is a controversial issue in 
the literature. Some studies argue that capital regulation contributes to bank stability whereas 
others find that they make banks’ balance sheets riskier than they would be in the absence of 
such requirements due to regulatory arbitrage. The empirical literature has mixed results on 
the effects of stricter capital regulations on banks’ behaviour. Bolt and Tieman (2004) show 
in their theoretical framework that stricter capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set 
stricter acceptance criteria for providing new loans. Pasiouras (2008) finds that technical 
efficiency is positively related to stricter capital adequacy standards. A more recent study by 
Barth et al. (2010) found that greater capital regulation stringency is positively associated 
with banks’ efficiency. Other recent studies conducted by Detragiache et al. (2010) and 
Beltratti and Stulz (2010) following the financial crisis of 2007-2009 found also that 
countries with better capitalized banks performed better during the crisis of 2007-2009. One 
comprehensive study by Barth et al. (2004) in a survey of 107 countries finds that capital 
requirements contribute to a decrease in the amount of non-performing loans. 
 On the other hand, some studies such as Calem and Robb (1999), Santomero and 
Koehn (1980), Blum (1999), and Kim and Santomero (1988) find that capital requirements 
increase the risk-taking behaviour of banks. This finding is supported by some other studies 
such as Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005), Kendall (1992), and Beatty and Gron (2001) only 
under specific circumstances. 
2. OFFDISCIPLINE stands for the ability of supervisors to have the authority to take 
specific actions to prevent and correct problems (Barth et al., 2001b). Disciplinary 
power is addressed in terms of the prompt corrective action, declaration of 
insolvency and restructuring power of regulatory authorities.185 The second pillar 
of Basel II and Basel III focuses on enhancing the official supervisory practices of 
banks. As discussed in Barth et al. (2005) and Levine et al. (2005), in addition to 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank also emphasize the importance of strengthening official 
supervision of banks. Beck et al. (2006) and Levine (2003) discuss that a powerful 
                                                 
185 These will be explained in detail in Chapter III. 
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supervisor could contribute to a bank’s performance in terms of improving the 
corporate governance of banks, reducing the corruption in lending and enhancing 
the functioning of banks as financial intermediaries. Barth et al. (2004) stress the 
advantages of the disciplinary power of regulatory authorities in terms of 
preventing banks from engaging in excessive risk-taking activities and in terms of 
improving bank performance and stability. However, they also argue that granting 
too much power to supervisors may create incentives for corruption and have 
negative effects on bank performance. Followed by that, in one of their studies, 
Barth et al. find (2003) a negative relationship between supervisory indicators and 
bank performance. On the other hand, Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) find that 
the greater disciplinary capacity of supervisors is useful in reducing risk-taking 
behaviour of banks. Pasiouras (2008, 2009) finds also that technical efficiency is 
positively influenced by more powerful supervisory agencies. A recent study by 
Barth et al. (2010) finds that stronger official supervision is positively associated 
with banks’ efficiency, though only in countries with independent supervisory 
authorities. 
 In Turkey, with the enactment of the Banks Act in 1999, an independent regulatory 
authority, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), was established. A new 
Banking Law, which abolished and replaced the previous Banks Act, became effective in 
2005. This Banking Law strengthened the effectiveness of the BRSA. In Russia, the Central 
Bank of Russia (CBR) is the primary authority responsible for the regulation of the banking 
sector in Russia and also acts as Russia’s central bank. However, as the analysis of this 
chapter as well as Chapter III186 will illustrate in detail later, the degree of disciplinary power 
in Russia is lower than that in Turkey. In Russia, the authority to enforce regulations is 
basically missing. Based on these differences regarding the extent of authority in enforcing 
regulations, I expect that this variable would have a positive impact on banks’ efficiency. 
3. PRVTMONITOR stands for private monitoring index, which indicates the degree 
of information released to officials and the public, the existence of auditing 
related requirements and whether credit ratings are required. In addition to 
capital adequacy requirements and the disciplinary power of regulatory 
authorities, bank behaviour is also affected by private market forces (Barth et al., 
                                                 
186 Section 3.2 
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2006a:137). The private monitoring index takes values between 0 and 10, and 
higher values indicate higher degrees of private monitoring. Demirguc- Kunt et al. 
(2008) and Levine et al. (2005) find that regulations that promote private 
monitoring contribute to bank development which is in line with the private 
monitoring approach. On the other hand, Barth et al. (2004) find no evidence that 
regulations which promote private monitoring decrease the possibility of the 
emergence of a banking crisis. Duarte et al. (2008) argue that increased disclosure 
requirements would have a negative impact on the efficiency of banks in terms of 
increasing the costs of making additional disclosures, not to mention the 
additional time and effort required to prepare the disclosure reports. This is 
supported by Pasiouras et al. (2007), who find that higher requirements related to 
private monitoring reduce cost efficiency.187 
 The questions of the World Bank survey regarding “Private Monitoring”188 refer 
mainly to information disclosure requirements and bank examination which were explained 
in Chapter II189 as tools of prudential regulation. The objective of disclosure requirements is 
to mitigate the asymmetric information problem in the banking industry since depositors 
won’t have the incentive to privately monitor the bank about the quality of its assets. Bank 
examination is also one of the regulations that aim to limit the moral hazard incentives of 
bank managers for excessive risk-taking. Other than establishing regulations, enforcement of 
these regulations is also very important. Hence, bank examination is important to determine 
whether banks are complying with these regulations. It also adds to the quality of the 
financial information disclosed to the public by bank owners and managers and to the 
strengthening of the enforcement of existing regulations (Tchana, 2010). 
 Turkey had a weak risk-management culture towards the end of the 1990’s. This 
became evident in the 2001 crisis when significant internal audit and risk management 
weaknesses emerged. The first steps were taken with the Restructuring Process after the crisis 
under the name of “Operational Restructuring of Public Banks”. Several regulations were 
introduced regarding information disclosure requirements. With the introduction of the new 
Banking Law in 2005, the BRSA started to change its rule-based regulation and supervision 
in the direction of a more risk-based approach (Kaymak, 2009). Market discipline started to 
                                                 
187 Berger and Humphrey (1991) find that technical inefficiencies contain the vast majority of cost inefficiency 
in banks. 
188 See Appendix A for the questions related to “Private Monitoring” index 
189 Section 6.1.2 
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gain importance in providing financial stability in order to fully comply with the E.U. 
Directives. 
 In Russia, the CBR has the authority to establish rules and procedures for banks 
regarding information disclosure requirements. Following the Banking Sector Development 
Strategy introduced in 2002, the CBR started to work on bringing the existing procedures for 
disclosing information in line with the international standards. Although several important 
steps have been taken in Russia, risk management is still limited in Russia compared to 
Turkey (as will be discussed in the next chapter). My hypothesis regarding private monitoring 
effects on banks’ efficiency is that it would have a positive effect on banks’ efficiency. 
4. DEPOSITINSUR is a dummy variable190 and indicates whether the country has 
an explicit deposit insurance scheme or not. According to Pasiouras (2008), the 
impact of other regulations should be examined by also considering the existence 
of deposit insurance schemes. Barth et al. (2006a) and Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) find that whereas deposit insurance contributes to depositors’ 
safety, it reduces market discipline by the bank creditors. Furthermore, Barth et al. 
(2004) and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) investigate the relationship 
between deposit insurance and banking stability and find that deposit insurance is 
detrimental to bank stability. In their earlier study conducted in 1999, they also 
found that deposit insurance increases banking system fragility in countries with 
weak institutions. Laeven (2002), Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and 
Hendrickson and Nichols (2001) also support the view that deposit insurance 
creates moral hazard for banks and encourages risk-taking behaviour. 
 Deposit insurance is an insurance mechanism designed by the government to pay 
depositors in the event of default (Gorton & Metrick, 2009). On one hand, deposit insurance 
contributes to bank stability by preventing self-fulfilling depositor runs since depositors 
would have little incentive to withdraw their funds if they know that their deposits are insured 
by the government (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). On the other hand, deposit insurance might 
have a negative effect on bank stability by encouraging risk-taking on the part of banks. In 
the existence of such an insurance mechanism, banks would have the incentive to engage in 
riskier activities for higher returns since they know that any possible failure will be bailed out 
                                                 
190 In econometrics, a dummy variable is a variable that takes the value of 0 or 1. Dummy variables are used to 
incorporate qualitative information into a regression analysis. In my analysis, it takes the value of 1 if the 
country has a deposit insurance scheme and takes the value of 0 if it does not have a deposit insurance scheme. 
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by the government (Detragiache & Demirguc-Kunt, 2002). Therefore, the implementation of 
the deposit insurance mechanism points to the moral hazard of banks. 
 In Turkey, the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) was established in 1983. In 
Russia, the Law on Deposit Insurance was introduced at the end of 2003. However, only by 
the end of 2005, the CBR had completely finalized all the evaluation procedures and hence 
March 2005 acceptances are referred to as “first round decisions” (Chernykh & Edmister, 
2010; IMF, 2005). Due to the possibility of moral hazard of deposit insurance schemes, it is 
expected that this policy would have a negative impact on banks’ efficiency. 
5. ENTRY stands for entry requirements. It shows the number of requirements for a 
banking licence.191 The interaction of competition and financial stability is an 
important aspect in the banking sector and any competition policy should take this 
into account. Competition may be good for efficiency but it may have a negative 
impact on banks’ stability (Allen & Gale, 2004). The competition-fragility view in 
the literature argues that competition encourages excessive risk-taking, which 
would lead to less stability (Allen & Gale, 2004). Hellmann, Murdoch, and 
Stiglitz (1999), and Gorton (2010a) argue that excessive competition caused by an 
overbanked192 system would create instability. Furthermore, Caprio and Summers 
(1996) and Keeley (1990) argue that since entry barriers would increase the 
franchise value of banks, bank managers would behave more prudently to 
maintain the successful state of their banks and prevent any insolvency. On the 
other hand, since bankers may be tempted to opt for an entry restriction to limit 
competition, regulators may choose to help them for rent extraction (Schleifer, La-
Porta et al., 2000). Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and Min (1998) and Wang and 
Bayraktar (2006) support the view that the entry restrictions do have negative 
effects on competition in banking. This is supported by Besanko and Thakor 
(1992), and Cordella and Yeyati (2002) where the relaxation of entry barriers is 
perceived as improving competition and hence contributing to efficiency and cost 
reduction. 
                                                 
191 See Appendix A 
192 System with a high number of banks 
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 Entry restrictions are one of the tools of structural regulations.193 Literature provides 
different results on the impact of entry restrictions on banks. Keeley (1990) argues that banks 
with monopolistic power have greater franchise value, which would give them an incentive 
for prudent behaviour. On the other hand, by emphasizing the positive effects of competition, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) do not support entry restrictions. Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and 
Min (1998) and Wang and Bayraktar (2006) support the view that the regulatory restrictions 
indeed have negative effects on competition in banking. As the next chapter will discuss, the 
competition in both Russian and Turkish banking sectors is low. Hence, this regulation might 
be expected to have a negative impact on banks’ efficiency due to its distorting effects on 
competition. 
6.3.2. Control Variables 
 Control variables include five bank-specific and five country-specific factors which 
are selected on the basis of data availability and previous studies. The bank-specific variables 
are as follows: 1) EQAS is the equity to assets ratio which controls capital strength, 2) 
LOANTA corresponds to a bank’s net loans to total assets ratio and is a measure for loan 
activity, 3) ROE is the pre-tax profit divided by equity, and 4) EXPTA is the non-interest 
expenses to assets ratio. Pasiouras (2006; 2008), Allen and Rai (1996), Isık and Hassan 
(2003) and Fries and Taci (2005) have used these variables to represent the relationship 
between bank-specific characteristics and efficiency. 
 Concerning country-specific characteristics, the annual growth in Gross Domestic 
Product (indicated as GDP) is used to control for the macroeconomic conditions within each 
country following Hauner (2005), Pasiouras (2008), Grigorian and Manole (2002), Pastor and 
Serrano (2005), and Pasiouras (2008). Yıldırım and Philippatos (2006) find a positive link 
between GDP growth and efficiency,194 whereas Pasiouras (2008) illustrates that GDP 
growth can be negatively associated with banks’ efficiency. 
 OFGOVBANKS indicates the fraction of the banking system’s assets held by banks 
which are 50% or more owned by the government. Barth et al. (2002, 2005) argue that since 
government ownership may distort the application of different supervisory approaches, it is 
                                                 
193 See Chapter II, Section 6.2.1. 
194 As argued by Grigorian and Manole (2002) and by Gadanecz and Jayaram (2008), controlling for crisis 
would not be easy due to the mere definition of it. Hence, following them, it is assumed that the regression will 
still account for the events of the crisis since relevant information is likely to be contained in the GDP growth 
rate. 
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important to control for the degree of state-owned banks. Hence, it is important to account for 
the degree of government ownership of banks while examining regulations and supervisory 
practices. Barth (2002, 2004), Fries and Taci (2005), Carvallo and Kasman (2005), Dietsch 
and Lozano-Vivas (2000) are some of the studies that controlled for cross-country differences 
in the national market structure when focusing on banks’ performance. 
 Finally, according to La Porta et al. (1998), Pasiouras (2008), Levine (1998), 
Grigorian and Manole (2002), and Beltratti and Stulz (2010), it is also important to control 
for the institutional differences in order to understand the effects of different legal 
environments on the financial system. This thesis includes the institutional differences in the 
GOVNINTERV variable that stands for the government intervention in the economy. 
 The data for country-specific variables are collected from the Global Market 
Information Database (GMID) of Euromonitor International and the Heritage Foundation. 
The market structure data concerning the share of government-owned banks is obtained from 
the yearly banking supervision reports of both countries’ national banking regulatory 
agencies and the EBRD Index of Banking Sector Reforms. Finally, the data for 
macroeconomic variables (GDP Growth rate) are obtained from World Bank data and the 
Treasury of Turkey. 
7. Empirical Findings 
7.1. First-Stage Analysis: DEA results 
 In this section, an input-oriented DEA model is applied to a panel data195 of 869 
observations. In constructing the sample of banks for each country, both local and foreign 
commercial banks were considered.196 The DEA efficiency computations are obtained by 
processing the Data Envelopment Analysis software197 created by Coelli (1996). The focus 
on commercial banks permits an analysis of a more homogenous sample in terms of service, 
and hence inputs and outputs, improving the comparability among countries. Since the 
regulatory data of Barth et al. (2008) database are for commercial banks, this analysis only 
covers commercial banks following Pasiouras (2008) and Levine et al. (2004). 
                                                 
195 In a panel data set, the behaviour of several entities is observed across several points in time. 
196 Applying the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test which is explained in Appendix B led to the 
conclusion that a common frontier approach can be used for both types of banks with the assumption that they 
use the same production technology. See Appendix B 
197 This program is developed by Tim Coelli to construct DEA frontiers for the calculation of technical and cost 
efficiencies. 
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 Table 12 presents the distribution of sample banks by both countries for 1999-2010. 
The Russian banking sector had experienced a financial crisis in 1998, where many of the 
banks failed.198 The sample starts with 1999 - the aftermath of the 1998 crisis in Russia - so 
that the effects of this crisis can also be shown in the analysis. Besides, there was no access to 
the balance sheets of failed banks in Russia during the 1998 crisis. This is also true for the 
aftermath of the banking crisis in 2004. However, as can be seen from the table, the number 
of banks changes remarkably during the analysis period in Turkey. In 1999, just one year 
before the twin crises of 2000/2001, there are 48 commercial banks in the sample of Turkish 
banks. During these two crises a lot of banks failed and some of them ceased their operations 
while others were taken over by the Savings Deposit and Insurance Fund (SDIF). 
Table 12: Number of Sample Banks by countries 1999-2010 
Country/Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total number 
of banks 
TURKEY 48 48 35 33 31 30 29 28 28 27 27 27 391 
RUSSIA 40 41 41 41 41 41 39 39 39 39 39 38 478 
Total 88 89 76 74 72 71 68 67 67 66 66 65 869 
 Table 13 introduces the DEA results under different scale assumptions (under CRS 
and VRS). The results are reported firstly for the Turkish banks indicated as Panel A, and 
secondly for the Russian banks in Panel B of Table 13. It shows the mean of technical 
efficiency scores (both under CRS and VRS)199 and Scale Efficiency (SE) for each year. 
Technical efficiency under VRS is the focus of this study since it is the most frequently 
adopted assumption in recent studies (Pasiouras, 2008). Moreover, the employment of VRS 
can provide more realistic results in terms of real-life examples and in the presence of 
competition (Resti, 1997; Ray & Desli, 1997).200 
 Panel A of Table 13 shows the mean technical efficiency results of Turkish banks. 
Following the 2000/2001 crises, there is a decrease in the efficiency scores of Turkish banks 
between 2000 and 2001, as expected. The reforms of the post-2001 Stabilisation Programme 
                                                 
198 The period of analysis covers the years between 1999 and 2010 (inclusive). Russia had experienced a 
financial crisis in 1998, 2004 and during 2008-2009. Turkey had a twin crisis in November, 2000 and February, 
2001. 
199 In constant returns to scale (CRS), an increase in inputs results in a proportional change in the outputs. In 
variable returns to scale (VRS), an increase in inputs does not result in a proportional change in the outputs. 
200 Input-oriented DEA with Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) developed by Banker et al. (1984) allows for the 
possibility that the production technology of banks in the sample may exhibit increasing, decreasing or constant 
returns to scale (Girardone et al., 2012). 
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involved stronger capital structures, changes in the banking law, and better risk management 
and supervision. After the introduction of the Banking Restructuring Program in 2001, except 
between 2003 and 2004, there is a slight increase in the efficiency scores of banks until 2005. 
Following the introduction of the new Banking Law in 2005, there is a remarkable increase in 
the efficiency scores of Turkish banks that continues until 2010. The mean efficiency of 
0.759 in 2007 is followed by 0.869 in 2008, 0.889 in 2009 and finally 0.878 in 2010. 
 Panel B of Table 13 presents the mean technical efficiency results of Russian banks. 
After the 1998 financial crisis, the Bank of Russia took steps towards restructuring the 
banking system. Looking at the efficiency results, it is observed that the Russian banks’ 
performance increased between 1999 and 2005, with only a slight decrease between 2001 and 
2002. Following the banking crisis experienced in Russia during 2004,201 the Russian 
Government and the Bank of Russia adopted the Banking Sector Development Strategy in 
April 2005 for the 2005-2008 period. This reform aimed at the development of the banking 
sector and the enhancement of the banking sector’s stability and efficiency in the medium 
term of 2005-2008. However, looking at the results, it is evident that the efficiency of 
Russian banks decreased after 2005. The mean efficiency of 0.821 in 2005 is followed by 
0.802 in 2006, 0.763 in 2007, 0.688 in 2008, 0.640 in 2009 and 0.598 in 2010. 
 These results show that during the time period of 1999-2005, both countries exhibited 
predictable results following their banking restructuring programs. The legal analysis in 
Chapter III will explain in detail that the Turkish banking sector’s restructuring efforts and 
regulatory reforms following the 2001 crisis were implemented very efficiently and strictly. 
None of the banks were affected during the 2007-2009 global crisis. Hence, although this 
analysis does not show causality, the increasing performance level of Turkish banks is not 
surprising. On the other hand, Chapter III will also argue in detail that the banking reform and 
restructuring process in Russia were not implemented as efficiently as in Turkey. Many 
Russian banks failed during the global crisis. Therefore, the decreasing trend in the efficiency 
levels of Russian banks is also not surprising. It can be claimed that the Turkish banks 
performed relatively better than the Russian banks after 2005, including the 2007-2009 global 
crisis, where the Turkish banks’ efficiency increased as opposed to the efficiency of Russian 
banks, which decreased. 
                                                 
201 Steinherr and Klär (2005) argue that the main cause of the 2004 Russian banking crisis must be seen in the 
banking sector regulation. 
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7.2. Second-Stage Analysis: OLS Results 
 In the second-stage analysis of this study, the determinants of efficiency are estimated 
by applying an econometric model using the VRS-technical efficiency score as the dependent 
variable. Due to the limited number of observations, following Hauner (2005), the technical 
efficiency scores of both countries for 12 years are merged in both estimations. 
 Two regressions were run i) to see the impact of control variables on efficiency, 
(specifically the country effect of TURKEY) ii) for the sake of robustness check. In the first 
specification presented in Table 14, when the regression was run without the regulatory 
variables, it was observed that the efficiency scores are positively and significantly related to 
the variable TURKEY. The positive coefficient on the dummy variable TURKEY indicates 
the fact that a bank being in Turkey has a positive and statistically significant impact on that 
bank’s efficiency. In the second table, we see the negative coefficient on the dummy variable 
RUSSIA which indicates that a bank being in Russia has a negative and statistically 
significant impact on that bank’s efficiency. 
Table 13: DEA Findings calculated on the basis of a common frontier 
PANEL A: Annual Average DEA Efficiency Estimates of Turkish Banks 
Years CRSTE VRSTE SE 
1999 0.325 0.606 0.559 
2000 0.505 0.644 0.794 
2001 0.498 0.629 0.816 
2002 0.526 0.681 0.767 
2003 0.662 0.741 0.878 
2004 0.624 0.691 0.921 
2005 0.526 0.691 0.794 
2006 0.368 0.710 0.555 
2007 0.719 0.759 0.951 
2008 0.821 0.869 0.945 
2009 0.818 0.889 0.922 
2010 0.785 0.878 0.895 
Average 
Mean 0.598 0.732 0.816 
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PANEL B: Annual Average DEA Efficiency Estimates of Russian Banks 
Years CRS VRS SE 
1999 0.594 0.653 0.905 
2000 0.551 0.729 0.745 
2001 0.716 0.804 0.892 
2002 0.739 0.787 0.944 
2003 0.735 0.805 0.925 
2004 0.785 0.815 0.966 
2005 0.810 0.821 0.988 
2006 0.780 0.802 0.976 
2007 0.713 0.763 0.936 
2008 0.594 0.688 0.879 
2009 0.561 0.640 0.895 
2010 0.505 0.598 0.885 
Average Mean 0.674 0.742 0.911 
Notes:  
CRSTE: Technical Efficiency from Constant Returns to Scale 
VRSTE: Technical Efficiency from Variable Returns to Scale 
SE: Scale Efficiency= CRSTE/VRSTE 
Figure 6: Graphical Representation of DEA Scores 
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Table 14: Impact of control variables on technical efficiency 
Variables Coefficient Robust Std. Error t P >|t| 
ROE 0.0000186 0.0000507 0.37 0.715 
EQAS 0.0029697 0.0008469 3.51 0.001* 
LOANTA 0.0079086 0.0007313 10.81 0.000* 
EXPTA 0.0009445 0.0015449 0.61 0.543 
GDP 0.0024515 0.0015853 1.55 0.126 
OFGOVBANKS -0.0017184 0.0008687 -1.98 0.051** 
GOVNTINTERV -0.0024108 0.0124208 -0.19 0.847 
TURKEY 0.1889056 0.219252 8.62 0.000* 
_cons 0.3523187 0.077009 4.58 0.000* 
 
Variables Coefficient Robust Std. Error t P >|t| 
ROE 0.0000186 0.0000507 0.37 0.715 
EQAS 0.0029697 0.0008469 3.51 0.001* 
LOANTA 0.0079086 0.0007313 10.81 0.000* 
EXPTA 0.0009445 0.0015449 0.61 0.543 
GDP 0.0024515 0.0015853 1.55 0.126 
OFGOVBANKS -0.0017184 0.0008687 -1.98 0.051** 
GOVNTINTERV -0.0024108 0.0124208 -0.19 0.847 
RUSSIA -0.1889056 0.0219252 -8.62 0.000* 
_cons 0.5412243 0.0768454 7.04 0.000* 
Notes: 
ROE: Return on Equity 
EQAS: Equity/Assets 
LOANTA: Net Loans/Total Assets 
EXPTA: Non-interest expenses/Total Assets 
GDP: Annual growth in Gross Domestic Product 
OFGOVBANKS: Presence of government-owned banks 
GOVNINTERV: Government intervention in the economy 
*Statistically significant at the 1% level 
 Since it is suspected that the regulations might be the cause of the difference between 
the two countries, a second regression was run. In order to test the impact of regulatory 
variables on the banks’ efficiency, the dummy variable was excluded and the regression was 
run adding the regulatory variables of interest (CAPTREQ, OFFDSCPLINE, 
PRVTMONITOR, DEPOSITINSUR, ENTRY) by controlling for bank-specific (ROE, EQAS, 
LOANTA,EXPTA) and country-specific (GDP, OFGOVBANKS, GOVNINTERV) variables. 
 Regulations and constitutions in a country change very little over time (Barth et al., 
2004). The impact of any change in the regulations may not be realised immediately by the 
bank’s performance. In fact, Isık and Hasan (2003) indicate that a relatively long period is 
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needed for developments in the regulatory environment to exert their influence upon banking 
technology. Following that, a 12-year time period is chosen since one cannot analyse the 
results independently of the past period. Increasing the size of the observation set provides 
more robust results. Furthermore, Barth et al. (2004), Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005), 
Pasiouras et al. (2007) and Pasiouras (2008) argue that since many regulations can be 
substitutes or complements, countries will probably not select these policies in isolation. 
Following this argument, all the regulatory policy variables are included in the regression. 
However, the degree of the included control variables is restricted since to include too many 
regressors would increase the potential for multi-collinearity.202 Furthermore, each bank in 
the sample starts with a different baseline, so banks are clustered to account for the 
dependence. Table 15 presents the results. 
Table 15: OLS Regression Results 
Variables Coefficient Robust Std. Error t P >|t| 
CAPTREQ 0.2329109 0.056166 4.15 0.000* 
OFFDISCPLINE 0.0578942 0.0114127 5.07 0.000* 
PRVTMONITOR -0.1770744 0.0394925 -4.48 0.000* 
DEPOSITINSUR -0.4754652 0.1092347 -4.35 0.000* 
ENTRY -0.1978618 0.0383493 -5.16 0.000* 
ROE -2.63E-06 0.0000468 -0.06 0.955 
EQAS 0.0027487 0.000934 2.94 0.004* 
LOANTA 0.0099268 0.0007869 12.61 0.000* 
EXPTA -0.0011137 0.0015121 -0.74 0.463 
GDP 0.0009409 0.001244 0.76 0.451 
ofgovbanks -0.0020203 0.0011628 -1.74 0.086 
GOVNTINTERV 0.0085346 0.0140041 0.61 0.544 
cons_ 1.065441 0.2014387 5.29 0.000* 
Notes: The regression includes bank-fixed effects. 
*** Statistically significant at the 10% level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
* Statistically significant at the 1% level 
CAPTREQ: Capital Requirements 
PRVTMONITOR: Private Monitoring 
OFFDISCPLINE: Official Disciplinary Power 
DEPOSITINSUR: Deposit Insurance 
ENTRY: Entry Requirements 
ROE: Return on Equity 
EQAS: Equity/Assets 
LOANTA: Net Loans/Total Assets 
EXPTA: Non-interest expenses/Total Assets 
                                                 
202 High correlation between two or more of the independent variables is called multicollinearity (Wooldridge, 
2003). 
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GDP: Annual growth in Gross Domestic Product 
OFGOVBANKS: Presence of government-owned banks 
GOVNINTERV: Government intervention in the economy 
REGQUALITY: Regulatory Quality 
 The results provide evidence in favour of the regulations related to stricter capital 
adequacy standards (CAPTREQ) and official disciplinary power (OFFDSCPLINE). Both 
variables are statistically significant. Higher capital stringency increases banks’ efficiency, 
which provides support to the first pillar of Basel II and to its prospective enhancement 
through Basel III. Higher official disciplinary power (Pillar 2 of Basel II) is also positively 
associated with higher efficiency, providing evidence for the official supervision approach as 
well. Although not directly related to the performance of banks, the stabilizing effect of 
capital regulations and supervisory power is supported by Pasiouras et al. (2011), who find 
that capital requirements and especially official disciplinary power provide a direct and 
effective mechanism in reducing both credit and solvency risks for banks. Their findings 
recommend improving the auditing of banks and imposing sanctions where appropriate. 
These findings support the theory of the official supervision approach, suggesting that 
powerful supervision can improve the corporate governance of banks and their functioning. 
 Regulations that enhance private monitoring – the variable PRVTMONITOR - (Pillar 
3 of Basel II) are negatively associated with banks’ efficiency. This is in line with Duarte et 
al. (2008) and Pasiouras et al. (2007), who argue that increased disclosure requirements such 
as obtaining credit ratings from external agencies, disclosure of off-balance sheet items to 
supervisors and to the public, disclosure of risk management procedures to the public as well 
as auditing by certified auditors might have a negative impact on banks’ efficiency due to 
increased costs. Besides, Pasiouras et al. (2006) find a negative relationship between 
disclosure requirements and credit ratings. Another study by Barth et al. (2004) finds no 
evidence that regulations enhancing private monitoring would reduce the possibility of the 
occurrence of major banking crises. Girardone et al. (2012) find that private monitoring is 
associated with greater banking system inefficiency. 
 Regulations related to deposit insurance (DEPOSITINSUR) and entry requirements 
(ENTRY) also have a negative impact on the efficiency of banks. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002) show that safety nets such as deposit insurance and Lender of Last Resort 
(LLR) provided by the central banks are likely to increase the risk of bank instability.203 
                                                 
203 Unlimited access to deposit insurance and Lender of Last Resort functions of the central banks would induce 
banks to risk-taking behaviours, because the losses would be ultimately borne by the taxpayers (Pacces, 2010). 
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Barth et al. (2006a) emphasize that subjecting bank liabilities to the risk of loss should be one 
of the key items of a prudential regulatory framework that aims to enhance market discipline 
and reduce risk-taking. Regarding the entry restrictions, Barth et al. (2004) found that the 
percentage of entry applications denied is greater for low-income countries than for high-
income countries; and that developing countries place more limitations on foreign bank 
ownership of domestic banks and foreign bank entry through branching than developed 
countries. 
 From the control variables related to bank-specific characteristics, the variable EQAS 
measuring the capital strength, is statistically significant and positively associated with 
efficiency. LOANTA, a measure of loan activity, is also positively associated with efficiency, 
but it is statistically significant. Finally, expenses relative to assets (EXPTA) and profitability 
(ROE) do not have an impact on banks’ technical efficiency which is in line with Pasiouras’ 
(2008) findings. Controlling for macro-economic conditions, it is found that the GDP growth 
rate (GDP) has a positive impact on efficiency; however it is statistically insignificant. 
 The negative coefficient on OFGOVBANKS indicates that a lower number of 
government-owned banks would result in an increase in efficiency. This result is statistically 
significant and it is also in line with Barth et al. (2001a) and Pasiouras (2008) who find that 
greater government ownership is generally associated with less efficient financial systems. 
De Nicolo (2000) shows that banks in countries with a higher level of state ownership exhibit 
a higher insolvency risk. This is also supported by Caprio and Martinez (2000), whose results 
show that government ownership of banks is positively related with bank fragility. La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) found also that countries with higher levels of 
government ownership of banks tend to have a lower level of financial development and 
slower economic growth rates. 
 The proxy used for the government intervention in the economy (GOVNINTERV) is 
meant to control for the differences in the overall institutional environment between Turkey 
and Russia. However, its impact is statistically insignificant. 
8. Conclusion 
 This study applied a two-stage analysis in which the DEA empirical findings obtained 
in the first-stage analysis are regressed by OLS in the second-stage in order to examine the 
impact of regulation and supervision on banks’ efficiency. The variables describing the 
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approach to regulation and supervision are as follows: capital adequacy, disciplinary power 
of the authorities, private monitoring, deposit insurance schemes, and entry regulations. The 
sample includes 88 commercial banks in total operating in Russia and Turkey over the 1999 - 
2010 period. The results of DEA indicate that Turkish banks’ performances in general show 
an increasing trend, firstly with the implementation of the Banking Restructuring Program in 
2001 and then with the introduction of a new Banking Law in 2005, which is based on stricter 
regulations and supervision system. On the contrary, Russian banks’ efficiency starts to 
decrease gradually from 2005 until 2010. Although Russia implemented a Banking 
Restructuring Program for the period 2005-2008, banks’ performances deteriorated. This 
analysis is followed by the regression analysis to investigate the impact of regulations related 
to capital adequacy, private monitoring, disciplinary power of the authorities, entry into 
banking and deposit insurance on banks’ technical efficiency while controlling for country-
specific macro-economic factors, market structure, and overall institutional development. 
 The empirical analysis provides support for stricter capital adequacy standards and for 
the development of powerful supervisory agencies, but not for a private monitoring approach, 
deposit insurance schemes and entry regulations. This would imply that banking regulatory 
authorities in emerging markets should focus on maintaining high levels of capital adequacy 
requirements and developing powerful supervisory agencies for the sake of enforcement of 
regulations. With respect to the bank-specific characteristics, it was found that capital 
strength and higher loan activity result in higher technical efficiency. Expenses relative to 
assets and profitability do not have an impact on banks’ technical efficiency. Finally, it was 
found that among the country-specific variables such as GDP, the presence of government-
owned banks and the degree of government intervention in the economy, only the presence of 
government-owned banks has a significant impact on banks’ efficiency, though in a negative 
way. 
 Looking at the regulatory indexes used in the regression analysis, it is observed that as 
most of the regulatory and supervisory indexes get a higher value in Turkey, Turkish banks’ 
performance increases gradually, even during the 2007-2009 crisis. This suggests that stricter 
regulations had a positive impact on Turkish banks across the years. On the other hand, most 
of the regulatory indexes in Russia get a lower value after 2005, which is accompanied by the 
decreasing efficiency scores of Russian banks after 2005. These decreasing efficiency scores 
of Russian banks are even confirmed by the 2008-2009 banking crisis experienced in Russia 
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where many banks were either wiped out or bailed out by the Central Bank of Russia whereas 
Turkish banks did not experience any other crisis after 2001. 
 Pasiouras et al. (2011) argue that new regulatory initiatives are not able to affect the 
risk-taking behaviour of banks immediately. If regulations have an impact on risk-taking of 
banks, then one should expect that there are lags between establishing new banking laws and 
taking new policy initiatives (which are reflected in the corresponding indices) and the time 
that these laws and initiatives are translated into more sound banking practices (Pasiouras et 
al., 2011). Hence, they suggest that the regulatory practices of the previous periods are 
expected to have an impact on the contemporaneous level of banks’ risk-taking behaviour. 
The data here suggest that the important reforms implemented after the 2001 crisis in Turkey 
followed by the introduction of a stricter Banking Law in 2005 had a positive impact on the 
performance of Turkish banks in the earlier period. Following the argument by Pasiouras et 
al. (2011), mentioned above, although the empirical results of this chapter are based on 
earlier years, the solidity of this regulatory/supervisory framework might well have 
contributed to the good performance of Turkish banks during the 2007-2009 crisis. These 
results also suggest that regulation has a significant role in diminishing the effects of a 
financial crisis in emerging markets. 
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Chapter III - Banking Regulation and Supervision in 
Turkey and Russia 
1. Introduction 
 Banking crises in emerging markets during the 1990s were associated with major 
macroeconomic disruptions where the specific nature of banking and financial systems has 
played a crucial role (Özkan, 2003). As was explained in the first chapter of this thesis,204 the 
existence of systemic risk and market failures constitutes the basis of the need for financial 
regulation. These problems tend to be more acute in emerging economies mainly due to 
institutional factors in terms of the indicators of the rule of law, enforcement, protection of 
property rights, supervision and accounting standards, all of which are poorly exercised in 
these countries. Furthermore, banks are the main drivers of economic development and their 
potential fragility may even exacerbate downturns (Vives, 2006). This was experienced in 
Turkey in the 2000/2001 crisis and in Russia in 1998, 2004 and 2008-2009. 
 The banking crises of both Turkey and Russia were followed by major restructuring 
and recovery of their banking industries.205 The restructuring of the Turkish banking sector 
following the 2000/2001 crisis started immediately after the crisis whereas in Russia there 
was no serious banking restructuring programme for more than four years following the 1998 
crisis. In fact, major reforms in banking were implemented in 2003-2005 (Barisitz, 2009). In 
the aftermath of the 1998 financial crisis, Russia’s banking system has grown stronger and 
larger. However, despite important steps taken, the assessments of the progress made in 
banking supervision, in improving the legal and regulatory framework and in their 
enforcement suggest that the weaknesses in prudential supervision and regulation remained; 
and Russian banks continued to play a limited role in intermediating savings and investments 
(OECD, 2009; Thiessen, 2005). In fact, in 2004, Russian banks’ stability proved weak again 
and the banking sector experienced a so called mini-crisis (Karas et al., 2008).206 More 
                                                 
204 Chapter I, Section 4 
205 The first Russian crisis mentioned in this thesis refers to the 1998 crisis. Russia experienced a crisis in 2004 
and again in 2008-2009. Turkey had twin crises in November 2000 and February 2001. 
206 In 2004, the Russian banking sector experienced instability resulting in a crisis of confidence towards 
Russian banks by their customers. In May 2004, the Central Bank of Russia suspended the banking licence of a 
medium-sized bank that had been accused of breaches of the Russian anti-money laundering laws. This 
intervention of the CBR created uncertainty in the market and triggered panic, putting various banks under 
stress. Many banks stopped extending interbank loans. These developments provoked a widespread loss of 
confidence within the banking system. A deposit insurance system was not yet established. Hence, being 
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importantly, the Russian banking sector succumbed to the global crisis in the second half of 
2008 (Fungacova & Jakubik, 2012). 
 On the other hand, Turkish banks have been more resilient in terms of their ability to 
absorb shocks and maintain liquidity compared to Russian banks during the global crisis. The 
resilience of the financial markets in Turkey seems to be mainly attributable to the reforms 
and consolidation of the banking sector after the 2001 financial crisis (BRSA, 2010; 
Bredenkamp et al., 2009).  
 The aim of this chapter is to show that Turkey has implemented a stricter and more 
comprehensive banking reform than Russia in their respective post-crisis periods, that is, the 
post-2001 period for Turkey and the post-1998 period for Russia. Banking reforms 
implemented in Turkey involved stronger capital structures, stricter enforcement of the 
banking law (through supervision as well as numerous and detailed regulations intended to 
support the implementation of the law), more disciplinary power granted to the regulatory 
authority, and a better risk management policy compared to the reforms implemented in 
Russia. 
 Section 2 of this chapter describes the banking environment in both countries in their 
pre-crisis periods. Similarities in the problems of the banking sectors will be highlighted. 
Section 3 discusses the weaknesses and the strengths of the banking regulations which were 
implemented in both Turkey and Russia in their post-crisis period, taking also into account 
the impact of these regulations on banks’ performances. The emphasis will be placed on the 
capital adequacy regulations and the official disciplinary power of the banking 
regulatory/supervisory bodies, since these variables seem to account for most of the 
differences in both countries, according to the qualitative analysis of this chapter. As found 
by the empirical analysis of the previous chapter,207 these variables have a positive and 
significant effect on banks’ efficiency. The qualitative analysis in this chapter suggests that 
the Turkish banking sector has a higher stringency in capital adequacy regulations and in the 
official disciplinary power of the regulatory authority compared to the Russian banking 
sector. 
                                                                                                                                                        
concerned about their deposits, depositors began to withdraw their money from their banks. A number of banks 
had to sell securities and loans to meet their liquidity needs. However, the lack of trust among banks caused the 
drying up of liquidity in the interbank market. The volume of interbank lending on the domestic market 
contracted by 12.2% in May, 2004 and 13.3% in June, 2004 (CBR, 2004; Steinherr, 2006). 
207 Chapter II, Section 6.2 
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 In addition to capital adequacy requirements and the disciplinary power of the 
regulatory authorities, bank behaviour is also affected by private market forces. Therefore, it 
is important to understand the extent of private monitoring that exists in a country (Barth et 
al., 2006a:137). The empirical analysis in Chapter II showed that private monitoring208 had a 
negative effect on efficiency. According to the qualitative analysis of this chapter, the 
Turkish banking sector has a higher stringency in private monitoring than the Russian 
banking sector. Regarding disclosure requirements, the public has more access to information 
about the overall condition of the banking industry. Besides, the risk management system in 
Turkish banks is implemented in a more disciplined way than it is implemented in Russian 
banks. However, increased disclosure requirements might have a negative impact on banks’ 
efficiency due to increased costs (Duarte et al., 2008; Pasiouras et al., 2007). 
 The impact of regulations and supervisory practices on banks’ performance may also 
depend on whether a country implements a deposit insurance scheme or not (Barth et al., 
2006a:133). It was found in Chapter II that deposit insurance has a negative impact on banks’ 
efficiency. This system has been implemented in Turkey since 1983. In Russia, it was first 
introduced in December, 2003. The qualitative analysis of this chapter suggests that the 
amount and duration of this insurance provided to banks is important in the sense that it 
might create a moral hazard for banks. 
 Entry requirements refer to the ability of banks to enter the banking industry in both 
Turkey and Russia. According to the qualitative analysis of this chapter, the number of 
barriers required as part of the licensing process is similar for both Turkish banks and 
Russian banks. Imposing basic requirements before a banking license is accepted or rejected 
can enhance the overall performance of the banking sector, because in that way only the 
higher quality banks are allowed to enter the banking sector (Barth et al., 2006a:111). In fact, 
considering both countries’ banking histories, which are characterised by pervasive 
connected-lending and corruptive practices and abuses of banks’ resources by their 
governments, imposing entry restrictions to better assure the quality of entrants gains a 
particular importance. On the other hand, the negative impact of this regulation on efficiency 
found in Chapter II suggests that its distorting effect on competition prevails. 
                                                 
208 As was explained in Chapter II, private monitoring mainly refers to the disclosure requirements such as 
obtaining credit ratings from external agencies, disclosure of off-balance sheet items to supervisors and to the 
public, disclosure of risk management procedures to the public as well as auditing by certified auditors. 
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 Finally, the banking environment of both countries in terms of the share of 
government-owned banks will be discussed in Section 4. This variable is found to have a 
negative impact on efficiency in Chapter II. The qualitative analysis in this chapter will show 
that the ratio of government-owned banks in Turkey is lower than in Russia. 
 The suggestive results obtained by the empirical work of Chapter II combined with 
the qualitative analysis of this chapter can contribute to reforms that could be implemented in 
the long run to improve the efficiency and the resilience of both countries’ banking sectors. 
After having understood the problems in the regulations in terms of their positive and 
negative impacts on banks’ performances in both countries, policymakers can focus on these 
problems to improve the banking performances in these two emerging countries. 
2. An Overview of the Financial Crises in Turkey and Russia 
 Both in Turkey and Russia, the economy relies primarily on the banking sector to 
promote its development and hence is highly vulnerable to the problems in the banking sector 
(Mahlberg et al., 2011; Caner et al., 2007). Both countries’ banking sectors were exposed to 
connected and politicized lending for a long time. Politicised lending is rent-seeking political 
intervention in the allocation of bank credit (Bakır & Öniş, 2010). Private actors such as 
banking lobbies and politicians in both countries had a tendency to use private banks for 
government financing and to abuse the public banks, in order to maintain their electoral 
support through inefficient credit allocations instead of productive investments. These players 
even had a tendency to resist regulations that might have conflicted with their interests.209 
 The restructuring process and the regulatory/supervisory framework established after 
the 2001 crisis ended this practice in the Turkish banking sector. The legal component of the 
bank restructuring and reform process focused on the strengthening of prudential regulations, 
with special emphasis on connected-lending practices.210 On the other hand, this is still a 
                                                 
209 In Russia, in the period up to the 1998 crisis during the 1990s, the banking lobby opposed any steps to 
introduce stricter regulations based on the model of Western standards, if this meant lower earnings (Steinherr & 
Klär, 2005). 
210 Following the 2001 crisis, the introduction of new regulations regarding connected lending practices replaced 
the narrow definition of the concept of a “risk group” which before the crisis led to much abuse of connected 
lending. The amount of a bank’s exposure with each risk group was reduced from 75% of the bank’s net worth 
to 25% in line with the E.U. standards. These limits are monitored regularly by the BRSA and the relevant 
information is included in the audited financial statements which are disclosed to the public (Steinherr et al., 
2004). According to the Banking Law which came into force in 2005, violation of this regulation is punishable 
with imprisonment and compensation for the losses incurred by the bank (Banking Law (2005)-Article 160). 
Thanks to the regular supervision and control of the BRSA, connected lending became a less significant issue in 
the Turkish banking system (Bascı, 2006). 
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problem in Russia where weak enforcement of regulations and delay of the restructuring 
process contributed to the existence of regulatory forbearance.211 The aim of bank 
supervision and regulation is to give banks incentives to take fewer risks. However a policy 
of regulatory forbearance creates moral hazards for banks. Following the 1998 crisis, the 
Central Bank of Russia allowed for a high degree of forbearance towards large banks in 
financial difficulties.212 As a result, only a few licenses were cancelled creating a moral 
hazard problem (Ippolito, 2002). Tompson (2004) says: “The CBR’s long record of 
regulatory forbearance before and after the 1998 crisis led many banks to believe that they 
could violate prudential norms and default on obligations with impunity” (Tompson, 2004). 
 This section will provide an overview of the reasons for the crises based on the 
weaknesses of both countries’ banking sectors. The analysis shows that both countries’ pre-
crisis environment was suffering from the same problems such as macro-economic instability 
in terms of high and volatile inflation, fluctuations in growth rate and capital movements, 
high public-sector debt, exposure to foreign exchange rate risks and liquidity risks, a high 
proportion of state-owned banks in the system and their distorting effects, politicized lending 
to government-owned banks, poor capital adequacy, and weak accounting and auditing 
standards. More importantly, both countries suffered from a lack of a proper legal and 
institutional framework underpinning the prudential banking regulation and supervision. This 
created a very fragile banking system in both countries. The pre-crisis environments and the 
restructuring processes that the banking sectors of both countries underwent after their crisis 
periods are critical for an understanding of the context in which they both started their 
banking reform, and for an evaluation of the level of successes of these reforms. 
                                                 
211 IMF Survey Online, (2010) Magazine: Interview with Poul Thomsen, August 2, 2010. 
Thiessen (2005) argues that the regulatory forbearance during and after the 1998 crisis was clearly further 
damaging the financial system. Causes of the crisis and its effects are explained in detail in Thiessen (2004) as 
well. It also provides evidence of the inadequate banking supervision in the aftermath of the crisis 
212According to Instruction No. 1 of the CBR ‘‘On the Procedure for Regulating the Activities of Credit 
Organisations’’, Russian banks are not permitted to have an exposure to any single borrower or a group of 
related borrowers in excess of 25% of their capital (Article 64 of the Russian Federation Federal Law- On the 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia). However, poor monitoring of the CBR contributed to 
the incentives for connected lending which is still a problem in banking (IMF, 2010; 2013). The definition of 
connected borrowers and related parties in the legislation is still narrow and does not cover situations when 
influence and connection can be exerted by economic means. Besides, current limitations on the legislative 
framework also limit the CBR’s powers to issue regulations or to impose supervisory restrictions to related 
parties’ transaction. In addition, the CBR lacks the authority to sanction directors individually. The CBR’s 
existing powers regarding related borrowers are not in the form of supporting laws or regulations (IMF, 2011a) 
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2.1. Financial Crisis in Turkey (2000/2001) 
 In November 2000, the Turkish economy was hit by a severe liquidity crisis. The 
situation was normalized by an IMF-led emergency package for a while. However, the 
Turkish currency came under heavy attack in February 2001 and this turned into the most 
serious financial and economic crisis Turkey has experienced in its post-war history (Özkan, 
2003).213 While the economy was suffering from several macroeconomic problems including 
a weak external and fiscal position which were at the root of the crisis, the fragility of the 
banking sector increased the magnitude of the crisis (Penas & Tümer-Alkan, 2008; Akyürek, 
2006). In fact, it is argued that the main cause of the 2000-2001 Turkish crises was the 
fragility of the banking sector, mainly as a result of the mechanism chosen to finance high 
public-sector deficits and hence heavy reliance on bank intermediation of government debt 
(Akyürek, 2006; Özatay & Sak, 2002). The poorly functioning and under-regulated banking 
system in Turkey contributed to the macroeconomic instability and the fragility of the 
financial system which characterised much of the 1990s in Turkey (Özkan, 2003). 
2.1.1. Problems in the Economy and Financial Sector 
 The macroeconomic problems which have contributed to the 2001 crisis are long-
standing conditions dating back to the 1990s (Özkan, 2003). The first source of vulnerability 
was the weak fiscal position due to high levels of public debt caused by record levels of 
interest payments on domestic borrowing. This caused a huge burden on public finances. 
Furthermore, fiscal imbalances were financed through inflation. This way of deficit financing 
increased the internal debt burden, leading to unsustainable public debt ratios. The second 
vulnerability was the weak external position of the balance of payments214 due to excessive 
levels of debt repayment, which was aggravated by the unpredictable trend of the exchange 
rate (Özkan, 2003). A third source of vulnerability was the growth performance, which was 
showing a very unstable trend. It was mainly dependent on global capital inflows, which were 
constantly slowing down. In fact, the GDP growth in 1990-2000 oscillated between 9.3 % 
and -5.5%. High domestic interest rates caused an increase in short-term capital inflows and 
hence, foreign direct investment (FDI) remained limited. The fact that these capital inflows 
                                                 
213 Turkey also experienced financial crises in the 1980s and in 1994. However, they are not discussed here 
since the empirical analysis covers the period from 1999 onwards. 
214 The balance of payments is a statistical statement that summarizes the economic transactions of an economy 
with the rest of the world. Transactions, (mostly between residents and non-residents) consist of those involving 
goods, services, and income; those involving financial claims on, and liabilities to, the rest of the world; and 
those classified as transfers (IMF, Balance of Payments Textbook, 1996). 
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were not permanent affected the economic environment and the financial markets negatively. 
As a result, in 2000 monetary expansion became heavily dependent on capital inflows. 
However, political ambiguities taking place caused deterioration in investor confidence; and 
net capital entry started to decrease steadily (BRSA, 2010). 
 These structural problems caused inflation to follow a high and volatile trend 
distorting expectations and reducing the maturity for the funds within the economy. This 
situation, accompanied by the pressure on interest rates and exchange rates caused by the 
deterioration in public sector debt and the balance of payments, created an environment 
which was not appropriate for the proper functioning of banking activities (BRSA, 2010). 
 The weak banking sector basically prepared the ground for the liquidity squeeze215 in 
November 2000 and aggravated the already distorted macro-economic environment 
(Altunbas et al., 2009:26). Enforcement was very weak due to widespread regulatory 
forbearance and overly lenient prudential regulations. The high degree of politicization of 
bank lending and heavy rent-seeking in the allocation of bank credit caused corruption in the 
banking sector. Towards the end of the 1990s, financial intermediation was not functioning 
properly. The banking sector was financing the government rather than the real sector. The 
government was incurring excessive public debt and misusing the public sector banks. 
Private banks were exposed to high levels of exchange rate and interest rate risk. Bank loans 
were not being allocated through market-based supply and demand mechanisms for credit 
and finance, but by political intervention. The result of this politicized bank lending was the 
inefficient allocation of bank credit for productive investments and the crowding out of the 
private sector (Bakir & Öniş, 2010; Bredenkamp et al., 2009; BRSA, 2010). 
2.1.2. Build-Up of the 2000/2001 Crisis 
 The insufficiency of the scope and effectiveness of regulations in banking and the 
weak risk management applications made the banking system very sensitive to liquidity, 
interest and exchange rate risks. Lack of transparency caused by the deficiencies in the 
implementation of financial reporting and international accounting standards distorted the 
banking structure and reduced confidence in the sector. In the second half of November 2000, 
interest rates increased significantly, large capital flows went abroad, Central Bank reserves 
decreased rapidly, and a sharp decrease was observed in stock prices. Several banks became 
                                                 
215 Liquidity crisis is explained in Chapter I-Section 2.2 
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exposed to a liquidity shortage, resulting in their transfers to the Savings and Deposits 
Insurance Fund (SDIF) and/or termination of their operating licenses. In order to prevent this 
first crisis of November 2000 from deepening, a series of measures were taken immediately 
in December 2000 with a relative recovery in markets. However, at the end of December 
2000 the average interest rates were four times higher than the levels at the beginning of 
November 2000. This unsustainable situation ended when the Prime Minister announced in 
February 19, 2001 that there was a severe political crisis which led to an equally serious 
economic crisis in highly sensitive markets. On that day, interest rates jumped to 
unprecedented levels and followed by these negative developments, a speculative attack 
started against the Turkish Lira. Three days later the exchange rate system collapsed 
triggering a second financial crisis in February 2001 (BRSA, 2010; Özatay & Sak, 2003). 
2.2. The Impact of the 2007-2009 Global Crisis 
 The Turkish economy was affected by the global crisis due to its interconnected 
relation with the world economy and hence, through international trade channels. Since 
Turkey is an open economy, the 2007-2009 global crisis transmitted itself to the Turkish 
economy in the sharp decline of world trade of goods and services.216 Its economy was 
negatively affected by the deceleration of global economic growth and slowing international 
capital flows (Canakcı, 2009). The GDP growth rate of the Turkish economy dropped sharply 
from 8.5% in 2007 to -7.8% in 2009 (which had returned back to 4% in 2010). This was 
accompanied by a decline in external and domestic demand. External financing became 
limited. The unemployment rate and the current account deficit increased (Aras, 2010). 
 Regarding the effects of the global crisis on the banking sector, Turkish banks have 
been more resilient in terms of the ability of banks to absorb shocks and maintain liquidity 
compared to other emerging markets (including the Russian banks) during the global crisis. 
The asset quality of Turkish banks remained stable. Banks continued to provide their 
financial intermediation functions effectively. The average capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 
the banking sector rose during the crisis, fluctuating around 20% - well above the target level 
of 12% and the legally required level of 8% (Yorukoglu & Atasoy, 2010). Although the 
stable growth environment created a rapid credit growth, excessive risk-taking of banks was 
prevented due to legal regulations.217 Hence, the ratios of non-performing loans were rather 
                                                 
216 Foreign trade comprises more than 50% of GDP (Aras, 2010). 
217 Regulations will be explained in detail in Section 3. 
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low even in the period of the crisis (Aras, 2010). More importantly, there were no bank 
failures in Turkey. Unlike most of the other emerging markets, the Turkish banking system 
has not required any rescue packages from the government, nor any capital support or any 
other forms of government support. No banks have been transferred to the Savings Deposit 
Insurance Fund. There were no changes in the ownership of banks, no liquidation and thus no 
fall in the number of banks. There was also no fall in the profitability of banks. In fact, the 
profitability of Turkish banks increased in 2008 and 2009. Moreover, Turkey is one of the 
few countries whose credit rating has improved during the crisis (Uygur, 2010; Yorukoglu & 
Atasoy, 2010). 
2.3. Financial Crises in Russia (1998, 2004, 2008-2009)  
2.3.1. Problems in the Economy and Financial Sector 
 Russia has a bank-based financial system. Banking in Russia is very young because 
most of the banks were established only in the 1990s. Until 1988, since Russia had a socialist 
economy, the banking sector was a mono-bank system which consisted of a state-bank 
operating as both a central bank and a commercial bank. With the creation of a two-tier 
banking system in 1988, the banking sector consisted of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) 
and five banks218 that were designed to finance specific state programmes. When the 
government introduced “the 1988 Law on Cooperatives”, banks were allowed to be formed 
with private capital. This was followed by the creation of the so-called “pocket” banks,219 
acting as agents for related companies. In 1992, the number of licensed banks in Russia was 
more than 1300. Lax entry conditions and close relations of former state bank officials with 
the CBR helped the bankers to accelerate their registrations. Besides, high inflation made it 
easy to satisfy the minimum capital requirements to establish a bank (Steinherr, 2006). In 
fact, the number of commercial banks registered by the CBR was 2552 in 1997 (CBR, 1997). 
 The CBR was responsible for supervising, regulating and licensing banks which 
exposed it to conflicts of interest: the regulatory agency (CBR) was in a close relationship 
                                                 
218 Agroprombank, Promstroibank, Sberbank, Vnesheconombank and Zhilsotsbank 
219 Pocket banks are best understood as tools of business groupings or state institutions rather than independent, 
profit-oriented businesses. Many larger Russian banks are closely affiliated with large financial industrial 
groupings and are oriented to serving the needs of those group members (OECD, 2004). Pocket-banks are also 
described as undercapitalized banks (Fidrmuc & Süss, 2009). Many banks in Russia were not operating as 
normal credit institutions. Instead of providing financial intermediation services to the public, they were rather 
privately used to allocate capital within industrial conglomerates and large corporations. These services were 
provided at a reduced cost and lower cost of capital (Ippolito, 2002). 
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with the commercial banks,220 providing privileges to some of them. Although many of the 
Soviet era banks transformed themselves into private commercial banks, the largest banks 
were still state-owned through the CBR ownership. Besides, the CBR was the majority owner 
of the country’s biggest bank, Sberbank. Due to its ownership status, Sberbank was able to 
enjoy the privilege of a state guarantee of its deposits. Its privileged situation in attracting 
deposits at more favourable rates than its competitors had a distorting effect on the level 
playing field in the sector. More importantly, its dominance in the deposit market crowded 
out the private banks from the market. Due these developments, banks were intended to 
extract rents from the state rather than to invest in improving financial intermediation 
between savers and investors (Steinherr, 2006).221  
 Most of the firms which were outside these industrial groups owning the banks didn’t 
have access to credit at all or they had to pay very high interest rates to get the credits. These 
high rates exacerbated the adverse selection problem due to the asymmetric information in 
the market. The bankers had no incentives to move towards more transparent and clearer 
regulation. In fact, they strongly resisted the introduction of higher capital requirements. This 
situation was amplified by the high-inflationary environment where banks paid negative real 
deposit rates and made loans at very large spreads. In sum, the increasing size of private 
banks in this unregulated world, the governments’ unusual relationship with banks, connected 
lending mechanisms between banks and the firms owning these banks provided an arena for 
rent extraction (Steinherr, 2006). 
2.3.2. Build-Up of the 1998 Crisis 
 Russia had experienced a financial meltdown in 1998 caused by the capital 
movements all around the world following the Asian Crisis in 1997.222 The banking sector 
suffered from a liquidity shortage. Steinherr and Klär (2005), and Ippolito (2002) argue that 
the main cause of the banking crisis must be seen in the banking sector regulation, which was 
weak or, even absent in the sense that it encouraged banks to take big exchange rate risks on 
                                                 
220 This situation changed in July, 2002. The law passed in 2002 limited the extent of bank ownership by the 
CBR. In 2003, it had only the right to control Sberbank and four banks abroad (Steinherr, 2006). 
221 Another problem concerning the playing field emerged when the government started to issue treasury bills 
(GKO’s) to finance its deficit. The banking industry lobbied to exclude foreign investors from the market so that 
CBR sold these treasury bills only to a selected group of banks. During 1995 and 1996, banks earned a lot from 
their special relationships with government funds. As a result of this connected lending procedure, financial 
intermediation was disturbed (Steinherr, 2006). 
222 The world financial and currency markets were hit by a wave of crises in the summer of 1997 that started in 
East Asia. It caused a big financial collapse with a crash in Asian foreign exchange and equity markets (Özkan, 
2003). 
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liabilities in foreign currencies, and also to lend with little risk diversification. Banks were 
allowed to borrow in foreign currency without matching foreign currency assets. 
Additionally, they were also free to open non-hedged positions in forward contracts in the 
foreign-exchange (FX) market, which was very risky. Hence, due to weak regulation and 
supervision, banks were able to provide risky loans that became non-performing in the 1998 
crisis. Besides, the borrowing ability of banks from the capital markets was constrained since 
the domestic capital market was under-developed.223 Followed by that, Russian banks needed 
to borrow from external capital markets in foreign currency which exposed them to additional 
foreign currency risk (Steinherr, 2006). 
 During the four years preceding the crisis, Russia received foreign capital inflows 
taking advantage of the worldwide boom in capital flows into emerging markets. Besides, 
foreign investors were allowed to buy short-term treasury bills with high yields. These 
positive developments led to a rise in Russian stock markets, which however collapsed after 
the 1997 Asian crisis. After the collapse of the stock markets, foreign investors purchased 
futures on the USD/Rouble exchange rate to hedge their portfolios against a depreciation of 
the rouble against the USD dollar. However, their Russian counterparts had short positions on 
the same contracts and hence were subject to rouble devaluation. This prudent behaviour of 
investors increased concerns over Russia’s reserve position and the sustainability of its 
exchange rate commitment. When investors started to reallocate their assets from risky 
countries to safer ones, the Russian government faced difficulties in rolling over its debt and 
defending its exchange rate. In August 1998, the government defaulted on its domestic public 
debt, declared a moratorium on private banks’ liabilities, abandoned its exchange rate, and 
froze treasury bill operations. This meant a complete default by the government and by the 
banking system with a dramatic liquidity crisis and massive bank runs (Steinherr, 2006; 
Tompson, 2004; Perotti, 2001). 
 This crisis revealed the underlying structural flaws of the banking sector (Steinherr, 
2006; Ippolito, 2002). First of all, there was a currency imbalance since foreign denominated 
currency assets were less than the foreign currency liabilities. Secondly, there was also 
maturity imbalance because banks borrowed foreign currency short-term to be rolled over 
and lent longer term. They financed their holdings via short-term foreign loans. A number of 
banks suffered from this maturity imbalance. The excessive risk taking behaviour of banks 
                                                 
223 Banks can borrow from the government but this cannot be a regular funding source. 
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was exacerbated by inadequate risk and liquidity management at commercial banks, poor 
monitoring by the CBR and too much confidence in the CBR’s ability to keep the rouble 
fixed (Steinherr, 2006). 
2.3.3. Build-Up of the 2004 Crisis 
 The 1998 crisis revealed the vulnerability of the Russian banking sector. Regarding 
regulatory flaws, Perottti (2001) argues that the foundations of the Russian financial system 
with soft legal constraints were long undermined by perverse incentives before the 1998 
crisis. When the banking system was newly developing in 1989, capital requirements for 
banking license were very low. In the early 1990s, due to lax entry conditions, the number of 
banks increased from around 10 to 2500. Legal rules were subject to arbitrary changes and 
were determined on a private bargaining process where rules were less important than the 
power of the parties involved. Similar to other economic and political activities such as 
privatization or creation of a public debt market, the supervision of banks was implemented 
as part of a compromise with a powerful banking lobby. In that way, bankers were able to 
extract major opportunities and rents from the state without being exposed to any compulsory 
rules of conduct. Government was unable and more importantly, unwilling to control this 
process since it needed the support of special interest groups (such as the bankers’ lobby) to 
remain in power (Perotti, 2001). 
  However, in the three years following the crisis, not much progress was made to 
restructure the banking system. Essential steps to strengthen the banking regulation were not 
taken (Steinherr, 2006). First of all, banks were still exposed to a significant amount of credit 
risk due to the rapid growth in credit caused mainly by the still-existent widespread practice 
of connected lending and insufficient transparency of borrowers. Banks were still lending 
money to borrowers that had economic links between them. Moreover, these connections 
were not easy to identify due to the continuing lack of transparency of borrowers. The Central 
Bank of Russia regarded the 1998 crisis as only a liquidity crisis and acted as a lender of last 
resort instead of following a clearly defined and transparent strategy. Secondly, there was a 
growing gap between the amount of loans provided to customers and deposits received from 
them. This maturity mismatch between banks’ assets and liabilities exposed banks to further 
liquidity risk (ECB, 2005). Thirdly, Russian banks were still allowed to use accounting 
standards that did not represent the asset quality of their balance sheets correctly. Fourthly, 
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the huge number of banks was an obstacle for efficient banking supervision (Komulainen et 
al., 2003). 
 At the beginning of 2003, Russia was still lacking a banking reform (Komulainen et 
al., 2003). Many flaws that affected the Russian banks before the 1998 crisis were still 
present in 2004. The government and the CBR had been unsuccessful in implementing a 
comprehensive banking restructuring programme and in establishing a banking reform, 
neglecting major flaws that affected the Russian banking sector before the 1998 crisis 
(Steinherr & Klär (2005); Ippolito, 2002). Compared to mid-1998, the weight of large credit 
risks in banks’ portfolios has risen from 25.5% to 33% in mid-2003 given the emergence of a 
larger number of big borrowers. These portfolios were rated as very concentrated according 
to the OECD standards. Interestingly at the same time, thanks to the new legislation adapted 
in 2003 that simplified the procedures for lending to small firms, consumer credit had 
exploded between 2002 and 2004 (see Table 16). Besides, since Russian banks were 
dependent on a small number of clients to get funding, the liability side of the balance sheets 
was also highly concentrated. This implies that many banks could lose their liquidity 
overnight by the withdrawal of a single large depositor. This was the case in the 2004 crisis 
(Tompson, 2004).224 
Table 16: Banking Sector Credit Risks 2002-2003: 
 1.01.02 1.01.03 1.07.03 
Volume of large credit risks in the banking sector 
(Rouble billion) 982.3 1329 1607 
Large credit risks as a share of total bank asset im % 31.1 32.1 33 
Source: Tompson, (2004). Tompson (2004) defines large credit risk as the exposure to a single borrower (or group of 
related borrowers) in excess of 5% of the capital. 
 The enduring vulnerability of the banking system became evident in the May-July 
2004 crisis (Tompson, 2004). Like the 1998 crisis, the 2004 crisis also resulted in the collapse 
of the interbank market due to deteriorated liquidity situations (Vernikov, 2007). In fact, in 
April-July 2004 the Russian banking sector experienced its first serious turmoil since the 
financial crisis of August 1998. In early July, the liquidity crisis spread leading to a run on 
several banks (Steinherr, 2006; Tompson, 2004). The CBR revoked the banking licenses of 
                                                 
224 This crisis is described as a mini-crisis in most of the academic works since it was not considered as a 
systemic banking crisis. 
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certain banks. Several small private banks failed while others experienced liquidity problems 
because they were unable to get funding from the interbank market or from their depositors. 
Several privately-owned Russian banks significantly limited their operations, collapsed or 
ceased to exist (CBR, 2004). 
2.3.4. Build-Up of the 2008-2009 Crisis 
 Russia has been affected by the global crisis more strongly than the majority of 
emerging markets (Fidrmuc & Dreger, 2009).225 Just as in the 1998 and 2004 crises, Russia’s 
financial crisis in 2009 was due to liquidity shortage. Many Russian banks failed during the 
global crisis. The economy experienced a sharp fall in output in 2009. As a result, non-
performing loans increased significantly (Jakobik & Fungacova, 2012). 
 Russian banks were not directly exposed to the financial instruments that triggered the 
crisis in the U.S. and the E.U. However, they were firstly affected through their dependence 
on foreign funding which reduced during the crisis due to the liquidity crisis experienced by 
the banking sectors in the E.U. and the U.S. Secondly, the global economic slowdown 
decreased the demand for commodities and this led to a decline in oil prices (Fidrmuc & 
Süss, 2009). Following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, the confidence 
of international investors in the Russian market weakened. Like elsewhere, this resulted in a 
“flight to quality” of international investors.226 There was a sharp decline in oil prices caused 
by the global economic slowdown, which decreased the demand for commodities. As more 
and more investors started to sell their assets, the Russian stock market became exposed to 
massive losses.227 Increased counterparty risk and loss of confidence between banks caused a 
liquidity shortage in the interbank market (Fidrmuc & Süss, 2009). 
 Adrian and Shin (2008), Brunnermeier (2009), Gorton (2010a), and Diamond and 
Rajan (2009), and Beltratti and Stulz (2009) found in their analysis of crises that banks 
financed with short-term wholesale capital experienced a run on funding by investors and 
hence performed worse during the crisis. Fidrmuc and Süss (2009) argue that this trend 
resembles the high short-term repayment obligations of Russian banks where by mid-2008 
                                                 
225 In fact, Qu et al. (2012) argue that Russia is the most affected country among the BRIC countries. 
226 The term “flight to quality” describes an environment where investors try to sell assets which they perceive 
as risky and purchase safe assets instead. This increases the risk premium and causes severe disruptions in the 
credit market and other financial markets. The U.S. experienced a severe episode of this kind during the 2007-
2009 global crises (Caballero & Kurlat, 2008). 
227 In the fourth quarter of 2008, net capital outflows were USD 130.5 billion, of which USD 56.2 billion was 
from the banking sector and USD 74.3 billion was from the non-banking sector (Fidrmuc & Süss, 2009). 
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Russia’s external debt had increased to $ 527 billion. Banks actively participated in the stock 
markets, and they borrowed money on their own stocks as collateral. Hence, the decline in 
stock prices was directly connected to bad loans. When the crisis hit the banking sector 
directly, the low ratio of owner’s equity and the long term loans using short-term borrowing 
triggered the crisis (Mizobata, 2009). The debt of the banking sector was 37% of overall debt 
(Bogetic, 2008; Fidrmuc & Süss, 2009). Small and medium-sized banks were dependent on 
short-term foreign borrowing as a funding source because deposit-based funding was 
weakened due to the dominant position of state banks.228 This exposed those banks to sudden 
reversals in capital flows since their refinancing conditions for their foreign loans worsened 
(Fidrmuch & Süss, 2009). This foreign funding constraint caused a sharp slowdown in credit 
(Deutsche Bank Report, 2008). 
 The crisis occurred in two stages. In the first stage, banks started to face serious 
liquidity shortages and significant deposit withdrawals in the second half of 2008. The second 
stage occurred in 2009 in the form of rising credit risk, which is the key risk for banks as 
explained in the second chapter of this thesis (IMF, 2011b). Jorda et al., (2010) and Hume 
and Sentence (2009) found that credit growth is one of the pre-crisis dynamics followed by a 
slowdown in the post-crisis period. The role of credit in the Russian economy increased 
significantly during the 2000s. Bank lending to the private sector grew from 11.93% of GDP 
in 1999 to around 42% at the end of 2008, and deposits rose from 15% to 30%. Between 
2001 and 2008, credit grew by 50% per year. This increase in credit risk started to build up 
during the boom period just before the crisis when the lending standards were lowered. In 
fact, the credit expansion rates exceeded 40% before the crisis. It stopped in the second half 
of 2008, and then it collapsed to -2.5% during the crisis in 2009. As a result, credit to the 
private sector started to contract. This contraction in domestic lending shows a breakdown in 
bank intermediation. As the financial situation of borrowers deteriorated, they became unable 
to serve their obligations. The banking system was put under pressure from increasing 
overdue loans. Followed by that, growth in overdue debt increased significantly compared to 
2007, by 129.2%. The share of the overdue debt of total loans extended in 2008 expanded 
from 1.3% to 2.1. In fact, due to weaknesses in supervision, regulators were unable to detect 
serious problems existing in important banks such as the Bank of Moscow (Fungacova & 
Jakubik, 2012). 
                                                 
228 Beltratti and Stulz (2009) found also that banks that relied more on deposits for their financing performed 
better during the crisis. 
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 The Russian government and the CBR responded by implementing measures to 
maintain the stability of the financial system. They provided liquidity to banks, a temporary 
decrease in reserve requirements, and guarantees for interbank lending to qualified banks. 
The limit of deposit insurance was increased and the deposit insurance agency assumed 
responsibility for restructuring individual troubled banks. State banks were recapitalized by 
the government in the form of capital support (IMF, 2011c). 
2.4. Post-Crisis Period in Turkey and Russia 
 In the period after the crises in the late 1990s, the banking sectors in most emerging 
markets including Russia and Turkey underwent significant restructuring processes (Caner et 
al., 2007). Dziobek and Pazarbasıoglu (1997) explain that prompt corrective action (within 
about ten months after the crisis starts) is a key element of a successful reform and 
restructuring. In fact, they mention that countries making substantial progress all took action 
within a year of the emergence of their banking problems. These include identifying the 
reasons and extent of banking sector problems, identifying problem banks, starting the 
restructuring process and improving of accounting, regulatory and legal framework to restore 
the conditions of a sound banking system (Dziobek & Pazarbasıoglu, 1997). 
 Regarding Turkey and Russia, the banking industry in both countries experienced a 
reform process starting in 2001. However, interestingly there was no serious restructuring 
programme in Russia for more than four years following the 1998 crisis. Important steps 
started to be taken in Russia only towards 2002 revealing the slow response of Russian 
authorities to the crisis (Thiessen, 2004; 2005; Ippolito, 2002). Ippolito (2002) says: “We can 
therefore conclude that Russian authorities failed to exploit the unprecedented ‘window of 
opportunity’ offered by the crisis: a mistake that could have negative consequences for the 
future development not only of Russia’s banking sector, but also of Russia’s economy in a 
wider sense”. On the contrary, Turkey adopted and implemented the restructuring process 
immediately after the twin crisis of 2000-2001. 
2.4.1. Post-Crisis Period in Russia 
 Russia was not very successful in restructuring its banking sector after the crisis in 
1998. The CBR and the government failed to promptly implement a restructuring 
programme, and improvement and enforcement of prudential regulation for banks (Thiessen, 
2004). Thiessen (2000, 2004) argues that the requirements for a successful banking 
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restructuring in Russia were not met. Only in mid-1999, ten months after the crisis, did the 
authorities started to develop a bank restructuring strategy. 
 In early 1999, the Agency for the Restructuring of Credit Organisations (ARCO) was 
established. However, this agency suffered from two problems: It was undercapitalized to 
effectively restructure the banking sector. Secondly, it didn’t have the right to close down 
insolvent banks (Thiessen, 2004; Steinherr, 2006). In fact, ARCO didn’t achieve much in 
restructuring the Russian banking sector. The majority of banks did not even start to 
restructure (Claeys & Schoors, 2007).229 
 In February 1999, “the Law on the Bankruptcy of Credit Institutions” was passed. The 
aim was to provide a definition for a “bankrupt bank” and establish the bankruptcy 
procedures. A bankruptcy law should protect creditors, impose financial discipline on 
managers, and induce restructuring (Lambert-Mogiliansky et al., 2003). However, the 
bankruptcy law in Russia was rather designed to protect the shareholders and not creditors. 
The law stipulated that creditors could only force banks into bankruptcy after the Central 
Bank of Russia had withdrawn its license. However, the CBR was very reluctant to withdraw 
the license of any big bank (Claeys & Shoors, 2007; Schoors, 1999). In fact, most of the 
bankrupt banks were not liquidated. They continued to accumulate liabilities instead of acting 
as a credit institution. After the introduction of the Law, many top-tier banks moved their 
businesses to the so-called “bridge” banks in violation of creditor rights (Steinherr, 2006). 
The failed banks were allowed to avoid repayment or liquidation without any legal 
consequences. Moreover, some bankrupt banks whose licenses were withdrawn around the 
time of the 1998 crisis managed to get their licenses back. The number of revoked licenses 
for credit institutions even decreased significantly after the crisis. The number of institutions 
liquidated due to violation of legislation increased after the crisis but many banks were not 
liquidated despite having lost their license, which resulted in the phenomenon of “phantom 
banks”. These banks obtained their banking licenses via court decisions after two years in 
bankruptcy proceedings, but without any new capital or restructuring plan (Thiessen, 2004) 
(See, Table 17). 
                                                 
229 For more on the Bankruptcy Law of Russia, see Lambert-Mogiliansky et al. (2003). 
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Table 17: Number of credit institutions and revoked licenses in Russia, 1998-2002 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Number of credit institutions registered by the CBR 2481 2376 2124 2001 1826 
Revoked licenses 229 130 33 12 10 
Credit institutions liquidated due to revocation of license 
for violation of the banking legislation 73 100 258 144 216 
Source: CBR, Bulletin of Banking Statistics and Annual Reports1997-2002; Steinherr, (2004). 
 As the following analysis in this chapter will discuss, the weak accounting standards 
continued to hide the bad loans in banks’ balance sheets. Excessive numbers of licensed 
banks, problems in banking legislation caused by the influence of the banking lobby over 
legislators, and poor legal enforcement continued to be the shortcomings in the Russian 
banking sector. 
 The legal framework for banking supervision in Russia consists of the Federal Law 
on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation of 2002 (in the course of time it was called 
“Central Bank Law”/CBR Law)230 and the Federal Law on Banks and Banking Activity 
promulgated in 1990, amended in 1996 (later on it referred to as “Banking Law”)231 and The 
Federal Law “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Lending Institutions” of February 25, 1999232 
(as amended). The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) is the primary authority responsible for the 
regulation of the banking sector in Russia233 and also acts as Russia’s central bank. Until 
2002, the CBR had been operating under the general terms of the Federal Law “On the 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation (the Bank of Russia)” of 2 December 1990 (as 
amended on 26 April 1995). This law was superseded by the Central Bank Law in 2002. Two 
years after the 1998 crisis, at the end of 2001, the Government of the Russian Federation and 
the Central Bank of Russia issued a joint declaration called “the Strategy for the 
Development of the Banking Sector in the Russian Federation” (the Strategy) setting out the 
strategy for banking reform in Russia and calling for certain legislative steps and structural 
changes to be taken during the following five years. In April 2005, the second Banking 
Sector Development Strategy was adopted for the Period up to 2008 (CBR, 2005). 
                                                 
230 The Federal Law “On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)” No. 86-ФЗ of July 10, 
2002 (hereinafter the “CBRF Law”) 
231 The Federal Law “On Banks and Banking” No. 395-1 of December 2, 1990 (as amended by the Federal Law 
No. 17-ФЗ of February 3, 1996 and others) (hereinafter the “Law on Banks”) 
232 No. 40-ФЗ 
233 Pursuant to Article 56 of the Banking Law 
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 The Bank of Russia is led by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision in implementing its role as the regulator of the 
banking sector (ECB, 2005). However, according to the Olsen Report (ECB, 2005), in spite 
of some progress achieved after the 1998 crisis, the legal foundation of banking regulation 
and supervision in Russia is still far from perfect and requires further serious improvement, 
both in the form of statutory legislation and Bank of Russia regulations. The Report describes 
the Russian banking sector as insufficiently capitalized and strictly recommends the 
implementation of stricter requirements with regard to capital adequacy. Regarding private 
monitoring practices, further improvement was recommended in the legal framework for 
consolidated supervision, including the preparation of consolidated statements, the 
calculation of consolidated risks and management. Requirements should have been increased 
significantly concerning the owners and managers of banks since it was necessary to prevent 
the management of a bank from falling into the hands of managers and owners with a bad 
reputation and an unstable financial position (ECB, 2005).  
2.4.2. Post-Crisis Period in Turkey 
 The main legislation regarding the Turkish banking industry is the Turkish Banking 
Law No. 5411 (the Banking Law), the Turkish Central Bank Law No. 1211 (the Central Bank 
Law), and Turkish Capital Markets Law No. 2499 (the Capital Markets Law), Law on the 
Protection of the Value of Turkish Currency No. 1567, Decree Law on Money Lending 
Transactions No. 90, and the regulations promulgated under these laws (Paksoy and Tiftikci, 
2010). 
  Turkish banks today are governed by two primary bank regulatory authorities in 
Turkey: the BRSA (Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency) and the Central Bank 
(CB). The Banks’ Act No. 4389 came into force in June, 1999 and introduced major reforms 
into the banking system. The BRSA is established by the former Banks Act No. 4389 in 1999 
as an independent agency to take over the supervisory and regulatory functions from the 
Treasury. It became operational on August 31, 2000. This was an important step because the 
regulatory framework needed improvement, especially regarding capital adequacy levels, 
connected-lending practices, transparency and consolidated accounts. However, as Steinherr 
et al. (2004) argue, the key problem was the lack of enforcement rather than the regulatory 
framework. 
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 In the late 1990s, as explained before, the Turkish economy was suffering from 
several problems: a high degree of politicization of bank lending and regulation, weak 
enforcement, state banks with inadequate amounts of cash, and inadequate capital for the risk 
exposure of most banks. In December 1999, the Turkish government agreed on implementing 
an IMF-supported disinflation programme to address Turkey’s macroeconomic instability. 
This programme also included a strategy for the banking sector. The institutional foundations 
of this banking sector programme included i) rehabilitating insolvent banks through public 
money and their transfer to private players, and ii) establishing the legal independence of the 
Central Bank. However, the most important step of this transformation was the enactment of 
a new Banking Act (1999) which provided the establishment of a new independent Banking 
Regulatory and Supervisory Agency (BRSA) to take over the regulatory and supervisory 
functions from the Treasury. The programme also aimed to promote the legal adaptation of 
this new Banking Act to Basel II- Banking Core Principles and banking norms of the E.U. 
(Steinherr et al., 2004; Bakır & Öniş, 2010). 
 However, due to the risks aggravated by the course of time, the programme came 
under heavy attack first in November 2000, then in February 2001 and it collapsed. 
Furthermore, it took more than one year to establish the board of the BRSA, so it was not 
able to commence its operations until 31 August 2000. On the other hand, the crisis provided 
a window of opportunity for banking sector restructuring in the sense that it revealed the 
structural weaknesses and the fragility of the banking sector and faced them with their eroded 
capital bases and deteriorated asset quality (Bakır & Öniş, 2010). 
  In May, 2001 the BRSA formulated and executed “the Banking Restructuring and 
Rehabilitation Programme”. During 2002 and 2003, fourteen banks were taken over by the 
Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF). The rehabilitation of banks involved recapitalization 
and debt consolidation. The restructuring of banks included strengthening the management 
and reducing the number of personnel and branches.234 In early 2004, 21 domestic private 
banks were taken over. Until the introduction of the new Banking Law in 2005, the Banking 
Act went through several amendments,235 accompanied by several regulations to strengthen 
the power of the BRSA. Regulations of the BRSA focused on the following areas: capital 
adequacy, risk management, restrictions on loans and subsidiaries, loan provisions, 
                                                 
234 For details, see Bakır and Öniş, (2010); BRSA (2001, 2003). The BRSA kept the public informed about the 
restructuring process through regular reports. 
235 A total of nine 
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compliance with international accounting standards, independent audit, and corporations with 
foreign supervisory authorities (BRSA Department of Strategy Development, 2006). 
 All banks in Turkey are subject to 2005 Banking Law and its accompanying 
regulations as well as to the provisions of other laws regarding banks. Following the 2007-
2009 global financial crisis, there was no serious deterioration in the financial structure of the 
Turkish banking sector. The impact of the global crisis on the Turkish banking system has 
remained limited, largely due to previous restructuring measures and comfortable prudential 
indicators (European Commission, 2008). Accordingly, very tight limitations on the banking 
system were brought through high capital adequacy ratios, strong supervision and 
enforcement through the disciplinary power of the regulatory agency and proper risk 
management.236 
3. Regulatory Variables 
3.1. Capital Adequacy Requirement (CAR) 
 The importance of the regulatory requirements on the capital adequacy ratio has been 
explained in detail in the first chapter of this thesis.237 The results of the empirical analysis in 
the second chapter also provided evidence in favour of the regulations imposing stricter 
capital adequacy standards. According to the consultative document of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS), banks entered the global crisis with too little capital and 
hence, the insufficiency of capital played an important role in the crisis (Hellwig, 2010). 
 The World Bank regulatory survey238 conducted for both Turkey and Russia is based 
on the questions prepared by Barth et al. (2008) who compiled alternative quantitative 
measures of capital regulatory stringency categorized as overall capital stringency and initial 
capital stringency. Overall capital stringency refers to whether there are explicit regulatory 
requirements regarding the amount of capital that a bank must have relative to various 
guidelines.239 These guidelines aim to understand the degree to which the leverage potential 
for capital is limited. Initial capital stringency refers to whether the source of funds counted 
as regulatory capital can include assets other than cash or government securities as well as 
                                                 
236 Other tight limitations include liquidity ratios and foreign exchange positions. 
237 Section 6.1.1 
238 See Appendix A 
239 These guidelines are explained in Appendix A. 
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whether the sources are verified by the regulatory or supervisory authorities (Barth et al., 
2006a:115-120). 
 The results of the survey reveal that there are three time periods that make the 
difference in the degree of capital stringency between two countries (See, Table 18). In 1999, 
capital stringency was higher in Russia. However, starting in 2000, this degree became higher 
for Turkish banks compared to Russian banks. After that, once again there was a change in 
the stringency degrees of both countries, Turkey again having a higher ratio between 2004 
and 2010. Looking at the capital adequacy ratios of both countries between 1999 and 2010 in 
Table 18, we observe that although Russian banks had a higher CAR in 1999 and 2000, 
starting in 2001 Turkish banks had a remarkably higher CAR than the Russian banks between 
2001 and 2010. 
Table 18: Indexes on Capital Requirements for Turkey and Russia* 
Years 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Turkey 5 7 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Russia 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 8 8 8 
*The index on capital requirements takes values between 0 and 9, with higher values indicating greater stringency. 
 Barth et al. (2006a:118) argue that although most countries set minimum risk-
weighted capital requirements in line with Basel I, in measuring the level of capital 
stringency the ability of banks in these countries to leverage capital may differ significantly. 
Barth’s et al. (2006:118) reasoning is based on the fact that when calculating capital, 
countries differ both with respect to the types of losses that are deducted from the capital and 
the type of risk that is taken into account in setting the minimum capital requirement. With 
respect to overall capital stringency, there is no difference between Russia’s and Turkey’s 
CAR calculations. Regarding the initial capital stringency, Barth et al. (2006a:119-120) 
expect substantial variation across countries in terms of to what constitutes initial capital and 
whether the sources of capital are verified by the authorities. They find that a high percentage 
of countries are not particularly stringent when it comes to the source of funds used to 
initially capitalize a bank. In fact, Turkey has a higher level of initial capital stringency than 
Russia. Overall, the survey results indicate greater capital stringency for Turkey since 2000. 
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Russian banks’ capital adequacy ratios are well below the CAR of Turkish banks during the 
period 2002-2010. 
Table 19: Capital Adequacy Ratios (CAR) 1999-2010 in Turkey and Russia 
Years 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Turkey 8.24 9.29 20.78 25.34 30.93 28.24 23.73 21.91 18.94 17.98 20.50 19 
Russia 26 24 24.4 22.2 19.1 17 16 14.9 15.5 16.8 20.9 18.1 
Source: BRSA (1999-2010), CBR Annual Banking Supervision Reports (1999-2010). 
3.1.1. Capital Adequacy Regulation in the Turkish Banking Sector 
 The global financial crisis had a limited impact on the Turkish banking industry.240 
One of the most important reasons of this limited effect is the high capital adequacy ratio of 
the Turkish banking sector (Yorukoglu & Atasoy, 2010; Atıcı & Gürsoy, 2011; BRSA Report 
2010). In fact, Atıcı & Gürsoy (2011) argue that the Turkish banking sector utilizes capital 
buffer as a precautionary measure against the financial crises. The importance of maintaining 
a strong capital structure was emphasized in all policies carried out during this period. The 
average capital adequacy ratio which was 9.3% in 2000 increased to 23.7% in 2005 (BRSA, 
2010). In fact, the levels of the capital adequacy ratio of Turkish banks have increased 
substantially after the 2000/2001 crises, well above the legally required ratio of 8% (see 
Table 19). 
A. Developments after the 2000/2001 Crisis 
 Towards the end of the 1990s, the banking sector in Turkey was operating with low 
capital which was one of the factors that contributed to the emergence of the 2001 crisis. 
Although the minimum capital adequacy requirement ratio was determined as 8% in 1999 
with the Banks’ Act (1999) and brought in line with the Basel Accords, in the period up to 
the 2000-2001 crises, the already low level of own funds had further decreased. In addition to 
the negative effects of the crisis, the problems of private banks were aggravated due to the 
                                                 
240 Section 2.1.3 
 For more on this, see (Yorukoglu & Atasoy, 2010; Aras, 2010). 
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inadequate provisioning for non-performing loans241 and the failure to meet the capital 
adequacy requirements (BRSA, 2010). 
 Following the 2000/2001 crises, the Banking Restructuring and Rehabilitation 
Programme was announced on May 15, 2001 in Turkey.242 The priorities of the program 
were identified as strengthening the capital structures of banks that had eroded during the 
crises and clearing the system of weak banks in order to recover the banking sector from the 
deterioration caused by the 2000/2001 crises. The framework of the program of strengthening 
banks’ capital was realized with two regulations under “the Regulation on Principles and 
Procedures of the Banking Sector Restructuring Program”. The first Regulation dated 
February 01, 2002 framed the details of the capital support program to be realized under the 
scope of the restructuring program in order to increase the asset quality of the banking 
sector.243 The second Regulation, published on March 27, 2002, determined the principles 
and procedures of the investigation of the first independent audit institution by a second 
independent audit institution, which was to be selected by the BRSA. This regulation aimed 
at contributing to the quality of the supervision process which was crucial within the process 
of restructuring (BRSA, 2010). 
 The minimum capital adequacy requirements set by the regulators/supervisors should 
reflect the risk that a bank undertakes and must also define the components of banks’ capital. 
The quality of these components is important in the sense that it enables the bank to absorb 
losses.244 For the reinforcement of the equity capital of private banks, a three-party audit245 
was made before extending capital support to banks whose asset quality had deteriorated and 
whose equity capital was diminished. The re-capitalization of banks within the method of the 
triple-audit process was realized in 25 private banks (BRSA, 2010). 
                                                 
241 Loan loss provisions in accounting have a central role in determining the asset quality (particularly loan 
quality) problems. See Chapter I, Section 6.1.1 and 6.1.4 
242 The focus was on improving the intermediation function of banks and establishing an internationally 
competitive banking sector which would be resilient to internal and external shocks (BRSA, 2010). 
243 In compliance with the Provisional Article 4 of the Banks Act (1999), the Regulation established the 
principles and procedures for the supervision of privately-owned deposit-taking banks founded in Turkey based 
on their financial statements and the investigation of their independent audit reports by a second independent 
audit institution determined by the BRSA. These procedures included the general assembly to be held by banks; 
increasing or decreasing banks’ capital; measures that need to be taken based on the assessments of the BRSA; 
transfer period for shares which are subject to capital increase; issuance of convertible bonds and conversion of 
these bonds into shares; sale of banks’ shares taken over by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund; and conversion 
of subordinated debts to capital (BRSA, 2001). 
244 See Chapter I, Section 6.1.1 
245 The two audits were conducted by the banks’ own auditors and an externally designated auditor for each 
bank. The final audit was essentially a judgment call by the BRSA (Steinherr et al., 2004). 
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 The second priority of the restructuring programme considered the problematic banks. 
In order to clear the system of weak banks, the operation licenses of problematic banks with 
deteriorated financial structures were cancelled with the regulations of the BRSA. Their 
partnership rights and also their management and control were transferred to the SDIF. The 
aim was to rehabilitate these banks and make them active in the economy again. If there was 
no rehabilitation possible, then the banks were liquidated.246 This settlement process of banks 
was very fast, lasting only 14 months. As a result, between 1999 and 2003, the Turkish 
banking sector went through a major consolidation process, with the number of banks 
decreasing from 81 to 50. This contributed to the improvement in the quality of capital of the 
banking sector (BRSA, 2010). 
Another factor that distorted the asset quality of banks in the period up to the 
2000/2001 crisis was the high inflation environment that encouraged banks to conduct their 
activities with foreign resources instead of own funds. In that sense, by tending towards risky 
activities, the incentive effect of the capital adequacy requirement was undermined.247 As a 
result, the level and the quality of own funds were negatively affected. In 2002, the 
implementation of inflation accounting in the banking system was introduced, which enabled 
measurement of the real dimensions of own funds, making balance sheets more 
transparent.248 Banks’ performances became assessable in a healthier way and capital quality 
improved (BRSA, 2009; 2010). 
 As explained above, the problems of private banks were aggravated due to the 
inadequate provisioning for non-performing loans. Loan loss provisions in accounting have a 
central role in determining asset quality (particularly loan quality) problems249 and banks 
may have the incentives to underreport their provisions. In order to further improve the 
quality of capital, a regulation regarding loan loss treatment and provisions was published in 
June 2001.250 The regulation251 required a detailed classification of all loans (and other 
                                                 
246 Resolution instruments of the SDIF defined by the Law were: share sales, sales of insured deposit and loans 
(Asset and Liability Transfer) merger with a bank or transfer to another bank (BRSA, 2010). 
247 The incentive effect of capital adequacy requirements is explained in Chapter I, Section 6.1.1. 
248 “Regulation on Principles and Procedures of Independent Audit to Be Carried Out in Banks” – According to 
this regulation, audits were implemented based on the rules of inflation accounting, different from previous 
years (BRSA, 2010). Developments in the accounting procedures of Turkish banks in the post-crisis period will 
be explained in detail in Section 3.3.1. 
249 Chapter I, Section 6.1.1 and 6.1.4 
250 The Regulation on the Procedures and Principles for Determination of Qualifications of Loans and Other 
Receivables by Banks and Provisions to be Set Aside 
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receivables) from borrowers categorized according to the borrowers’ payment capabilities.252 
This regulation also provided a strong incentive for the connected-lending practices of the 
past (Steinherr et al., 2004; BRSA, 2010).253 
Between 2000 and 2003, fourteen banks were taken over by the SDIF. During 1997 
and 2003, the total number of banks taken over by the SDIF was 22 (SDIF, 2003). These 
banks were subjected to an intensive financial and restructuring process after their 
takeover.254 Accordingly, the distorting impacts of problematic banks on the asset structure of 
the sector were removed from the sector (Steinherr et al., 2004).255 
Regarding the measurement of the capital adequacy ratio, in February 2001, the 
BRSA issued a regulation entitled “Regulation on the Measurement and the Evaluation of 
Banks’ Capital Adequacy”256 to establish the methodology for the calculation of capital 
adequacy ratios of banks.257 This regulation aimed to insure that banks maintain an adequate 
amount of capital against potential losses underlining the buffer effect of capital which 
protects banks against adverse shocks and enables them to absorb losses.258 The minimum 
capital adequacy ratio threshold was determined as 8% in line with the Basel standards 
(BRSA, 2010; Bakır & Öniş, 2010). 
                                                                                                                                                        
251 In November 2006, the regulation was amended by the BRSA and issued under “the Regulation on the 
Principles and Procedures Related to the Determination of the Loans and Other Receivables by Banks and 
Provisions to be set Aside” 
252 The regulation required the classification of loans into five categories: standard, closely-monitored, limited 
collection ability, remote collection ability and losses. Any loans that are subject to deterioration of credit or 
collateral quality, or in any case a non-payment of principal or interest on the due date should be moved out of 
the “standard category”. If the non-payment period exceeds 180 days, the loan is progressively reclassified into 
the last three categories, which are considered “nonperforming” categories that prompt provisioning 
requirements. Loan provisioning starts at 20% and all loans with a non-payment period of one year must be fully 
provisioned. If a loan is classified as non-performing, then all other loans of the same borrower must be 
categorized as non-performing. These provisioning regulations outlined above were fully operational since 
January 2002 (Steinherr et al., 2004). 
253 “Regulation on Establishment and Activities of Banks” was published in June, 2001 to prevent the risk 
concentration in loans. Pursuant to this regulation, direct and indirect loans were taken into consideration in 
setting credit limits. This regulation aims to prevent the concentration of bank resources on specific groups. 
Besides, it ensures that banks consolidate their assets in line with security, liquidity and productivity principles 
(BRSA, 2010). If a bank’s total credit amount given to a risk group exceeds the limitations in the Banking Law, 
it cannot extend new loans to natural persons and legal entities included in this risk group. With this regulation, 
it became obligatory for banks to remove the amounts exceeding the limitations until 2006 (BRSA, 2010). 
254 Their short-term liabilities were liquidated, foreign currency open positions were reduced, deposit and 
foreign currency liabilities were transferred to other banks and a number of branches and personnel were cut 
down significantly (BRSA, 2010). 
255 The cost of restructuring the banking sector was $ 53.6 billion, which was almost equivalent to one-third of 
the national income (BRSA, 2010). 
256 Published in the Official Gazette dated February 10, 2001 (numbered 24314); The ratio is called the “Capital 
Base Divided By Risk-Bearing Assets, Non-cash Credits and Obligations Standard Ratio”. 
257 On both a consolidated and unconsolidated basis 
258 For the buffer effect, see Chapter I, Section 6.1.1 
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In June 2001, with the amendments made to the 1999 Banks Act, the definition of 
“consolidated own funds” (consolidated equity) was introduced in compliance with the EU 
Directives. This definition became the basis for the calculation of credit limits to be applied 
to banks (BRSA, 2010). The same year, the BRSA, the Under-secretariat of the Treasury, 
CBRT and Ministry of Finance collaborated to incentivize the increase of own funds (equity) 
within the sector. Within this framework, regulations were introduced to provide tax 
incentives for corporate mergers and takeovers.259 In addition to the incentives introduced 
with the legal framework, the banking sector voluntarily oriented itself towards a 
consolidation to increase their profit margins in an environment of high inflation rates and 
decreasing interest rates (BRSA, 2010). 
 Another attempt to bring the calculation of the capital adequacy ratio in line with 
these Basel standards260 in Turkey, calculation was expanded to include capital charges for 
market risk261 beginning January, 2002 (BRSA, 2010). This new procedure had already been 
proposed by the Basel Committee in 1993. It introduced the incorporation of market risk on 
banks’ capital requirements through a standard approach that was also used for credit risks 
under the 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I). Hence, the 1996 Amendment to “the Capital Accord 
to Incorporate Market Risks” by the Basel Committee allowed banks to calculate their capital 
to be held against market risks by using their own internal quantitative models. 
In addition to the inclusion of capital charges for market risk in the calculation of 
CAR in 2002, the definition of own funds was changed,262 and general loan-loss provisions 
were added to Tier 2 capital the same year.263 As a result of these changes, a single own fund 
(equity) definition was established for the Turkish banking system, providing uniformity both 
in the calculation of credit limitations and in the application of financial ratios.264 
                                                 
259 The “Regulation on Mergers and Transfers of Banks” prepared by the BRSA defined the general principles 
and processes concerning the banks’ mergers and transfers. It was published within the Official Gazette dated 
June 27, 2001. A legal regulation enabling the tax advantages given within the Act Nr. 4605 to be applied in the 
merger of banks’ subsidiaries became effective on July 3, 2001 (BRSA, 2010). 
260 Turkey is a member country of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
261 Starting from July, 2002 
As was explained in Chapter I, market risk includes interest rate risk, exchange rate risks and equity risk, see 
Section 2.4. 
262 Pursuant to the amendment made to the “Regulation on Establishment and Activities of Banks” 
263 The Basel Accords define the capital of a bank as Tier 1 and Tier 2. Tier 1 is basically the core capital and 
Tier 2 is the supplementary capital. See Chapter I, Section 6.1.1 
264 The framework for the risk weights was also rearranged to comply with the inclusion of the repo transactions 
in the balance sheet (BRSA, 2010). 
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Furthermore, this regulation increased the power of the BRSA in supervising banks’ 
compliance with the capital adequacy requirement. It was decided that capital adequacy ratios 
would be monitored on a daily basis by the BRSA, and though the data were not public, the 
BRSA began informing the market with its banking sector reports. Since then, the capital 
adequacy ratios are calculated quarterly with on- and off-balance sheet risks incorporated in 
the calculation (BRSA, 2010). 
 Another regulation introduced in 2002265 authorized the BRSA to establish a higher 
individual capital adequacy ratio for each bank and additions were made to the standards of 
risk measurement methods to be used by banks.266 A provision regarding the publication of 
the capital adequacy ratio by banks in each March, June, September and December was 
added to increase transparency. During the 2000/2001 crises, banks’ own funds had suffered 
from erosion due to interest rate volatilities caused by the crisis and capital shortage. Hence, a 
“Structural Position”267 definition was introduced to prevent the erosion of banks’ equities 
from these kinds of price movements and foreign exchange rate movements (BRSA, 
2010).268 As a result of these positive developments, the balance sheet of the banking 
sector grew stable after 2002. Thanks to the policies on capital quality, the composition of the 
banks’ balance sheets was improved. The high growth experienced in the banking sector 
increased financial deepening and the banking sector became able to support the real 
economy again. During 2002 and 2005, the ratio of loans to GDP reached from 17.8 % to 
30.8% (See Table 20). Total assets of the sector increased by 24% and total loans grew by 
45% on average. The deposit/loan ratio rose from 35.5% in 2002 to 62.2% in 2005. The ratio 
                                                 
265 In January, 2002, the BRSA cancelled “the Regulation on the Measurement and the Evaluation of Banks’ 
Capital Adequacy” and replaced it with a new regulation under the same title which brought up additional 
regulations on capital adequacy. Under this regulation, the capital adequacy ratio was set at 8% both on a 
consolidated and unconsolidated basis by taking into account the market risks (BRSA, 2010). 
266 Pursuant to the provisional article 1 of the Regulation, application of market risks in the calculation of capital 
adequacy was initiated beginning from July 1, 2002 (BRSA, 2010). Subordinated loans were included in the 
calculation of capital adequacy ratio in line with the EU Directives. Subordinated loans are listed as one of the 
items that constitute supplementary capital (i.e., Tier Two Capital) (Thompson, 2002). The subordinated debt 
has a market disciplining effect on banks risk-taking activities since it is unsecured by the government 
(Levonian, 2001). For more on the disciplining effect of subordinated debt on banking see Distinguin, 2008; 
Ashcraft, 2006. 
267 “Structural Position” is basically a matched currency position to protect a bank’s capital adequacy ratio. It 
protects against the possible losses from fluctuations in exchange rates. If a bank has its capital denominated in 
its domestic currency and has a portfolio of foreign currency assets and liabilities that are completely matched, 
its capital to asset ratio will fall if the domestic currency depreciates. The bank can protect its capital adequacy 
ratio by running a short position in the domestic currency. However, the position would lead to a loss if the 
domestic currency were to appreciate (BIS, 2005). 
268 Principles and procedures regarding the structural positions to be taken into consideration in the calculation 
of CAR were published on May 8, 2002. 
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of non-performing loans (NPLs) to gross loans decreased from 17.6% in 2002 to 4.8% in 
2005 sharply revealing the sound growth in loans (BRSA, 2010). 
Table 20: Turkish Banking Sector 2001-2005 
Years Assets/GDP Capital/GDP Loans/GDP Deposits/GDP 
2001 95.9 8.6 21 66.1 
2002 77.3 9.3 17.8 50.2 
2003 70 10 18.6 43.5 
2004 71.4 10.7 23.2 44.6 
2005 81.6 11 30.8 50 
Source: Caner et al, (2007) 
B. Developments after 2005 
 Since 2004, the BRSA has been working on the implementation of Basel II in Turkey. 
In 2005, the 1999 Banks Act was abolished and replaced by the Banking Law No. 5411, 
which came into effect on November 1, 2005. The new Banking Law (2005) was an 
important step in terms of the implementation of Basel II. One amendment made was the 
incorporation of the banks’ operational risk (in addition to credit risk and market risk) in the 
calculation of the capital adequacy ratio in order to bring it in line with the E.U. standards. As 
of June 2007, capital adequacy regulation in Turkey has been made compliant with Basel II 
by including the operational risk component in the capital adequacy calculation. Currently, 
Turkish banks’ capital adequacy is calculated on the basis of “The Regulation on 
Measurement and Evaluation of Banks’ Capital Adequacy”,269 which is compliant with the 
Basel-II Provisions (BRSA, 2010). 
The new Banking Law basically maintained the same provisions regarding capital 
adequacy. The minimum CAR ratio required by the BRSA remained at 8% (or greater). The 
BRSA kept its right to set and monitor the capital requirement ratios for all banks. It 
maintained its power to increase the minimum capital adequacy ratios, set different ratios for 
                                                 
269 Published in the Official Gazette dated on November 1, 2006. 
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each bank and revise the risk-weighting of assets, taking into account banks’ internal 
systems, as well as their asset and financial structures. 
Additionally, since November 2006, the BRSA requires banks to hold a CAR target 
ratio of 12% which is determined as a precondition to open a new branch. This ratio exceeds 
the CAR of many other emerging markets even in the global financial crisis years.270 This 
policy is considered a variation of the capital buffer in excess of what is required by the 
regulations recognising the fact that more capital is required in good times if a bank tends to 
exploit favourable market conditions by opening new branches. On the other hand, during 
periods of adverse economic conditions, this prerequisite becomes a slack condition since 
banks will have less incentive to open a new branch. Besides, banks will be protected against 
negative shocks with a cushion (Yorukoğlu & Atasoy, 2010). One of the most important 
lessons gained from the 2000/2001 crisis was the significance of maintaining a strong capital 
structure in the banking system. Therefore, the importance of maintaining a strong capital 
structure was emphasized in all policies carried out since the May, 2001 Rehabilitation 
Programme. Since the beginning of the restructuring period, the capital adequacy ratio of 
Turkish banks was increased well above the legal requirement. In fact, the CAR, which was 
9.3% in 2000, increased to 23.7% in 2005 (BRSA, 2010).271 
In order to control the credit supply for credit cards, the risk weights assigned to 
assets were adjusted. The risk weights for credit card limit commitments were increased from 
50% to 100%, which pushed down the capital adequacy ratio, hence encouraging banks to 
decrease the limits they assigned to credit cards (Yorukoğlu & Atasoy, 2010). 
 As a result of these developments in restructuring and reforming the banking sector, 
performance of the banking sector improved greatly between 2002 and 2008. The total assets 
increased to $465 billion from $130 billion, and the total asset to GDP ratio increased from 
57% to 77 %. Banks’ shareholders’ equity increased to $54 billion from $16 billion (Gursoy 
& Atıcı, 2011). 
                                                 
270 The CAR declined from 25.3 % in 2002 to 17.9 % in 2008. The recent decline in the CAR was due to 
increased bank loans and increased weights for letters of guarantee and letters of credit imposed in January 
2008. It should be noted that the CAR will fall further with the full application of the Basel II standard 
depending on the size of foreign currency Turkish government securities holdings, which will be the 100 per 
cent risk weight (Bakır, 2009). 
271 It increased to 20.78% in 2001, to 25.34% in 2002 and 30.93% in 2003. The decrease to 23.7% in 2005 is 
due to the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005 where banks suffered a 
temporary reduction in capitalization due to mark-to-market valuation losses on their holdings of government 
securities (IMF, 2007).  
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C. Measures taken during the Global Crisis 
 During the 2008 global crisis, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency 
(BRSA) adopted measures to preserve the financial strength of banks and contain the effects 
of abrupt changes in the financial asset prices on banks’ capital adequacy. For this purpose, 
BRSA made the distribution of banks’ 2008 and 2009 earnings subject to permission in order 
to contribute to the strengthening of banks’ capital structure (BRSA, 2010). Yorukoglu and 
Atasoy (2010) evaluate this measure as a tool for increasing banks’ resilience to 
vulnerabilities. In 2008, 20% of the profit and in 2009, 15% of the profit was distributed. 
 Although there was a considerable credit growth in the sector, banks were prevented 
from taking excessive risks through the regulations applied and as a result, the non-
performing loans ratio remained low even during the global crisis. One of the measures that 
the BRSA took during the global crisis was to restrict loan to value ratios for certain 
segments of bank credits, and also to increase the minimum payments on credit cards.272 
These two policies intended, in support of the policies of the Central Bank, to control the 
credit supply (Yorukoglu & Atasoy, 2010). 
 Loan-loss provisioning is another tool to ensure that banks build up buffers against 
losses (as was explained before). As a second measure, the BRSA allowed banks to 
restructure loans posing no problems, in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the loan 
relations between banks and non-financial institutions (Yorukoglu & Atasoy, 2010).273 
 Moreover, considering the fields in which there is growth and potential of important 
risk concentration, in order to take prudent measures and follow-up these risks, principles and 
procedures concerning the banks’ TL274 Bond issuances were permitted on September 30, 
                                                 
272 The regulation “the Bank Cards and Credit Cards Law” became effective on 1 March 2006. With this 
regulation, the total credit card limit determined for all customer cards should not be greater than two times 
his/her average net total monthly income for the first year and four times for the second year. The customer 
should supply the necessary documents, which are confirmed by related institutions, as evidence of his or her 
monthly income. Otherwise, the total limit for all the customer’s cards is set at TRY 1,000. These controls on 
credit card limits are intended to restrict systemic risk by forestalling households’ exposure to excessive risk. 
273 Other measures applied by the BRSA: It allowed banks to reclassify the securities in their balance sheets 
from trading portfolio to investment portfolio once only. Furthermore, three liquidity ratios that are used to 
measure and assess the liquidity adequacy of banks were put into effect in 2007. Therefore, Turkish banks have 
already been operating within the framework of liquidity regulations, which the Basel Committee is currently 
trying to implement at an international level. These ratios had a strong positive effect on the resilience of 
Turkish banks when facing the global financial stress (Yorukoglu & Atasoy, 2010; BAT, 2009). The sound 
financial positions of Turkish banks put them under less pressure in their lending activities through the positive 
effect of capital buffer (Atıcı & Gursoy, 2011). 
274 Turkish currency 
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2010 by the BRSA.275 However, the BRSA manifested that the capital adequacy ratio of the 
issuer bank could not be below 12% as of the date of application compared to the legislative 
threshold of 8% (Paksoy & Tiftikci, 2012). Furthermore, a bank must present to the BRSA a 
detailed report including the benefit and cost analysis, the effect of the issuance on the bank’s 
financial structure and detailed evaluations concerning risks which may originate from the 
issuance.276 This report is to be used in measuring, monitoring and controlling these risks 
(BRSA, 2010). 
  Finally, regarding the liquidity ratio in Basel III,277 the ratio reported by all banks in 
the Turkish banking sector is parallel (even more conservative in some items) to the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio of the Basel III Framework (BRSA Vice Chairman Speech, 2011). 
Regulation on “the Measurement and Evaluation of Liquidity Adequacy of Banks” has been 
in place since November 2006.278 Although an official timetable for the full adoption of 
Basel III in Turkey has not been announced by the BRSA, the regulations are expected to be 
implemented between 2013 and 2019 in accordance with the transition period provided for by 
the Basel Committee. 
3.1.2. Capital Adequacy Regulation in the Russian Banking Sector 
 Russia experienced a financial meltdown in 1998. Three years after the crisis, at the 
end of 2001, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Central Bank of Russia 
issued a joint declaration called “the Strategy for the Development of the Banking Sector in 
the Russian Federation” (the Strategy) setting out the strategy for banking reform in Russia 
and calling for certain legislative steps and structural changes to be taken during the 
following five years. This was followed by the introduction of “the Federal Law on the 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation” in 2002 which was an important step in banking 
reform. Finally, four years after the 1998 crisis, this law introduced new provisions related to 
banking regulation and supervision (CBR, 2002).279 Among the measures aimed at increasing 
                                                 
275 Pursuant to the Resolution Number 3875 
276 Considering the possible stress conditions as well as the application principles 
277 Basel III is the new version of the Basel Accords. It will be ultimately phased in by 2018. Basel III will 
increase the capital adequacy ratios and introduce new global regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and 
bank leverage. 
278 Redrafted in June 2007 and January 2009 
279 For more on this, see CBR Annual Report 2002, Section II.2.1 
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the stability of the Russian banking sector was an increase in the capital adequacy 
requirements to encourage the establishment of a better-capitalized banking sector.280 
A. Developments after the 1998 Crisis 
 In 2001, three years after the 1998 crisis, the Russian banking sector was still 
suffering from shortcomings that created obstacles to banking sector development, concealed 
banks’ risk exposure and distorted the capital quality of the banking sector. These 
shortcomings were false reporting, non-compliance with mandatory standards, failure to 
observe the procedure and deadlines for submitting reports and publishing them in the 
general press, and failure to observe the procedure for creating loan loss reserves. The 
restructuring process did not eliminate most of the unsound banks from the sector, which 
further distorted the asset quality of the banking sector.281 Serious defects in law 
enforcement, inadequate transparency in balance sheets, a low level of market discipline, and 
low level of corporate governance resulted in the distortion of accounting operations by some 
banks (CBR, 2000; 2001). Due to the violation of the reporting procedures in order to conceal 
the actual level of risk banks assume, their performance on the balance sheets was 
exaggerated. These situations, accompanied by the flaws in the internal control systems and 
incompetence and negligence of bank employees, led to violations committed by the banks. 
In fact, banks were still manipulating their end-of-period balance sheets to ensure their 
compliance (CBR, 2000). 
After the introduction of the Basel Accord in 1999,282 in April, 2000, Russian banks 
started to include market risk283 in the evaluation of capital adequacy.284 Three years after the 
1998 crisis, with the Development Strategy in 2001, the CBR started to work on bringing the 
banking regulation system into compliance with the Basel standards. A new version of the 
                                                 
280 The capital adequacy requirement for the Russian banks was 6% as of February 1, 1997 and 7% as of 
February 1, 1998 Bank of Russia Instruction No. 1 of January 30, 1996, “On the Procedure for Regulating the 
Activities of Credit Organisations” 
http://www.cbr.ru/eng/analytics/standart_acts/currency_regulations/print.asp?file=i1_e.htm 
281 See Section 2.3.1 
Besides, the 2004 IMF Report emphasized the need for amendments to the Bankruptcy Law in order to facilitate 
certain and speedy resolution processes. 
282 See Balin (2008) 
283 In 1993, the Basel Committee proposed a procedure to incorporate market risks on banks’ capital 
requirements through a standard approach which was also used for credit risks under the 1988 Basel Accord 
(Basel I). 
284 It was calculated in accordance with the procedure set by the Bank of Russia’s Regulation No. 89-P, dated 
September 24, 1999 (On the Market Risk Calculation Procedure for Credit Institutions). The enforcement 
started in April 1, 2000 (CBR, 2003). 
151 
 
CBR’s Regulation285 on calculating capital was adapted in order to bring the calculation of 
the capital adequacy requirement in line with the Basel Core Principles.286 In 2001, the Bank 
of Russia introduced a criterion that expanded the range of credit institutions required to 
calculate market risks to be included in the capital adequacy calculation. Between 2001 and 
2003, the number of credit institutions that included market risk calculations increased from 
703 to 848 (CBR, 2002). 
The new Banking Law (2002) stipulated that the CBR may set prudential 
requirements for banks.287 Therefore, the CBR became authorized to establish ten 
compulsory standards for banking groups, including the capital adequacy ratios (CBR, 
2002).288 Accordingly, the CBR is authorised to introduce various capital adequacy 
requirements (CAR) applicable to banks.289 The Banking Law also specified the procedure 
for fining banks by the CBR for non-compliance with the specified prudential requirements. 
The law empowered the CBR to recommend the founders of a credit institution to take 
actions to increase its equity capital to the required level (CBR, 2002). Another amendment 
to the law and the subsequent changes in CBR regulations was that the CBR became 
authorized to revoke the banking licence from a credit institution, but only if the credit 
institution’s capital adequacy ratio fell below 2%.290 
As was explained in Chapter I,291 the minimum capital adequacy requirements set by 
the regulators should reflect the risk that banks undertake and also must define the 
components of banks’ capital. The quality of these components is important in the sense that 
it enables the bank to absorb losses. In 2003, the CBR issued a regulation292 designed to 
                                                 
285 “On the Methodology of Calculating Credit Institutions’ Own Funds (Capital)” 
The new version stipulated that the revaluation gains should not be included in the calculation of additional 
sources of credit institutions’ capital more than once in three years (CBR, 2002). 
286 Capital Adequacy Requirement refers to Core Principle 6 (CP 6) of the “Basel Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision”. 
287 According to the articles 62, 64, 65, 67, 70, and 71 of the Banking Law 
288 In accord with the Article 62 of the Law 
289 Articles 62, 67 and 72 of the Banking Law 
290 Based on the amendments made to the Federal Law “On Banks and Banking Activities” and the subsequent 
changes in Bank of Russia regulations requirements 
In accord with Article 20, Section 10 of the BL (395-I) the CBR is obliged to revoke a bank’s license if its 
bank’s capital adequacy ratio falls below 2% (IMF, 2011a; b). 
291 Chapter I, Section 6.1.1. 
292 Bank of Russia Regulation No. 215P, dated February 10, 2003, “On the Methodology of Determining Own 
Funds (Capital) of Credit Institutions” and Bank of Russia Ordinance No. 1246U, dated February 10, 2003, “On 
Actions to be Taken upon the Discovery of the Evidence (Signs) of the Formation of Own Funds (Capital) or a 
Part Thereof, Using Inappropriate Assets”. 
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improve the quality of credit institutions’ capital and defined the “own funds” in line with the 
Basel standards.293 
After 2001, although still above the required level the aggregate capital adequacy 
ratios of banks decreased steadily. The average capital adequacy registered in 2002 was 22.2 
against 24.4 in 2001. This ratio continued to decline to 19.1% in 2003, due to the fact that the 
credit institutions’ aggregate risk increased faster than their capital as was also evidenced in 
2002. The capital adequacy ratio decreased from 19.1% to 17.0% in 2004 as again banks’ 
risk-weighted assets grew faster than their equity capital (CBR, 2004) (See, Table 19). 
 Moreover, the findings of the 2003 IMF Financial System Stability Assessment 
(FSSA) showed that although Russian banks were well capitalized in 2002 and in 2003, the 
quality of capital was questionable and loan loss provisioning was not reflecting actual credit 
risks.294 The report emphasized the weakness of the banking sector in terms of the 
supervisory and regulatory framework and warned against a possible banking shock, which in 
fact happened in 2004. One of the recommendations of the 2003 IMF report referred to the 
tightening of the definition of capital and enforcement of capital requirements. Furthermore, 
the report mentioned that a CBR study of 30 banks at that time indicated that those banks had 
significantly overstated their capital level and actually had negative net worth. The same 
report also mentioned that the changes in the laws were not always accompanied by 
immediate reviews of regulations and that there was considerable overlap in the number of 
guidelines.295 
                                                 
293 This regulation No. 215-p was replaced in 2006. The Federal Law No. 247FZ, dated December 29, 2006, 
Ordinance No. 1793U, dated February 20, 2007, ‘On Amending Bank of Russia Regulation No. 215P, dated 
February 10, 2003, on the Methodology of Calculating the Capital of Credit Institutions’, defined the term 
‘subordinated loan’. 
It established the conditions to include subordinated loans in the sources of additional capital. The amendments 
made to this regulation in the following year extended the list of subordinated instruments included in capital 
calculation. These amendments correspond to international banking and supervisory practices. They aim to 
contribute to the growth in the capitalisation of the Russian banking sector (CBR, 2006; 2007). 
294 Loan-loss provisions in accounting have a central role in determining the asset quality (particularly loan 
quality) problems. However, banks may have the incentives to underreport their provisions. See, Chapter I, 
Section 6.1.1 and 6.1.4 
295 In 2002, the CBR drafted and received the approval for the Regulations “On the Procedure for Making 
Allowances for Estimated Losses” and “On the Procedure for Making and Use of Allowances for Estimated 
Loan Losses” (CBR, 2002). This regulation was changed in August 2004 with the introduction of a new loan 
classification and provisioning procedure called “Bank of Russia Regulation No. 254 P, dated March 26, 2004, 
On the Procedure for Making by Credit Institutions Loan Loss Provisions and Provisions for Loan Debts and 
Similar Debts” (CBR, 2004). 
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 The adoption of a new regulation ‘‘On Mandatory Ratios of Banks’’296 by the CBR in 
2004297 was an important step because this regulation formed the foundation of the CBR’s 
prudential supervision. Firstly, regarding capital adequacy requirements, the CAR ratio was 
increased to tighten the regulatory framework. Banks with capital of €5Million and more 
were required to hold a risk-weighted capital-asset ratio of 10%, and banks with capital less 
than €5 Million were required to hold 11%.298 Secondly, this regulation required credit 
institutions to comply with the required ratios on a daily basis299 in order to eliminate the 
motivation for the accounting manipulations mentioned above and contribute to asset quality 
(Tompson, 2004).300 
  In spite of these developments, financial intermediation in the Russian banking sector 
did not develop as intended between 2001 and 2005 (See, Table 21). The Russian banking 
sector experienced instability and a liquidity deficit in 2004 called a mini-crisis.301 This crisis 
resulted from the actions taken by the CBR and a crisis of confidence among Russian 
banking customers. During July 2004, the CBR revoked the banking licences of several 
Russian banks. The resulting uncertainty in the Russian banking system led to the collapse of 
the interbank lending system and to liquidity pressure for many Russian banks. The collapse 
of several Russian banks caused panic among depositors. Even reliable larger banks became 
subject to deposit withdrawals (Tompson, 2004). 
                                                 
296 Regulation No. 110-I 
297 Pursuant to the Federal Law No. 86-FZ, dated July 10, 2002, “On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation 
(Bank of Russia)” which superseded the CBR Instruction No. 1 ‘‘On the Procedure for Regulating the Activities 
of Credit Organisations’’, approved by the Order of the CBR No. 02-430 dated 1 October 1997, as amended 
(Instruction No. 1). 
298 This new regulation of the Bank of Russia Instruction No. 110 I, dated January 16, 2004 “On Banks’ 
Required Ratios,” replaced Bank of Russia Instruction No. 1, dated October 1, 1997, “On the Regulation of 
Banking Activities,” starting from May 1, 2004. Pursuant to this new regulation, changes were made to the 
calculation of market risk in calculating the amount of risk-weighted assets regarding certain off-balance sheet 
items. The CBR also extended the concept of risk-weights to all other ratios that include assets in the 
denominator (Tompson, 2004). 
In December 2011, a new law was introduced that incrementally increases the minimum capital requirements to 
RUB 300 million (around €7.4 million) by 2015. At the time of writing this thesis, minimum capital 
requirements are RUB 90 million (around €2.3 million). 
299 These ratios were calculated on the reporting date (the first day of each month) and in case of non-
compliance the bank could be fined. 
300 Tompson (2004) adds that the mandatory ratios under the new instruction were not covering key issues such 
as the quality of capital and liability concentration which, according to him, would have a distorting effect on 
the disclosure by disabling market observers to detect risks in banks. 
301 See Footnote 206 
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Table 21: Russian Banking Sector 2001-2005 
Years Assets/GDP Capital/GDP Loans/GDP Deposits/GDP 
2001 35.3 5.1 14.8 7.6 
2002 38.3 5.4 16.6 9.5 
2003 42.3 6.2 20.3 11.5 
2004 42.1 5.6 22.9 11.7 
2005 45.1 5.7 25.3 12.8 
Source: CBR (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005; Caner et al. (2007)\ 
B. Developments after 2005 
 In 2005, the CBR started to prepare for the introduction of international capital 
adequacy standards established by the Basel New Capital Accord (Basel II) by studying the 
nature and scale of the changes that must be made to laws and regulations. The Government 
of Russia and the CBR published a new strategy for the development of the Russian banking 
sector regarding the period from 2005 to 2008, which replaced the 2001 joint declaration of 
“the Strategy”. Several regulations were issued in 2005302 by the Bank of Russia to make 
changes for the specification of methods in calculating the assets included in the capital 
adequacy ratio and in calculating the prudential ratios limiting a bank’s credit risks (CBR, 
2005). 
However, the average capital adequacy ratio of Russian banks continued to decline after 
2004. Although this decrease was in part the result of rapid credit growth, some banks were 
not able to raise enough capital as their businesses were expanding. Not all banks were 
meeting the 10% capital adequacy requirement. Several banks were still not meeting the 
minimum requirement on the basis of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) 
(IMF, 2006). The trend towards a gradual decline in the average capital adequacy ratio 
continued as the growth in banking sector assets exceeded the growth in banking sector 
capital, leading to an increase in banks’ balance sheets. In 2005, the average capital adequacy 
ratio decreased from 17.0% to 16.0%. In 2006, it decreased from 16.0% to 14.9%. Only in 
                                                 
302 Ordinance of February 18, 2005 No. 1549-U, Ordinance of July 6, 2005, No. 1592-U and Ordinance of July 
29, 2005, No. 1599-U “On Amending Bank of Russia Instruction of January 16, 2004, No. 110-I ‘On Banks 
Prudential Ratios”. 
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2007, unlike the situation in previous years, did the average capital adequacy ratio increase 
from 14.9% to 15.5% as the banking sector total capital grew faster than the assets (See, 
Table 19). 
C. Impact of the Global Crisis 
 In 2008, the global financial crisis adversely affected the dynamics of the banking 
sector average capital adequacy ratio. It contracted from 15.5% as of January 1, 2008 to 
14.5% as of October 1, 2008 (See Table 19). However, due to measures taken by the 
government at the end of the year, specifically the extension of subordinated loans (i.e. quasi 
capital)303 to several large banks reversed this trend and the banking sector capital adequacy 
ratio increased to 16.8% in 2008 (CBR, 2008). In 2009, due to the growth in the banking 
sector’s capital, the CAR increased from 16.8% to 20.9%. It decreased to 18.1% in 2010. 
This was caused by the slowdown of the capital growth rate compared to the considerable 
growth of risk-weighted assets (CBR, 2010). 
 In order to improve the incorporation of Pillar 1 of Basel II to its regulatory 
framework, the Bank of Russia issued two regulations in 2009. The regulation304 in 
November 2009 was introduced in order to improve the regulation on “Banks Required 
Ratios” (dated 2004). This established a procedure for implementing Basel II simplified 
approach to credit risk assessment. Moreover, another regulation in 2009305 “On the 
Procedure for Calculating Operational Risk” established a procedure for the inclusion of 
operational risk in the calculation of capital adequacy ratio.306 
 In 2010, CBR continued to take steps to apply Basel II in the Russian banking sector. 
Amendments to the Bank of Russia regulations regarding the procedure for the calculation of 
required ratios and operational risk (introduced in November, 2009) became effective in July, 
2010. These regulations implemented a simplified standardised approach to the assessment of 
                                                 
303 Subordinated loans are listed as one of the items that constitute supplementary capital. Ashcraft (2006) finds 
that that an increase in the amount of subordinated debt in regulatory capital has an important positive effect in 
helping a bank recover from financial distress. 
304 Ordinance No 2324-U “On Amending Bank of Russia Instruction No. 110-I”, dated January, 2004, on 
‘Banks’ Required Ratios 
305 Regulation No.346-P as of November, 2009 
306 In November, 2009 the CBR issued three regulations: 1) Ordinance No.2321-U “On Amending Bank of 
Russia Regulation No. 313-P, dated November, 2007, on the Procedure for Calculating Market Risk by Credit 
Institutions”. 2) Ordinance No. 2322-U of November 2009, “On Amending Bank of Russia Regulation No. 283-
P, dated March, 2006, on “the Loss Provision Procedure for Credit Institutions”, and 3) Ordinance No. 2323-U 
of November 3 2009, “On Amending Bank of Russia Regulation No. 254-P, dated March 26, 2004, on the 
“Procedure for Making by Credit Institution Provisions for Possible Losses on Loans, Loan and Similar Debts”. 
This provided the necessary changes regarding the transition within the framework of the capital adequacy 
calculation system. 
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credit risk and a basic indicator approach to the calculation of operational risk under Basel II. 
As of 1 January 2010, the minimum equity capital of an operating bank cannot be less than 
90 million roubles (€2.234.570) and as of 1 January 2012, not less than 180 million roubles 
(€4.469.148). From June 2010, the Bank of Russia is to phase in operational risk coverage (at 
first 40%, then 70% and finally 100%) which banks should ensure when calculating the 
capital adequacy ratio (CBR, 2010).307  
3.1.3.  Discussion 
 The qualitative analysis regarding the post-crisis periods in Turkish and Russian 
banking sectors suggests that the restructuring process implemented following the crisis 
period was more comprehensive and more disciplined in Turkey compared to Russia. This 
had a significant positive impact on the Turkish banks’ asset quality compared to the Russian 
banks where the existence of problematic banks in the sector still has a distorting effect on 
the asset quality. Hence, the analysis suggests that the asset quality remained a problem in the 
Russian banking sector partly due to the existence of the problematic banks (such as the so-
called pocket banks), even in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis.308 Whereas in Turkey many 
problematic banks’ licenses were cancelled or transferred to the SDIF immediately after the 
2001 crisis, the restructuring process in Russia was not achieved successfully. Many of these 
Russian weak banks continued to operate distorting the overall asset quality of the banking 
sector. In fact, the total funding of restructuring measures amounted to $ 0.52 billion (16 
billion roubles) in Russia (a very modest amount compared to the usual banking sector 
restructuring costs which arise following deep banking crises) (Steinherr et al., 2004). The 
total cost of the restructuring of the Turkish banking sector was $ 53.6 billion which was 
almost equivalent to one third of the national income (BRSA, 2010). 
 Table 22 shows some of the developments in the balance sheet activities of both 
countries’ banking sectors during 2001 and 2005. The table shows that the Turkish banks 
recovered more quickly than the Russian banks in terms of the achievement of financial 
intermediation in their respective post-crisis periods. In fact, Russia experienced further 
crises in 2004 and in 2008. Looking at the non-performing loan (NPL) ratios in both 
                                                 
307 Operational risk is connected with the conclusion and execution of deals, organisational issues and the 
implementation of business processes in a bank. 
308 This situation was aggravated by the weak accounting and enforcement standards in Russia compared to the 
strict enforcement of the accounting standards by the BRSA in Turkey. These issues will be explained in detail 
in the following sections regarding disciplinary power of the regulatory authority and private monitoring 
practices in both countries. 
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countries, we see that in Turkey this ratio was very low during the global crisis compared to 
Russia (See, Table 23).309 
 The 2010 IMF Report emphasizes that generous accounting and provisioning rules 
continue to mask the extent of systemic risks, the severity of the deterioration of the loan 
portfolio, and the adequacy of capital in the Russian banking sector. The report insists on 
strengthening the loan classification and provisioning system, which are important for the 
health of a loan portfolio and for understanding a bank’s capital adequacy (IMF, 2010). 
Table 22: Banking Sector Indicators in Turkey and Russia, 2001-2005 
Russian Banking Sector  Turkish Banking Sector 
Years Assets/GDP Capital/GDP Loans/GDP Deposits/GDP Assets/GDP Capital/GDP Loans/GDP Deposits/GDP 
2001 35.3 5.1 14.8 7.6 95.9 8.6 21 66.1 
2002 38.3 5.4 16.6 9.5 77.3 9.3 17.8 50.2 
2003 42.3 6.2 20.3 11.5 70 10 18.6 43.5 
2004 42.1 5.6 22.9 11.7 71.4 10.7 23.2 44.6 
2005 45.1 5.7 25.3 12.8 81.6 11 30.8 50 
Source: CBR Banking Supervision Reports (2001-2006), Caner et al, 2007 
Table 23: Non-Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans 2003-2011 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Turkey 11.5 6 5 3.9 3.6 3.8 5.6 3.8 3.1 
Russia 5 3.8 2.6 2.4 2.5 3.8 9.5 8.2 8 
Source: The World Bank (2003-2011). http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.ZS/countries?page=2 
 Although above the minimum required level, the average capital adequacy ratios of 
Russian banks had a declining trend between 2000 and 2006, compared to the increasing 
trend of CAR in the Turkish banking sector during the same period (See, Table 19). More 
importantly, some banks were not able to meet the minimum requirement ratio. The annual 
CBR banking supervision reports repeatedly refer to violations of capital adequacy 
requirements by several banks. Conversely, despite close scrutiny by Turkish authorities, 
                                                 
309 In fact, the NPL to total gross loans decreased from 29.3% in 2001 to 3.1% in 2011 (World Bank). 
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there has been no publicly reported breach by a Turkish bank of the BRSA imposed capital 
adequacy requirements. 
3.2. Official Disciplinary Power 
 As explained in Chapter I,310 the public interest view argues that bank supervisors can 
overcome market imperfections. Strong official supervision in the public interest view 
contributes to preventing banks from engaging in overly risky behaviour and hence improves 
banks performance and stability. An independent supervisory agency would be able to 
insulate regulators from political pressures and from bankers (Barth et al, 2006:55). This 
argument is also supported by my results of the empirical analysis, which showed that higher 
official disciplinary power is positively and significantly associated with higher efficiency 
results. 
 Following Pasiouras (2008),311 the official disciplinary power variable used in the 
empirical analysis of this thesis measures the extent to which official supervisory authorities 
have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems in the banking 
sector. It is analysed in three sections: Prompt corrective power measures the extent to which 
the law establishes predetermined levels of bank solvency deterioration that force automatic 
enforcement actions, such as intervention, and the extent to which supervisors have the 
requisite, and suitable powers to do so. Restructuring power measures the extent to which 
supervisory authorities have the power to restructure and reorganize troubled banks. 
Declaring insolvency power measures the extent to which supervisory authorities have the 
power to declare a deeply troubled bank insolvent (See Table 24).312 
                                                 
310 See Section 5.1 
311 See Appendix A 
312 Barth et al. (2001a; 2006:121-132) decompose official supervisory action variable into five parts. However, 
since the empirical analysis in this thesis is based on the questions selected by Pasiouras (2008), I only include 
one part of the questions which is the official supervisory power. Other parts are titled as Supervisory 
Forbearance Discretion, Loan Classification Stringency Provisioning Stringency Diversification Index. 
Supervisory forbearance discretion measures the degree to which supervisory authorities may engage in 
forbearance when confronted with violations of laws or regulations or with other imprudent behaviour on the 
part of banks. Since forbearance is a long-standing problem in Russia, I will touch upon this part in brief. 
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Table 24: Components of Official Disciplinary Power 
 
 On top of the prudential regulations and banking laws, establishing a sound 
supervisory regime is very important in ensuring their implementation and compliance by the 
banks (Cetin, 2009; Hüpkes, 2000). Hüpkes mentions (2000:31-32) “If it is determined by the 
supervisory authority that a bank does not comply with prudential requirements, this 
contravention must be addressed immediately and sufficiently before it leads to more serious 
problems”. Lastra (2006) adds that supervision is a process that starts from the beginning of 
the business life of a supervised entity and continues until its end and it consists of four 
stages: licensing, supervision, sanctioning and crisis management. Based on this fact, the 
sanctioning process is crucial regarding the enforcement of prudential regulations because the 
success of banking regulations depends on their effective efficient enforcement (Lastra, 
2006;313 Hüpkes, 2000:31). According to Hüpkes (2000), enforcement of prudential 
regulations might comprise remedial measures against a bank or its directors, managers and 
shareholders. Following these arguments, penalties and sanctions for failures to comply with 
the regulations should be clearly specified in a banking law (Cetin, 2011). 
 Examining the role of the regulatory/supervisory agency becomes especially 
important when it comes to analysing two emerging markets such as Russia and Turkey 
                                                 
313 The categorization of sanctions by Lastra (2006) is very similar to the classification of Barth et al. (2001b) I 
used in my empirical analysis in terms of their content. The first category refers to “institutional sanctions” such 
as financial penalties, cease and desist orders, prompt corrective actions, and revocation of licenses. The second 
category refers to “personal sanctions” such as temporary or permanent inability to be a banker, fines, loss of 
job, call of attention, management overhaul, and imprisonment that directly penalizes the management (Lastra, 
2006:89). 
Official Supervisory 
Power 
Declaring Insolvency 
Power 
Restructuring Power 
Prompt Corrective 
Power 
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where the way of doing business and banking in the form of corruption and connected 
lending used to be considered normal practices of doing business.314 However, whereas this 
continues to be a major problem in Russia, doing banking in Turkey has transformed itself 
with the establishment of the BRSA. Kaymak (2009) argues that the BRSA case shows its 
originality as an emerging country banking regulatory and supervisory authority. The BRSA 
experience shows that banking regulation and supervision requires more than enacting laws 
to founding supervisory and regulatory authorities, making it very important for an emerging 
market economy to comply with the proposed standards and regulations (Kaymak, 2009). 
 Following the crisis periods, although both countries needed much improvement in 
their regulatory frameworks, (especially with regard to connected-lending practices, 
transparency and consolidated accounts), the key problem had been the lack of enforcement 
rather than the regulatory framework (Steinherr et al., 2004; Steinherr, 2006). One difference 
between the two countries is that the 2001 crisis in Turkey shifted the focus of the newly born 
BRSA from supervision to restructuring and rehabilitation in the first place whereas in 
Russia, there was no official program for more than four years with any serious restructuring 
plan. The requirements for a successful banking restructuring were not met (Steinherr et al., 
2004; Thiessen, 2004). Thiessen (2004) argues that following the 1998 crisis, the banking 
system was rather stabilized through central bank credit and forbearance in rule enforcement 
of the CBR.315 After the 1998 crisis, the CBR provided liquidity to banks that faced liquidity 
problems. However, these measures were flawed because the process was not transparent and 
the criteria in selecting the banks that received support from the government was not defined. 
Besides, there was no control regarding the use of provided funds (Thiessen, 2004). In fact, 
Thiessen (2004) argues that the CBR and the government were not successful in promptly 
implementing a transparent bank restructuring program (even over several years after the 
1998 crisis) and enforcing prudential regulations for banks such as the enforcement of 
liability for any overdue debt. In spite of the Bankruptcy Law that came into effect in March 
1998, many large enterprises or large debtors to producers continued to enjoy leniency. As a 
result, the leniency of the CBR in terms of the violation of prudential rules, and its provision 
of uncollateralized “stabilization credits” to banks in very generous amounts, (mostly 
uncollateralized) created incentives for bank managers to lobby for further leniency and 
                                                 
314 See Section 2.1.1 and 2.3.1 
315 Based on Beck’s (2004) empirical analysis’ findings, Steinherr (2006) argues that the limited effect of the 
1998 crisis on the growth rates is due to good luck provided by the real devaluation of the rouble and the 
increase in the world market price of oil. Therefore the failures became less visible. This argument is also 
supported by Thiessen (2004). 
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government support, to continue to take high risks and to distribute profits in spite of the 
solvency problems (Thiessen, 2004). 
 In the end, most of the bankrupt banks were not liquidated after the 1998 crisis. In 
fact, compared to other countries that wound down 20-40% of their banks following a crisis, 
the Russian banking system experienced only a 12% decline in the number of its banks over 
the year following the 1998 crisis. Moreover, the number of licenses withdrawn between the 
start of the crisis until the end of March 1999 is fewer than the number withdrawn in the same 
period of the previous year316 (Ippolito, 2002) (see Table 17).317 The number of institutions 
liquidated due to violation of legislation increased after the crisis. However, in spite of having 
lost their licenses, many banks were not liquidated (Thiessen, 2004).318 
 Looking at the indexes concerning the disciplinary power, there is a considerable 
difference between Russia and Turkey, where the Turkish regulatory agency has a higher 
disciplinary power (see Table 25). BRSA has a rule-based approach (IFC, 2009). In contrast, 
Claeys et al. (2005) results indicate regulatory forbearance by the CBR. His argument is 
strengthened by Malyutina and Parilova (2001) who argue that although the CBR stated the 
prudential requirements, it did not apply them by tolerating their violations. 
Table 25: Index on Official Disciplinary Power in Turkey and Russia* 
Years 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Turkey 4 6 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Russia 5 5 8 8 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 
*This variable takes values between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating higher power of the supervisory authority. 
                                                 
316 The total number of revoked bank licenses in 1998 was 152 compared to 282 in 1997 (CBR Report, 
December, 1998 & December 1997). In 1999, licenses of only 24 banks were revoked (CBR Report, January 
2000). 
317 Thiessen (2004) argues that the issue of forbearance might have its pros and cons relative to restructuring of 
a banking system. There can be an optimal degree of forbearance in a crisis situation depending on factors such 
as the nature of the shock and its degree of permanence and on the authorities’ ability to carry out an effective 
restructuring program. But based on many country cases of banking crises used by the cited empirical literature 
on banking crises, which were examined individually, the literature finds that forbearance and delaying 
implementation of a comprehensive restructuring program tends to raise the real economic costs of such crises 
and only make things worse (Thiessen, 2004). 
318 Thiessen (2004) adds that in the view of many observers the lack of government action with regard to 
implementing serious banking restructuring measures continued through several years after the crisis. 
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3.2.1. Official Disciplinary Power of the Banking Regulatory Authority in 
Turkey 
 The Turkish Banking Law gives statutory recognition to two institutions in the 
banking sector: the Banking Regulations and Supervision Agency (BRSA) and the Savings 
Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) (Cetin, 2011). The Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency (BRSA) was established by the former Banks Act No. 4389 effective as of June, 
1999. Following the foundation of the BRSA, several regulations were introduced to improve 
its autonomy and accountability and to empower its administrative capacity.319 Pursuant to 
the Banks Act (1999), the BRSA embodied all public institutions which were responsible for 
the banking sector’s supervision.320 
 After the BRSA became fully operational in August 2000, all banking evaluation and 
supervision departments at the Treasury and the monitoring department at the Central Bank 
were closed, so that the overlaps between the Turkish Treasury and Central Bank in 
regulating the financial markets were brought to an end (Aysan & Al, 2007). Their personnel 
were transferred to the new agency. The Banks Act (1999) delegated to the BRSA the 
primary authority to regulate and supervise the Turkish banking sector (Cetin, 2011).
 This new structure gave the BRSA a wide range of authority in monitoring the 
conditions of all banks in Turkey through off-site analysis of bank balance sheets and income 
reports and through on-site examinations. In other words, its supervisory process was made 
stronger with the unification of on-site audit and off-site audit (Aysan & Al 2007; Altunbas et 
al., 2009:55). Following the 2001 crisis, in addition to the banking restructuring program, the 
supervisory field of BRSA was expanded in order to increase the institutional capacity. All 
resolutions related to banks were given to the authority of BRSA. These included: i) the 
principles and procedures related to the redefinition of loans, ii) application of rules related to 
banks’ consolidated audit in line with the international standards, and iii) regular monitoring 
of banks’ compliance with the requirements (Paksoy & Tiftikci, 2010). 
 Regarding on-site and off-site supervision of banks, the BRSA is authorized with 
extensive powers over the banks regarding i) their compliance with the laws such as lending 
limits, capital and liquidity requirements and shareholding limits, ii) the relation and balance 
                                                 
319 Following the establishment of BRSA, its autonomy and accountability was strengthened and the scope of its 
surveillance and supervision was expanded first by the Law Nr. 4491 in December 19, 1999 and then secondly 
by the Law Nr. 4743 dated January 31, 2002 (BRSA, 2010). 
320 Pursuant to the Banks Act (1999), the SDIF was also administered and represented by the BRSA. 
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between the consolidated and non-consolidated risk structures and internal control systems of 
the financial institutions and iii) compliance with the corporate governance principles. In 
order to facilitate its supervision over the financial institutions, the BRSA may send 1) an 
observer to the general assembly meetings of the banks; 2) evaluate the structure, conformity 
and reliability of the annual financial reports prepared by the independent audit firms; and 3) 
request any consolidated and non-consolidated information (or financial statements) from 
banks and their subsidiaries, (including those classified as confidential) (Paksoy & Tiftikçi, 
2010). 
 Although in its first years, the BRSA had to deal with the most urgent problem of the 
restructuring process, following the resolution process of troubled banks,321 the BRSA 
continued to issue several prudential regulations to establish a sound regulatory framework 
(Kaymak, 2009).322 
 With the enactment of Act No. 5020 in December 2003, the management of the SDIF 
was separated from the management of the BRSA. Pursuant to this law,323 the SDIF became 
a separate entity. More importantly, this Act provided a powerful framework for effectively 
penalizing persons who are responsible for putting at risk and damaging the stability of the 
financial system by misbehaviour in management as well as persons causing loss to 
depositors. Bakır and Önis (2010) argue that the former legal environment was conducive to 
the establishment of a rent-seeking coalition through statutory decrees in banking. The 
authors indicate that the Statutory Decree No. 512 enacted in 1993 legally protected corrupt 
bank managers by: (1) removing their individual liability in unlawful acts, which would lead 
to loss and bankruptcy of a bank, and (2) removing the clause stipulating the exclusion of 
such bankers from any bank management activities. Hence, in order to create deterrence, Act 
No. 5020 brought heavy imprisonment and penalty relating to banking crimes (BRSA, 2010). 
                                                 
321 According to the BRSA 2006 report, 20 banks were taken over by the SDIF and resolved from 1997 until 
2003. 12 of these banks were found to be misusing their financial positions for the benefit of majority 
shareholders causing major significant losses. Besides, these bankers had taken loans from state banks and other 
SDIF banks as well. Hence, the total share of non-performing loans in the banking sector’s gross loans was 
29.3% as a result of these connected-lending practices (BRSA, 2006). 
322 A number of regulations were issued and put into force on the following areas: Capital adequacy, Risk 
management, Lending limits and Loan Loss provisioning, Accounting Standards, Independent Auditing, Bank 
Capital Strengthening Program, Special Finance Institutions, and Supervision and cooperation agreements with 
foreign supervisory authorities (BRSA, 2010). 
323 “The Law on Making Amendments to Some Laws” 
The Law Nr. 5020 came into force in December 26, 2003. It was related to amendments in Certain Laws and 
Banks Act (1999). 
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 In 2003, the BRSA tightened branch supervision. It issued a regulation on support 
services. It increased the scope of audits by increasing the number of auditors conducting on-
site supervision, made amendments in legislation to implement information systems audit in 
banks, issued regulations concerning internal systems and corporate management to establish 
transparency and accountability in internal audit, internal control and brought more severe 
rules in granting licenses with amendments in legislation and brought tighter applications to 
off-shore banking (BRSA, 2010). In fact, every move and transaction of a bank became 
regulated. 
 The Banks Act (1999) was amended nine times following its introduction. Its 
systematic became deteriorated, and hence it was unable to support the sub-regulations. It 
became insufficient for a broad supervision and maintaining good governance. Therefore it 
was replaced by the Banking Law Nr. 5411 in 2005. This law increased the scope of duties, 
authority and responsibilities of the BRSA because the regulation and supervision of non-
bank financial institutions were transferred from the Treasury to the BRSA in January, 2006. 
The aim was to improve consolidated supervision and facilitate integration in markets 
(BRSA, 2006; Steinherr et al., 2004). 
 The success of banking regulations depends on their effective enforcement (Lastra, 
2006). Sanctions for failures to comply with prudential regulatory requirements must be 
clearly specified in the law as the efficiency of banking regulations depends on their effective 
enforcement (Lastra, 2006; Cetin, 2011). The current Banking Law (2005) consists of many 
prudential standards for banks. More importantly, the Banking Law (2005) established an 
effective sanctioning regime to ensure the implementation of these standards. Since one of 
the reasons of the crisis experienced in Turkey in 2001 was illegal practices conducted by 
managers and controlling shareholders, the Banking Law draws a comprehensive framework 
for the liability of these persons (Cetin, 2011). This law introduced personal liability and 
breach of the certain provisions of the law can constitute criminal liability.324 
                                                 
324 The academic literature uses deterrence-based enforcement theory in explaining the social goal of 
enforcement policies. The foundations of this theory first appeared by Becker in 1968 and since then, Becker’s 
theory has been accepted as a general law and economics framework for the analysis of law enforcement. The 
idea is that if market players act rationally in deciding whether to obey the law, enforcement policies must deter 
these players from law-breaking by creating an incentive scheme that makes them better-off obeying the law, 
rather than violating it. If people know that law-breaking triggers sanctions, they may be deterred from breaking 
the law (Ogus, 2004 in Oded (2012:29-33). 
For more on the deterrence-based enforcement theory, see Becker, (1968); Cooter & Ulen, (2007); Oded, 
(2012). 
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 The implementation of prudential standards is monitored by the BRSA since the 
institutions under the scope of this Law and their activities are subject to supervision of the 
BRSA, and as such this supervisory power allows the BRSA to apply the sanctions specified 
in the Banking Law when a bank violates the regulatory requirements.325 
 The sanctioning regime in the Turkish Banking Law consists of institutional sanctions 
and personal sanctions. The institutional sanctions in the Banking Law consist of three 
categories; prompt corrective actions, revocation of license and closure, and finally financial 
penalties. Personal sanctions consist of management overhaul and loss of job, temporary 
prohibition from employment in the banking sector, financial penalties, criminal liability, and 
civil liability of managers and controlling shareholders (Cetin, 2011) (Table 26). 
 Prompt corrective actions aim at dealing with banks in financial distress or banks that 
have breached regulatory requirements. This system allows the BRSA to take early action. It 
is worth noting that the codification of these measures is crucial to eliminate regulatory 
forbearance and the abuse of supervisors’ discretion (Hüpkes, 2000:36-37). The regulation of 
prompt corrective action specifies the pre-conditions to take corrective, rehabilitating and 
restrictive measures326 under the Articles 68-70 of the Banking Law.327 The evaluation takes 
place based on the financial situation of the bank (such as asset quality, profitability etc.) and 
based on the contravention of the prudential regulatory requirements such as the capital 
adequacy requirement, liquidity requirement etc.328 If the pre-conditions have already 
occurred as ascertained by the BRSA, then the agency shall require the bank to take the 
necessary measures immediately. The aim of this design is to create an early-warning system. 
  
                                                 
325 Article 65 of the Banking Law 
326 The regulation of prompt corrective action is codified in detail in the Banking Law under “Supervision and 
Measures to be Taken”; Articles 68-70 of the Banking Law 
327 In cases where: i) the assets of a bank are unlikely to meet its obligations in terms of maturity or the bank 
doesn’t comply with the capital adequacy or liquidity requirements; ii) the profitability of a bank is not 
sufficient to reliably perform its activities due to the distorted balance between revenues and expenses; iii) the 
quality of a banks’ assets has deteriorated and its financial structure is likely to weaken; iv) the decision and 
practices of the bank breach the legislation; and v) the bank fails to establish its internal control system or fails 
to operate the system efficiently (Paksoy & Tiftikci, 2012). 
328 Article 67 of the Banking Law (2005) specifies these conditions in detail under “Cases where measures are 
required to be taken”. 
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Table 26: Sanctioning Regime in Turkey 
 
 However, if the bank under supervision has not taken those measures, or has been 
unsuccessful even with the measures, then the BRSA starts the license revocation process. 
Article 68 gives the BRSA the power to call on the board of directors of the relevant bank to 
take and implement corrective measures specified in the Law as deemed appropriate by the 
BRSA, within the time period approved by the BRSA. If the bank fails to implement the 
measures laid down in Article 68, and the bank has more serious financial problems than the 
ones subject to corrective measures, then the BRSA has the authority to force the bank to take 
more radical and stronger measures under Article 69 called “rehabilitating measures”. 
 “Restrictive Measures”329 is the last component of the prompt corrective actions to be 
taken. They directly affect the activities of the bank and are designed to prevent the financial 
failure of a bank that may spread within the whole banking system. These measures are 
interpreted as a last resort for banks before closure since they intend to keep the bank in the 
system by imposing several restrictions (Cetin, 2011). These measures include restricting or 
to temporarily suspending the bank’s activities, dismissing some or all of the general 
                                                 
329 Article 70 of the Banking Law (2005) 
Sanctioning Regime 
Institutional Sanctions 
Financial penalties. 
Revocation of license 
and closure 
Prompt Corrective 
Actions 
Personal Sanctions 
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managers, relevant unit or branch directors, sometimes even the board of directors. The 
prompt corrective action system aims at enabling a bank in financial distress to continue its 
activities in a sound manner and bring it back to viability. However, if these measures are not 
sufficient to prevent the failure of the bank, the BRSA has the power330 of revocation of 
license and closure331 in order to protect financial stability and depositors’ rights (Cetin, 
2011; Banking Law, 2005). 
 The third part of the institutional sanctions refers to financial penalties332 which 
specify the reasons and the amount of the penalties. The BRSA has the right to impose 
financial penalties on banks when they breach regulatory requirements (Banking Law, 2005). 
 Other than the institutional sanctions, banking laws may also impose some sanctions 
against persons such as directors, managers and controlling shareholders who fail to comply 
with the regulatory requirements (Hüpkes, 2000:41). These sanctions are called personal 
sanctions. Their purpose is to directly penalize the management or the controlling 
shareholders. In the Turkish Banking Law (2005), personal sanctions are specified under five 
titles: management overhaul and loss of job;333 temporary prohibition from employment in 
the banking sector;334 financial penalties;335 criminal liability; and civil liability of managers 
and controlling shareholders.336 
3.2.2. Official Disciplinary Power of the Banking Regulatory Authority in 
Russia 
 The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) is the primary authority responsible for the 
regulation of the banking sector in Russia and also acts as Russia’s central bank. Until 2002, 
the CBR had been operating under the general terms of the Federal Law “On the Central 
Bank of the Russian Federation (the Bank of Russia)”337 of 2 December 1990. This law was 
superseded by the Central Bank Law in 2002. The legal framework for banking supervision 
consists of the Federal Law on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation of 2002 (later it 
                                                 
330 Pursuant to the Article 71 of the Banking Law (2005) 
331 “Revocation of license and closure” refers to the second part of institutional sanctions (See Table 25). 
332 Financial penalties are laid down in Articles 146 and 148 of the Banking Law (2005). 
333 Banking Act Article 68/1-a and 69/1-and Banking Act Article 70/1-c 
334 Banking Act Article 26/2 
335 Banking Act Article 18/1, 2 and 4, Banking Act art. 36, Banking Act art. 38 
336 These sanctions are laid down in Articles 106-110, 132-143 and 146-161 in the Banking Law (2005). 
337 As amended on 26 April 1995. 
168 
 
came to be called “the Central Bank Law”) and the Federal Law on Banks and Banking 
Activity promulgated in 1990 (later on it was referred to as “Banking Law”).338 
 Banks are regulated under Chapter I0 of the Banking Law. According to the CBR 
Law and the Banking Law (BL), responsibility for the licensing and supervision of banks 
belong to the CBR. The CBR is also authorized to approve permissible activities, issue 
regulations, and enforce compliance with laws and regulations (IMF, 2011c). 
 As explained above, the first component of the official disciplinary power refers to the 
prompt corrective actions which aim at dealing with banks in financial distress or banks that 
breached regulatory requirements. Corrective actions enable supervisors to act at an early 
stage to address unsafe and unsound activities that could create risks to banks. Hence, the 
codification of these measures is crucial to eliminate the regulatory forbearance and abuse of 
discretion. The supervisors should also be possessed with an adequate range of supervisory 
tools to bring about timely actions (Hüpkes, 2006:36-37; BIS, 2011). The powers of the CBR 
regarding supervisory corrective actions against credit institutions are established in the 
Federal Law (ECB, 2005).339  
 Regarding restructuring power in Russia, following the 1998 crisis, the Russian 
government and the CBR adopted a key policy document “On Measures to Restructure the 
Russian Banking System” which established the guidelines for the legislature and the extent 
of power of the CBR to restructure the banking sector. The amendments made to banking 
legislation in 2001 broadened the powers of the CBR to withdraw financially unsound banks 
from the market, before their financial problems would make them unable to serve their 
obligations to creditors (CBR, 2002). According to the Article 74 of the Banking Law, the 
CBR has the power to prohibit the reorganisation of a credit institution if its reorganisation 
may create grounds for the implementation of bankruptcy-prevention measures under the 
Federal Law “On Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of Credit Institutions”.340 
                                                 
338 Russian Federation Federal Law On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia) 
339 “On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation” (in Articles 73 and 75), the Federal Law “On Banks and 
Banking” (in Articles 19, 20, 23.1), and the Federal Law “On Insolvency (bankruptcy) of credit institutions (in 
Articles 4, 7-17, 32,33 and 35 and the regulations of the Bank of Russia implementing them; the latter include, 
the Instruction No. 59 of the Bank of Russia “On corrective actions against credit institutions” (ECB, 2005). 
340 Law No. 144-FZ “On the Restructuring of Credit Institutions”, dated July 8, 1999 establishes the procedure 
for restructuring of credit institutions by implementing measures to overcome their financial instability and 
restore solvency or liquidate them in compliance with the Russian legislation. 
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 The corrective actions set in the CBR Law341 and the Banking Law342 have several 
limitations. Firstly, the CBR lacks the authority to enforce cease-desist type orders whose 
infraction leads to automatic imposition of civil and penal sanctions on banks’ directors and 
managers (Melecky et al. (2010).343 The CBR lacks the authority to penalize or sanction 
individual bank directors (compared to Turkey where the bank directors have personal 
liability for misleading information). Secondly, Melecky et al. (2010) argue that the Russian 
banking supervisors are not required to make timely disclosure of enforcement actions. The 
enforcement tools given by the CBR Law do not allow for sufficient options to report 
imprudent practices at an early stage (IMF, 2011c). The 2008 IMF report also emphasizes 
that the CBR lacks the authority to intervene at an early stage so as to minimize the cost of 
resolution and the disruption to creditors, including depositors.344 Although the current 
legislative framework provides the CBR with the authority to intervene in commercial banks, 
including removing bank management, CBR still has limited ability to impose bankruptcy on 
commercial banks (IMF 2006). Hence, the CBR should be given more authority (IMF 2010). 
Thirdly, the CBR doesn’t have the power to reduce or suspend the distribution of bonuses and 
other remuneration such as management fees to bank directors and managers (Melecky et al., 
2010). It also lacks the power to establish limits on salaries paid out to directors and key bank 
personnel (IMF, 2011a) (compared to Turkey where the BRSA has the power to establish 
limits on dividends, bonuses and management fees). 
 The problem of regulatory forbearance has been emphasized in most of the IMF 
Reports for Russia. In fact, Malyutina & Parilova, (2001) argue that the Russian banks 
enjoyed regulatory forbearance because the violation of prudential requirements has not been 
followed by timely license withdrawal after the 1998 crisis. The CBR withdrew a license 
only after a bank had been violating prudential ratios for a long time. This fact continued to 
be a problem since the 1998 crisis. According to the 2002 IMF Report, although there was a 
system of business laws including corporate, bankruptcy, contract, consumer protection and 
private property laws, and although the objectives and the institutional framework for 
                                                 
341 Article 74 of the CBR Law 
342 Article 20 of the Banking Law 
343 They argue that Russia is the only BRIC country unequipped with legally enforced cease and desist orders. 
344 In Russia, the following actions can be taken against banks: preventive actions through letters, meetings or 
consultations, penalties; actions restricting the activities of the banks; replacement of managers and revocation 
of banking licenses. However, this range of power given to the CBR is less than recommended by the Basel 
Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS). According to the Supervisory Guidelines for Dealing with Weak 
Banks (prepared by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision in 2002), banking supervisors are empowered 
with 16 supervisory corrective actions. However, the CBR uses only nine of them. Not all the criteria for 
selecting corrective actions are applied in Russia. Besides, the actions taken are usually inadequate (ECB, 2005). 
170 
 
regulation and supervision are broadly defined in the Banking Law, this system was neither 
consistently enforced nor provided a mechanism for fair resolutions in a timely manner. The 
changes in laws were not always accompanied by immediate reviews of regulations and 
guidelines.345 The report recommended that the banking legislation should include provisions 
so that the banking supervision authority would gain sufficient power for prompt action. 
 Regarding the last component of disciplinary power, the CBR lacks the authority to 
declare bank insolvency. The power of declaring a bank insolvent in Russia is legally in the 
hands of courts where court approval is required for declaring insolvency (compared to 
Turkey where the BRSA has the power to declare bank insolvency) (Barth et al., 2012). 
Hence, the CBR is limited in superseding shareholders’ rights (IMF 2006; Melecky et al., 
2010). Finally, CBR lacks the power to require a bank to meet supervisory requirements (e.g. 
capital, liquidity etc.) that are stricter than the legal or regulatory minimum (compared to 
Turkey where the BRSA possess this power) (Barth et al., 2013). These limitations on the 
extent of power of CBR have a negative impact on discipline in dealing with problem banks 
(Melecky et al., 2010).346 
 The authority of CBR is deficient in preventing transactions between the bank and its 
affiliates as well. It lacks the regulatory power to require that lending to related parties should 
be done at market terms and sanction banks that do not comply. The regulatory framework 
for related party transactions has some shortcomings in the sense that it does not require that 
lending to related parties should be on the same terms and conditions as those offered to the 
public. Although the CBR has issued recommendations to banks on related party lending, 
they lack enforcement capacity (IMF, 2011a; c). The narrow definition of related parties and 
connected relationships prevents the CBR from applying limits or imposing supervisory 
restrictions. Hence, appropriate powers should be given to the CBR to sanction and remove 
                                                 
345 One of the amendments made to the Law was the development of an early warning system by the CBR. 
However, the analytical work done by the supervisors did not concentrate on the credit institutions that needed 
special attention. They ignored the risks reflected in the reviews (IMF FSSA, 2002). 
346 CBR lacks authority also in these areas: i) suspending shareholders from participation in the management of 
the credit organization, including their right to vote or accept dividends; ii) requiring additional capital levels to 
be maintained against the risks specific to the bank, except to impose higher CAR as a sanction for violations of 
federal law and iii) requiring prior consent of the supervisory authority to incur a major expenditure or take on a 
new liability. Although Article 75 of the Federal Law on the Central Bank of Russian Federation stipulates that 
the Bank of Russia may take corrective actions under Article 74 of the said Law in case the assessment of a 
bank reveals any situation which would threaten the interests of depositors and creditors or the stability of the 
banking system, the Law does not explicitly recognise the right of the Bank of Russia to take supervisory 
corrective actions against credit institutions based on professional supervisory judgement (IMF, 2011a). 
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the persons affiliated with banks. This would have a strong signalling effect to deter other 
banks (IMF, 2011a). 
 Despite the fact that banking reforms were progressing, the actual implementation 
was slow and the problems of regulatory forbearance, enforcement of prudential standards 
and weaknesses in the resolution and crisis management framework, continued to be a 
problem in Russia (IMF; 2005, 2006, 2010). The weakness of the CBR in enforcement 
became evident in the 2004 mini-crisis, which revealed the need for the CBR to have more 
effective instruments to strengthen banking supervision and deal with problem banks. It was 
understood that there had only been very limited progress in implementing banking reforms 
since the 1998 crisis, notwithstanding the recent steps to strengthen the enforcement of 
prudential norms.347 In fact, the 2003 IMF Report insisted on the need of the CBR to move to 
forcefully close those banks which were non-viable and overburdened with connected-
lending. 
 Taking into account the lessons of the 2008-2009 crisis, the CBR started to prepare 
proposals to receive sufficient power to require credit institutions to maintain their capital at a 
specified level, to make the management and directors of banks accountable for their 
performance and to sanction them. Russian lawmakers continue to legislate additional powers 
to the Bank of Russia with regards to the use of sanctions against credit institution chief 
executives and owners (CBR, 2009). In fact, long-standing weaknesses in banking 
supervision and regulation allowed rapid credit expansion and accumulation of large 
unhedged foreign exchange exposures in the run-up to the crisis. Prudential regulations to 
limit credit booms and greater powers for the CBR to supervise banks are needed (IMF, 
2010). The 2011 IMF Report emphasizes that the CBR lacks the legal authority to implement 
the supervisory process (Pillar 2 component) of Basel II (IMF, 2011a). 
3.2.3. Discussion 
 The efficiency of a regulation determines the possibility of banks’ exposure to 
excessive risk-taking behaviour (Malyutina & Parilova, 2001). Followed by that, the stance 
of a regulator significantly affects the behaviour of a bank (Mailath & Mester, 1994). 
However, the CBR’s policy has been criticized for being passive before and after the 1998 
crisis compared to the BRSA’s policy in the post-crisis period. As argued in Perotti (2000), 
                                                 
347 In fact, the IMF officials warned the CBR staff about the possibility of a major crisis in the future. 
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Malyutina and Parilova (2001), Steinherr (2006), and Steinherr and Klär (2005), the main 
reason of the Russian crisis in 1998 was the imprudent behaviour of banks, encouraged by 
poor law enforcement and the absence of prudential regulation, which continued to be the 
case even after the crisis. Many banks violated the prudential ratios specified in the CBR’s 
regulations; however they did not lose their licenses. The qualitative analysis shows that the 
Turkish banking regulatory authority had implemented its restructuring power tools in a more 
disciplined way than the Russian regulatory authority in their respective post-crisis period. 
 More importantly, the qualitative analysis shows that the Turkish banking regulatory 
authority is empowered with a wider range of authorities than the Russian regulatory 
authority. The bank standards established by a regulatory authority would create the desired 
effect on preventing banks’ risk-taking, if banks anticipate that these standards will be 
enforced. This proper enforcement involves license withdrawal as the ultimate penalty for 
banks which repeatedly violate the rules (Schoors et al., 2005). However, the analysis 
regarding the power of the Russian banking regulatory authority (the CBR) shows that the 
enforcement authority of the CBR is deficient in several areas compared to the Turkish 
regulatory authority. 
 One major difference is that the CBR is unequipped with legally enforced cease and 
desist orders and that it lacks the power to sanction directors personally for non-compliance 
(even with regulations). In fact, the 2011 IMF report argues that because of this lack of 
power, the CBR is unable to enforce related party regulations. Additionally, the CBR lacks 
the authority to penalize a bank for non-compliance. The CBR’s existing powers towards 
related borrowers are not in the form of supporting laws or regulations. Its ability to identify 
connected borrowers348 on the basis of a “legal” relationship prevents the consideration of 
other, potentially binding “economic” relationships between connected parties (IMF 2011). 
 However, in Turkey bank directors are legally liable for misleading information. The 
enactment of Law Nr. 5020 in Turkey provided a powerful basis for penalizing the persons 
who are responsible for risking the stability of financial system by misbehaviour in 
management. In addition to expanding the scope of regulation, this Act brought heavy 
imprisonment and penalty relating to banking crimes. Regarding connected-lending practices, 
new regulations implemented after the 200/2001 crisis introduced the concept of a “risk 
                                                 
348 Connected-lending or lending to related parties occurs when a bank lends to its own shareholders or 
managers, including also the entities controlled by them or their family members (Bredenkamp et al.,) 
173 
 
group” and replaced the narrow definition of the previous period which led to abuse of 
connected lending practices. The amount of exposure a bank can take with each risk group 
has been determined very specifically. These limits are being monitored by the BRSA and the 
relevant information is also included in the publicly-disclosed audit financial statements 
(Steinherr et al., 2004).349 Compared to Turkey, connected lending practice is regarded as a 
serious problem in Russia according to the 2011 IMF Report. Narrow definition of related 
parties and connected relationships prevents the CBR from applying limits or imposing 
supervisory restrictions. 
 Other differences in the power of Turkish and Russian banking regulatory authorities 
concern the power to suspend directors’ decisions to distribute bonuses and management 
fees, declaring bank insolvency, requiring banks to meet supervisory requirements (e.g. 
capital, liquidity etc.) that are stricter than the legal or regulatory minimum. These limitations 
on the extent of power of the CBR have a negative impact on discipline in dealing with 
problem banks (Melecky et al, 2010). 
 These results suggest that the Turkish supervisory authority has more power than the 
Russian supervisory authority. Whereas enforcement in Russia seems to be a long-standing 
problem accompanied by the limitations granted to the CBR supervisory power, stricter 
disciplining power of the BRSA in Turkey contributed to the proper enforcement of banking 
law and regulations. This finding supports my empirical result on the positive impact of 
supervisory power on banks’ efficiency. 
3.3. Private Monitoring 
 Private monitoring is the third pillar of Basel II and aims at creating a market 
disciplining mechanism.350 However, there is limited research in the literature about the costs 
and benefits of financial reporting and disclosure requirements. In addition, there is little 
guidance on the economic consequences of reporting and corporate disclosure (Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2008). In general, there are disagreements about the role of the private sector in 
monitoring banks. Barth et al., (2002) argue that the complexity and opacity of banks may 
make private sector monitoring difficult even in the most developed economies. Having this 
in mind, less-developed countries with poorly developed capital markets, weak accounting 
                                                 
349 The 2007 IMF report on Turkey’s financial assessment recommends the BRSA to continue with the current 
limits. 
350 See Chapter I, Section 6.1.1 
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standards and legal environment may not be able to rely effectively on private monitoring 
since it may lead to exploitation of depositors and poor bank performance (Barth et al., 2002). 
This is in line with the findings in the empirical chapter that a higher degree of private 
oversight is negatively associated with banks’ efficiency.351 Barth et al. (2001b) find that the 
degree of private monitoring decreases as one moves from high income countries to lower 
income countries.352 
 Following Pasiouras (2008),353 I measured private monitoring variables based on 
three indicators: i) whether an outside licensed audit is required of the financial statements 
issued by the banks; (this would indicate the presence or absence of an independent 
assessment of the accuracy of financial statements released to the public) ii) whether 
regulations require credit ratings for commercial banks; (this would make the public aware of 
the overall condition of the banking industry as viewed by an independent third party) iii) 
whether the income statements of banks include accrued354 interest and principal on non-
performing loans and whether banks are required to produce consolidated financial 
statements; iv) whether banks must disclose their risk management policies and off-balance 
sheet items to the public;355 and v) whether directors are legally liable for erroneous 
information (Barth et al., 2001b). Looking at Turkey’s and Russia’s overall indexes in private 
sector monitoring, we see that until 2001 they both had the same degree. From 2001 until 
2005, Russia’s degree of private sector monitoring was higher than in Turkey’s. However, 
from 2005 until 2010, Turkey had a higher degree of private oversight (see Table 27). 
Table 27: Indexes on Private Monitoring in Turkey and Russia* 
Years 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Turkey 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Russia 5 5 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 
*This variable takes values between 0 and 10, higher values indicating policies that promote private monitoring. 
                                                 
351 See Chapter II, Section 7.2 
352 The U.K. is an exception. In fact, Barth et al. (2008) found that the U.K. authorities weakened private 
monitoring slightly. 
353 See Appendix A 
354 Or unpaid 
355 Pasiouras (2008) also includes whether banks are required to disclose their off-balance sheet items to 
supervisors. See Appendix A 
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 There are in fact some differences in the measures. Starting in 2005, Turkish banks 
became obligated to disclose their risk management procedures to the public. This is not a 
requirement in Russia. Secondly, compared to Russia, directors of Turkish banks have been 
held legally liable for misleading information since 2005. 
3.3.1. Private Monitoring in the Turkish Banking Sector 
 Turkey had a weak risk-management culture towards the end of the 1990s. This 
became evident in the 2000/2001 crisis when significant internal audit and risk management 
weaknesses emerged. The risks realized increased the losses in the balance sheets and hence 
caused the own funds of banks to deteriorate quickly.356 The loss in the banking sector was 
around 10.5 billion TL,357 corresponding to approximately 6% of the total assets of the 
banking sector. 19 banks were transferred to the SDIF due to the erosion of their equity 
(BRSA, 2010). 
 Private monitoring practices include internal control and audit practices, establishing 
a solid accounting system to provide for transparency of the banks’ financial statements, 
information disclosure and consolidated supervision. The objective of these tools is to enable 
market participants such as creditors and investors to have a sufficient understanding of 
banks’ operations.358 
A. Internal Control and Audit Practices in Turkey 
 The objective of an internal audit is to analyse whether banks’ assets are protected and 
whether the operations are carried out in compliance with policies in place. In this context, an 
internal audit is necessary to improve the risk management and control and governance 
processes. Banks use internal audit to evaluate their overall financial and non-financial 
operations. Internal audit of banks in Turkey is carried out by the internal control unit, the 
audit unit and the risk management group of the banks (Gencoglu et al., 2011). 
 One of the problems that led banks to financial losses during the 2001 crisis was the 
deficiency in internal audit systems, because error and fraud in banks’ operations were not 
detected. The first steps regarding risk management practices in the Turkish banking sector 
                                                 
356 The level of own funds which was already low had further decreased. Inflation accounting was not applied 
and the high inflation environment encouraged activity with foreign resources instead of own funds, which had 
affected the level and the quality of the own funds negatively. Furthermore, due to the unstable structure of the 
Turkish economy during the 2000-2001 period, the fund supply of the banking sector from international markets 
remained limited (BRSA, 2010). 
357 10.5 billion YTL corresponds to approximately €4.5 billion. 
358 See Chapter I Section 6.1.3 
176 
 
were taken with the Restructuring Process after the 2001 crisis under the “Operational 
Restructuring of Public Banks”. In February, 2001 “Regulation on Internal Audit and Risk 
Management Systems of Banks” was published. Pursuant to this regulation”,359 banks became 
required to establish internal audit and risk management systems and became obligated to 
report their activities quarterly. As a result, the reports started being analysed regularly and 
developments were monitored closely (BRSA, 2010). Pursuant to this regulation, banks are 
required to determine limits to risk that might emerge from their operations. These limits 
need to be approved by the Board of Directors (Gencoglu et al., 2011).360 
 With the “Regulation on Internal Systems of Banks” which became effective in 2006, 
banks were obliged to implement an internal auditing system, and conduct continuous audits 
together with periodic inspection (BRSA, 2010).361 The audit unit periodically audits all 
domestic and foreign units, branches and affiliates. It controls whether these activities are 
conducted in accordance with the law and regulations. The risk management unit is 
responsible for the identification, measurement, monitoring and control of risk through 
policies.362 
 Regarding the external auditing of banks, a regulation on external audit was issued in 
January 2002 to determine the procedures and principles of external audit in compliance with 
the international standards (BRSA, 2010).363 The BRSA, the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund 
(SDIF), the Banks Association of Turkey (BAT), the Central Bank in Turkey (CBRT) and 
independent external audit firms are the institutions that perform external audits of banks. 
The working principles of the independent audit firms are established by the BRSA 
(Gencoglu et al., 2011). If an audit firm detects any violation of law or any matter that might 
endanger the bank’s existence, it shall notify the BRSA.364 The aim of having an independent 
audit firm is to determine whether the banks’ financial reports are prepared in line with the 
                                                 
359 This regulation exists in the Banking Law (2005) under Article 29. Additionally, according to the Article 30 
of the Banking Law (2005) internal control activities shall be carried out by the internal control department and 
the internal control personnel under the board of directors. 
360 For more on risks banks are subject to, see Chapter I, Section 2.4 
361 Accordingly, internal control systems and operations shall be presented by the internal control unit and top 
managements of related units. 
362 “Regulation on Banks’ Internal Systems”, 2006; Article Nr. 35 
363 This regulation was accompanied by a second regulation on external audit to increase the transparency of 
external audit application (BRSA, 2010). “Regulation on External Audit Procedures” and “Regulation on 
External Audit Principles” and “Regulation on Authorization of Institutions to Perform External Audit and 
Termination of Authorities Temporarily or Permanently Thereof” were issued on January 31, 2002. 
364 Article Nr. 33 of the Banking Law (2005) 
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generally accepted accounting rules.365 Henceforth, these reports have different qualifications 
from the reports prepared by the internal bank auditors (Delikanlı, 1998). The BRSA, as the 
principal regulatory authority, has the right to review these independent audit reports (Paksoy 
& Tiftikci, 2010).366 
 Following the 2001 crisis, Turkish authorities realized the importance of building a 
risk management approach in accordance with the international banking regulations. The 
effectiveness of internal audit, internal control and risk management systems have gained 
considerable importance so that the Turkish authorities introduced several regulations to 
improve the risk management of banks. However, Gencoglu et al. (2011) argue that the audit 
procedures are not very effective in the Turkish banking sector regarding the number of 
auditors, their technical knowledge and also political barriers. This argument can be related to 
the results of my empirical analysis suggesting a negative impact of private monitoring on 
banks’ efficiency. The ineffective implementation of audit procedures might have an 
increasing impact on operational costs of a bank and hence negatively affect its efficiency. 
B. Disclosure Requirements 
 As explained in the first chapter of this thesis,367 the objective of disclosure 
requirements is to mitigate the asymmetric information problem in the banking industry. To 
ensure that depositors and other market participants have access to information about a 
bank’s portfolio and degree of risk exposure, regulators can require banks to adhere to certain 
accounting principles and disclose a wide range of information about their financials. More 
public information about the risk profile and the quality of a bank’s portfolio is likely to have 
a deterrent effect on banks’ risk taking behaviour through increased market discipline since 
depositors and other creditors will be able to monitor and evaluate banks activities at a lower 
cost (Tchana, 2008; Frankel & Li, 2004; Mishkin, 2000). 
 Disclosure requirements in the forms of financial reporting are important in 
evaluating a bank’s financial status because they reduce asymmetric information problems by 
disclosing timely and accurate information (Frankel & Li, 2004). In that context, accounting 
quality contributes to the quality of financial reporting (Sonderstrom & Sun, 2007). In 2002, 
                                                 
365 Generally Accepted Accounting Rules are the set of systematic guidelines used by auditors when conducting 
audits on banks’ financial statements. These standards ensure the accuracy, and verifiability of the audit reports. 
366 Banks are also required to submit these independent audit reports to the Central Bank. Prior to the Banks Act 
of 1999, the supervision was conducted by the Treasury and the Central Bank. 
In accordance with the “Regulation on Authorization and Activities of Institutions to Perform External Audit in 
Banks” published in 2006, banks are required to select an audit firm. 
367 Chapter I, Section 4.1.1 
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the European Union (E.U.) issued a regulation requiring consolidated accounts for all 
companies listed in the E.U. to use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
beginning January 1, 2005.368 Barth et al. (2006b) show that IFRS increases accounting 
quality of financial reports.369 
 The first step to improve accounting standards in Turkey was the introduction of a 
regulation stating that the financial statements should be prepared with inflation accounting 
principles so that banks’ performances became assessable in a healthier way (BRSA, 
2010).370 In order to bring the Turkish accounting standards in line with international 
regulations,371 additions and amendments were made to “Accounting Standards to be Applied 
by Banks, Uniform Accounting Plan and Prospectus”372 in 2002 (BRSA, 2010).373 In 
November, 2006, the BRSA issued a final regulation on the new accounting standards to 
ensure that the year-end balance sheets of all banks comply with the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS). According to the Banking Law (2005), Turkish banks became required to 
follow the BRSA’s principles and procedures374 in preparing annual reports.375 Each bank 
must submit a copy of its annual report to the BRSA and publish it on its website. In 2005, 
the Turkish Accounting Standards Board376 implemented harmonization with IFRS (Yalkin 
& Demir, 2007). 
 Abad et al. (2000) and Niskanen et al. (1998) find that consolidated financial 
statements are more value relevant and reliable than non-consolidated377 financial statements 
because they increase the quality of the information content. In Turkey, banks became 
required to consolidate their financial statements on a quarterly basis in line with certain 
consolidation principles established by the BRSA (BRSA, 2010). With the amendment to 
                                                 
368 Before 2005, companies followed a variety of country-specific Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) (Soderstrom & Sun, 2007). 
369 Barth et al. (2006b) findings show that firms that implement IFRS have more timely loss recognition, and 
more value relevance of earnings which provide evidence for higher accounting quality. 
370 The Regulation on Procedures and Principles for the Special External Audit to be Performed published in 
February, 2002 (in line with the Provisional Article 4 of the Banks Act (1999). 
371 Including the repo transactions 
372 Amendments were made twice: December 13, 2001 and January 31, 2002. 
373 The Article 13 of the Banks’ Act specified the principles on conducting external audit, providing 
transparency and uniformity in the accounting systems of banks, preventing unrecorded transactions, and 
preparing financial statements on time which would reflect the true condition of banks (BRSA, 2010). 
374 These standards are determined in consultation with the Turkish Accounting Standards Board and 
international standards. 
375 “The Regulation on the Preparation and Publication of Annual Reports” 
376 The Turkish Accounting Standards Board has the authority and power for the determination and application 
of Turkish Accounting Standards (Yalkın et al., 2007). 
377 Non-consolidated financial statements report only the parent company’s financial information, excluding the 
subsidiaries. 
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“the Declaration of Consolidated Financial Statements”, the preparation of consolidated 
financial statements was amended and made stricter in the sense that banks became obligated 
to prepare their consolidated financial statements quarterly instead of semi-annually and the 
four-month reporting period was decreased to two months (BRSA, 2010).378 
3.3.2. Private Monitoring in the Russian Banking Sector 
 As was explained above, private monitoring practices include internal control and 
audit practices, establishing a solid accounting system to provide the transparency of the 
banks’ financial statements, information disclosure and consolidated supervision. 
A. Internal Control and Audit Practices 
 Internal controls and audit are important to evaluate the overall financial status of a 
bank. Having in mind the banking history of Russia, transparency becomes an important 
issue regarding the Russian banks. Alexander et al. (2000) argue that during the 1990’s, the 
Russian banking sector was suffering from a lack of transparent and reliable financial 
statements. Off-site analysis was based on unreliable data. On-site examinations were 
infrequent. Moreover, supervisors didn’t use their authority to require changes in unsafe 
practices and they lacked insight into how to make real improvements in bank safety and 
soundness. Although the figures published at the end of 1997 implied that the banks were 
highly capitalized and sound, these figures were actually overstated. They were hiding the 
true condition of banks due to non-transparent accounting standards (Alexander et al., 2000). 
 Following the 1998 crisis, some institutional modifications were commenced by the 
CBR. In 1998, the departments responsible for on-site and off-site supervision, for licensing 
of banks, bank auditors and bank rehabilitation were consolidated under a single Deputy 
Chairman. Furthermore, a high-level committee was established to ensure that he CBR’s 
supervisory efforts were fully coordinated (Alexander et al., 2000). 
 Before the implementation of the banking reform in 2002, Russian banks were guided 
by two regulations on internal control379 in 2002. These regulations failed to comply with the 
                                                 
378 The Communiqué amending the Communiqué on Principles and Procedures relating to Declaration of 
Consolidated Financial Statements became effective, published in Official Gazette dated July 05, 2000; Nr. 
24100. 
379 Regulation No. 509, dated August, 1997 “On Organising Internal Controls in Banks” and Bank of Russia 
Ordinance No. 603-U, dated July, 1999 “On the Procedure for Implementing Internal Control over Compliance 
by Credit Institutions with the Financial Market Legislation. In March 2009, Ordinance No. 2194-U “On the 
Organisation of Internal Controls in Credit Institutions and Banking Groups” amended the regulation of 
December 2003. It recommended measures that need to be taken to ensure continuity in the activities of credit 
institutions (CBR, 2009). 
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requirements of the Basel Committee’s Core Principles380 in organising and implementing 
internal controls. Besides, some of the credit institutions were regarding internal control as a 
mere formality or they were not obeying at all (CBR; 2002, 2003).381 Following the 
introduction of “the Federal Law on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation” in 2002, 
the CBR decided to present the elements of an internal control service and some other non-
binding standards in the form of regulatory requirements (CBR, 2002; 2003). 
 The Banking Law provided the CBR with the authority to establish rules on internal 
control in a bank.382 Hence, a new regulation enforced by the CBR in 2004383 put emphasis 
on the Basel Committee’s recommendations on internal controls aiming at improving the 
legal basis of internal controls in credit institutions. It provided the definition of internal 
control, the mechanism of internal control and the responsible bodies384 involved in internal 
control (IMF, 2011a). This regulation attached special importance to the participation of 
boards of directors and executive bodies in this process. It also facilitated the conversion of 
Russian internal control practices to internationally accepted standards (CBR, 2004). 
 This regulation was followed by another regulation385 in 2004 to improve the content 
of prudential reports in order to facilitate the early detection of problems. Pursuant to this 
regulation, banks’ financial statements must be disclosed to public by the bank on a quarterly 
and yearly basis (CBR, 2004). 
 Regarding audit practices, the CBR is responsible to introduce international audit, 
accounting and reporting standards. According to the same regulation on internal control,386 
banks are subject to an independent review by an audit firm. External audit is important in 
assessing a bank’s financial condition. Pursuant to the Banking Law, banks’ consolidated 
financial statements must be audited by a licensed external auditor once a year.387 The 
                                                 
380 Principle 17: ‘Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place internal controls that are adequate for 
the size and complexity of their business. These should include clear arrangements for delegating authority and 
responsibility; separation of the functions that involve committing the bank, paying away its funds, and 
accounting for its assets and liabilities; reconciliation of these processes; safeguarding the bank’s assets; and 
appropriate independent internal audit and compliance functions to test adherence to these controls as well as 
applicable laws and regulations’. 
381 The need to create effective internal control arose also from the legislation against money laundering. 
382 Article 57 Central Bank Law (CBL) 
383 Regulation No. 242_P, On Organising Internal Controls in Credit Institutions and Banking Groups 
384 Pursuant to Article 2.2 of Regulation 242-P internal controls shall be exercised by the management bodies, 
the auditor and chief accountant and other staff (IMF, 2011a). 
385 “List and Forms of Credit Institutions’ Reports and the Procedure for Compiling and Submitting Them to the 
Bank of Russia” 
386 Regulation No. 242-P 
387 Pursuant to the Article 42 Banking Law (BL) (IMF, 2011a) 
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accounting rules are determined by the CBR but the auditing standards are not (IMF, 2011a). 
The CBR also has the right to conduct full or selective audits of any bank at any time and 
inspect all books and records of the bank.388 Regarding external audit, the Banking Law 
requires that an independent auditor certifies banks’ annual financial statements. 
 In spite of these developments, according to the 2005 CBR Annual Report, not much 
progress had been made in the internal control area. Specifically, the relations between banks 
and affiliated parties remained imperfectly transparent because the law did not require 
affiliated parties to disclose information to credit institutions about themselves and their 
activities. Furthermore, most banks were not really trying to identify such parties or disclose 
information about them. In 2006, the CBR tried to improve the regulation of banks by 
encouraging risk-based supervision. Risk-based supervision included the evaluation of banks’ 
performance based on the assessment of banking risks and their possible impact on the 
stability of credit institutions. In 2006, still no substantial progress was made in the disclosure 
of information by banks about their related parties. Only half of the credit institutions were 
disclosing information about their activities on the Bank of Russia internet site. As a result of 
ineffective internal controls, the number of banking licence revocations increased in 2006 
(CBR, 2005; 2006). 
B. Disclosure Requirements 
 As explained above, the objective of disclosure requirements is to mitigate the 
asymmetric information problem in the banking industry. To ensure that depositors and other 
market participants have access to information about a bank’s portfolio and degree of risk 
exposure, regulators can require banks to adhere to certain accounting principles and disclose 
a wide range of information about their financials (Tchana, 2008; Frankel & Li, 2004; 
Mishkin, 2000). In that context, accounting quality contributes to the quality of financial 
reporting (Sonderstrom & Sun, 2007). 
  In Russia, the Central Bank of Russia has the authority to establish accounting rules 
and procedures for banks. The Bank of Russia’s accounting and financial reporting is 
determined by the Federal Law “On Accounting” and Bank of Russia Regulation389 “On 
                                                 
388 Under CBR Regulation No. 2332-U dated November 2009, routine reporting is performed by banks on a 
daily, five day, ten day, monthly, quarterly, half yearly and yearly basis; and certain reporting is effected on an 
ad hoc basis. 
389 No. 66-P, (dated January 1, 2006) 
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Accounting Rules in the Central Bank of the Russian Federation”390 and other Bank of Russia 
regulations issued in pursuance of these federal laws. It establishes a standard format for the 
presentation of a bank’s accounts and instructions on how transactions are recorded within 
the accounts.391 It requires that banks should prepare their financial statements according to 
the Directive of the CBR392 “On the Rules for the Preparation and Submission of Reports to 
the CBR by Credit Organisations” dated 16 January 2004.393 
 As with Turkey, Russian banks were also suffering from weak risk management 
practices before the 1998 crisis. Accounting norms differed from international accounting 
standards. In fact, Russian accounting practices were not aiming to provide information about 
the true financial conditions of banks. Most of the financial data were based on the Russian 
Accounting Standards (RAS).394 These standards were putting more emphasis on formal 
reporting requirements rather than on material elements and their economic meaning. Their 
focus was on verifying the banks’ statistical reports. However, no qualitative analysis was 
made about the true value or risk of a particular asset or about the quality of management 
(Barisitz, 2009). 
 In order to bring accounting standards in line with international standards, the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the international accounting 
standards (IAS) were introduced in 2004 (Barisitz, 2009; CBR, 2004; 2005).395 The IFRS 
implementation in Russia introduced consolidated reporting which did not exist under 
Russian Accounting Standards (RAS). It was determined that the new Russian accounting 
standards would be developed in line with the IFRS principles (Bagaeva, 2008). 
                                                 
390 Bank of Russia Accounting Rules No. 66, dated September 18, 1997 
In March, 2007 this regulation was amended and since then accounting practices are regulated by CBR 
Regulation No. 302-P (CBR, 2007). 
391 In accordance with the Directive of the CBR No. 7-U ‘‘On Preparation and Submitting of Accountancy by 
Lending Organisations to the CBR’’, dated 24 October 1997 
392 No. 1375-U 
393 In March 2007, a new accounting procedure was introduced “On Accounting Rules in Credit Institutions 
Domiciled in the Russian Federation Regulation No. 302-P”.This directive was amended in 2009 under “the 
Directive of the CBR No. 2332-U dated 12 November 2009 (CBR, 2004, 2005, 2010). 
394 When banks were using Russian Accounting Standards (RAS), losses in balance sheets were concealed so 
that the banks that failed after the 1998 crisis continued to show a profit on their RAS accounts, despite the fact 
that they could no longer service their obligations (Tompson, 2004). Only 24% of Russian banks officially 
recorded losses in 1998, despite the fact that the CBR recognised the sector as a whole to be bankrupt after the 
crisis (Interfaks AiF, 25 March 1999, in Tompson, 2004). 
395 In November 2005, “On the Analysis of IFRS Statements for 2004” was published which specified the 
methods for examining consolidated and unconsolidated statements compiled by credit institutions in line with 
the IFRS, for the purpose of providing methodological support to Bank of Russia regional branches in analysing 
the activities of credit institutions. 
For the preparation to reach international accounting standards (IAS), the Bank of Russia drew up the plan for 
the Conversion of the Russian Banking Sector to IAS from 1 January, 2004. 
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Implementation of “consolidated reporting”396 is important because it enables a 
comprehensive evaluation of a bank’s financial condition to market participants by increasing 
the quality of the information content as explained above.397 However, the implementation 
has been slow due to lack of availability of comprehensive education on IFRS, inadequate 
translations of standards from English into Russian, and lack of professionals with IFRS 
knowledge who could oversee the implementation and adherence to IFRS standards 
(Preobragenskaya & McGee, 2003). As of 2010, the CBR requires all banks to prepare 
supplementary IFRS financial statements, but there is no requirement to publish (IMF, 
2011a).398 
 Another development in 2004 was that the CBR replaced the long-standing 
Instruction No.1 “On Banks’ Mandatory Norms” with the Instruction No. 110 (Tompson, 
2004). Tompson (2004) argues that one of the most important innovations brought within this 
regulation was the requirement for prudential ratios to be available for inspection for every 
day of a bank’s operation. Hence, all mandatory ratios must be in compliance at all times. On 
the other hand, this regulation reduced the number of mandatory prudential ratios from 18 to 
                                                 
396 On April 2003, the regulation on consolidated reporting was published to specify the requirements for the 
publication of consolidated reports. “On the Statements Published by Credit Institutions and 
Banking/Consolidated Groups”. This was accompanied by “On Auditing Credit Institutions and 
Banking/Consolidated Groups dated July, 2003. In April 2003, Bank of Russia Ordinance No. 55, “On 
Disclosure of Information by Credit Institutions” was issued. Regarding consolidated supervision “Regulation 
No. 246-P on the Procedure for Compiling Consolidated Statements by the Parent Bank of a 
Banking/Consolidated Group” on January 2004 and “On Methodological Recommendations for Compiling 
consolidated Statements” were issued (both dated January, 2004). 
397 Regarding the implementation of consolidated reporting in Russia, one of the main changes made to the 
Banking Law in 2002 was the introduction of consolidated accounting for a bank group. In conformity with the 
Banking Sector Development Strategy introduced in 2002, CBR formulated the principles for evaluating the 
level of consolidated risk assumed by credit institutions. It specified the procedure for compiling consolidated 
reports based on “Regulation No. 191-P dated July, 2002” (CBR, 2002). The draft Federal Law “On Amending 
the Federal Laws on Banks and Banking Activities and on the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of 
Russia)” specifying the core provisions of consolidated supervision regarding credit institutions, banking groups 
and bank holding companies to disclose their operations was submitted to the Russian Government for approval 
in the first quarter of 2011 (CBR, 2010). 
Bank of Russia Ordinance No. 1114-U, dated February 21, 2002, “On Amending Bank of Russia Regulation 
No. 85- P, dated August 5, 1999, “On the Procedure for Using Reported Data of Non-Credit Institutions 
Members of a Group in Compiling Consolidated Reports by Credit Institutions”, regulated the procedure for 
using data of non-credit institutions members of a banking/consolidated group in calculating required ratios for 
the banking/consolidated group and specified the procedure for including data of non-credit institutions 
members of banking/consolidated groups in consolidated statements (CBR, 2002). 
398 On July 27, 2010 the Federal Law No. 208-FZ “On Consolidated Financial Statements” was adopted (Law 
No. 208-FZ). With this regulation, Russia introduced a legislative requirement on mandatory application of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by all public interest entities including credit institutions for 
the preparation of consolidated financial statements (CBR, 2010; Ernst & Young, (2012): Implementation of 
IFRS in Russia in accordance with the Law “On Consolidated Financial Statements”). 
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10 which decreased the transparency of banks’ financial status for the sake of depositors and 
investor understanding (Tompson, 2004). 
  As of January 2008, banks became more transparent. Over 84% of credit institutions 
disclosed information about their activities on the CBR website. As of the beginning of 2008, 
more than 61% of all operating credit institutions agreed to disclose information.399 However, 
in 2008, there were still problems in establishing the risk management systems. Integrated 
risk management systems were developed mainly in large credit institutions. Risk 
management units in many other credit institutions were fragmented (CBR, 2007). 
 According to the 2008 CBR report, the most severe problems faced by the Russian 
banks during the 2008 crisis were caused by the lack of coordination of bank risk 
management and strategy development. According to the 2008 IMF Report’s evaluation, 
although the banking law400 clarifies the key provisions of consolidated supervision and 
disclosure, the CBR is unable to capture all related parties and affiliates due to the narrow 
definition of consolidated supervision in Russian legislation.401 In fact, the 2009 CBR report 
also underlines that the 2008 crisis revealed serious internal problems in most of the banks. 
These included a lack of efficient risk management, high risk concentrations, poor 
transparency, and the use of manipulative schemes which allowed banks to avoid compliance 
with the regulatory requirements, including credit and liquidity risk mitigation requirements 
(CBR, 2009). 
 One major problem was that the heads of risk management departments lacked the 
necessary powers and status. Another major drawback in risk management was the lack of 
efficient control by their boards of directors (supervisory boards) over the decisions taken by 
senior management regarding the level of risk assumed by banks. Specifically, some credit 
institutions became financially unstable because their owners and management failed to 
formulate sensible credit, investment and liquidity management policies. This is attributed to 
the owners’ and executives’ excessive appetite for risk as well as the lack of an efficient 
mechanism to identify and assess the actual risks taken by credit institutions and inform their 
management about them (CBR, 2009). It should be noted that some credit institutions had 
                                                 
399 Pursuant to Bank of Russia Letter No. 165_T, dated December 21, 2006, ‘On Disclosure of 
Information by Credit Institutions’ 
400 The Federal Law “On Amending the Federal Law on Banks and Banking Activities” 
401 At the beginning of 2008, the CBR enacted changes in Russian Accounting Standards. These changes 
eliminated some discrepancies between domestic and international accounting principles but material 
differences remained (including consolidation and problem loan reporting and provisioning) 
(Trofimova et al., (2007), p. 29–30 in Barisitz, 2009) 
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problems that resulted from low risk diversification (high risk concentration). This risk 
concentration was caused by the risks associated with investment projects, securities 
issuances, and related parties (CBR, 2009). 
 After the 2008-2009 crises, in 2009, the CBR decided to improve the quality of 
banking regulation and promote a risk-based approach. It started to prepare the groundwork 
for the introduction of Basel II recommendations. Firstly, it plans to introduce new 
approaches to risk assessment, based on advanced financial practice and mathematical 
methods. Secondly, it will complement bank capital quantification with quality assessment, 
by formulating the general principles of risk-based supervision and setting market discipline 
requirements (CBR, 2009).402 
3.3.3. Discussion 
 Although several important steps have been taken in Russia, risk management is still 
limited. One difference from Turkey is that public disclosure of risk management procedures 
is not mandatory in Russia. The lack of quality data and consolidated reporting in the Russian 
reporting standards is continuously emphasized in the annual IMF and CBR reports. On the 
other hand, the 2007 IMF report on Turkey underlines: “the Turkish banks’ improved 
financial situation and risk management techniques, supported by a better framework of 
regulation, supervision, and intervention, have made the system more resilient”. The 2010 
IMF reports mentions again that the sub-regulations pursuant to the Banking Law in Turkey 
are in effect and implemented on a continuous basis. 
 In the 2009 IMF Report on Russia, the continuing deficiencies were stressed, with 
specific emphasis on generous accounting and provisioning rules and more importantly, 
regarding related party transaction disclosure requirements. These shortcomings continue to 
distort the CBR’s ability to assess the quality of assets and adequacy of loan loss reserves. 
Hence, they increase uncertainty about the creditworthiness of Russian banks (IMF, 2009; 
IMF, 2011).403 
                                                 
402 In 2009, the CBR prepared proposals that legislation should be amended in order to give it sufficient power 
in the following areas:1) to require credit institutions to maintain their capital at a specified level; 2) to require 
credit institutions and banking groups to disclose information about their risk exposure and risk management 
procedures to a wide range of users; 3) to set banking risk management rules for credit institutions and banking 
groups, in order enable them to meet the requirements of Basel II Pillar 2, 4) to make the management and 
boards of directors (supervisory boards) of credit institutions accountable for their institutions’ performance, 
including risk management, and to sanction the chief executives and owners of credit institutions. 
403 The 2009 IMF report also mentions that there are still important differences on the revenue recognition, 
consolidation, pension accounting, and application of fair value accounting. Shortcomings in reporting 
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 According to the 2009 CBR Report, Russian lawmakers will continue to legislate 
additional powers to the Bank of Russia regarding the use of sanctions against banks’ chief 
executives and owners. The aim is to make the owners and management of credit institutions 
accountable for the quality and results of their risk assessment and management policy, and 
to empower the Bank of Russia to use sanctions in case this policy proves ineffective (CBR, 
2011a). The broadening of the CBR’s powers in dealing with credit institutions in the event 
of mismanagement or dishonest practices aims at making bank managers more responsible 
when taking decisions that affect the interests of creditors and depositors (CBR, 2009). It also 
aims to define the requirements for risk management systems in banks. 
 These developments regarding information disclosure are important for the 
transparency of the banks’ activities. However, the reporting requirements increase the 
regulatory burden and they are costly (Thompson, 2004). This argument is in line with my 
empirical findings on the negative effect of private monitoring on banks’ performance. It 
suggests that these costs might negatively affect the banks’ performances in Turkey and 
Russia. In fact, based on Gencoglu et al. (2011), I argue above that the audit procedures are 
not very effective in the Turkish banking sector regarding the number of auditors, and their 
technical knowledge. Hence, the negative impact might be caused by the costs and burden 
created by the ineffective implementation of audit components of the disclosure practices. 
 Regarding Russia, Tompson (2004) argues that the regulatory arrangements in Russia 
have been extremely burdensome in terms of the paperwork and complicated instructions. 
Hence, the negative impact of private monitoring practices on Russian banks’ efficiency can 
be explained with this ineffective regulatory burden. However, the ratio of increased non-
performing loans in Russian banks’ balance sheets and the number of failed banks compared 
to Turkey point to the fact that the negative impact of private monitoring practices have been 
less severe in the Turkish banking sector (See, Table 23). 
3.4. Deposit Insurance Scheme 
 As explained in the first chapter of this thesis, deposit insurance aims to protect 
banking systems and small, uninformed depositors from bank runs.404 However, my 
                                                                                                                                                        
requirements for consolidated financial statements create significant uncertainty regarding the activities of 
banks’ off-balance sheet activities. This weakness is compounded by the lack of adequate powers given to the 
CBR to monitor and supervise bank holding companies and sanction bank officers and directors (IMF, 2009; 
IMF, 2011a). 
404 Chapter I, Section 3.1 
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empirical findings in the second chapter showed that deposit insurance had a negative effect 
on banks’ efficiency.405 This finding is in line with Detragiache and Demirguc-Kunt (2002), 
and Laeven (2002) who emphasize that deposit insurance induces the moral hazard of banks. 
In the existence of such an insurance mechanism, banks would have the incentive to engage 
in riskier activities for higher returns since they know that any possible failure will be bailed 
out by the deposit insurance fund, which is ultimately backed by the government. 
3.4.1. Deposit Insurance Scheme in the Turkish Banking Sector 
 The Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) in Turkey was established under the 
auspices of the Central Bank406 in 1983 as a public entity. Initially, it was administered by the 
Central Bank of Turkey. After the introduction of the Banks Act No. 4389 in 1999, the 
administration and representation of the SDIF was transferred to the BRSA in 2000. It was 
initially responsible only for insuring savings deposits. However, in the presence of financial 
crises, its duties have been enlarged. In 1994,407 the Fund was allowed to intervene in order 
to strengthen the financial health of banks in trouble and to restructure them whenever that 
was necessary, not just to protect deposits. On December, 2003, the SDIF gained its 
administrative and financial autonomy according to Act Nr. 5020 (Ayzit, 2004). 
 The SDIF is responsible and authorized for insuring savings deposits. The amount of 
deposits subject to insurance, the tariff of the insurance premium and other relevant matters 
are determined by the SDIF upon consultation with the Treasury, the BRSA, and the Central 
Bank. If a bank becomes insolvent or unable to operate, the SDIF takes over the bank, and 
restructures it financially. If however there is no recovery to save the financial strength of the 
bank despite the measures, the BRSA can either cancel the bank’s operation license or 
transfer the bank to the SDIF. When the bank is taken over by the SDIF, its debt is paid and 
its liquidation is completed. Bankruptcy proceedings are strictly regulated since the 2001 
crisis and the SDIF has a wide range of authority in exercising the rules over the bankrupt 
banks (Paksoy & Tiftikci, 2010).408 
                                                 
405 Chapter II, Section 7.2 
406 According to the Decree Law No. 70 about banks 
407 With the Decree of Law Nr. 538 dated June 16, 1994 
408 Pursuant to Article 15 of the Banks Act (1999) and Article 111 of the Banking Law (2005) 
SDIF is authorized to insure savings deposit, restructuring and strengthening the financial soundness of the 
banks; transfer, merge, sell or liquidate such banks; execute and conclude the follow-up and collection of 
transactions of the Fund, manage the Fund’s assets and resources and perform other duties assigned thereto by 
the Law. 
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 The SDIF has significant legal powers for resolving failed banks. Under the Banking 
Law, the SDIF has the right firstly to transfer the assets, as well as the deposits and 
participation funds subject to insurance to another bank, and then ask the BRSA to revoke the 
operating license of the failed bank; secondly, to provide financial support to the intervened 
bank by increasing its capital and/or liquidity; and finally, to sell the financially restructured 
bank or organize a merger with another bank (IMF, 2012). The deposit insurance framework 
broadly conforms to best international practice (IMF, 2012). 
 Since the establishment of the deposit insurance scheme in 1983, the coverage of 
deposit insurance has changed several times. The deposit insurance was made unlimited in 
the crisis of 1994409 and remained so until 2000. Although this full coverage system was 
conceived as a temporary measure at that time to prevent a possible bank panic, it was not 
removed until 2000 due to a lack of political will. In 2000, it was changed to a new limited 
guarantee system. However, this didn’t last long and with the emergence of the 2000/2001 
crisis it was changed back to full guarantee (“blanket guarantee”) (BRSA 2010).410 
 Following the 2001 crisis, the deposit guarantee system was effectively used in order 
to deal with the problem banks. The number of banks was reduced as a result of take-overs by 
the SDIF or mergers. In order to prevent the negative side effect of deposit insurance 
regarding moral hazard, the blanket guarantee provided by the deposit insurance scheme was 
cancelled when the 2001 crisis was over. Another resolution was issued on July, 2003.411 
This resolution determined that the temporary full guarantee practice was to be abolished 
starting on July, 2004. Blanket deposit insurance, which had caused a moral hazard problem 
and unfair competition among banks, was ended in July 2004 and deposit insurance was 
aligned with the E.U. levels. The guarantee limited to YTL412 50.000 (around €21.000) was 
adopted (BRSA, 2010)413 which was in line with the E.U. level.414 
                                                 
409 Turkey experienced financial crises during the 80s and in 1994. However, I will not discuss them as my 
empirical analysis covers only the period from 1999 onwards. 
410 During the twin crisis of 2000-2001 it was changed back to full guarantee for a short time. Within this scope, 
the BRSA issued a resolution (BRSA Resolution Nr. 151) in January, 2001 concerning the application of this 
guarantee. According to this resolution, deposit insurance guarantee would be applied by the SDIF by taking 
over the shares of banks which had violated the related articles of Banks Act (BRSA, 2010). 
411 BRSA Resolution Nr. 1084 
412 YTL is the Turkish currency 
413 With the BRSA Resolution Nr. 1083 
414 According to the Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on 
deposit-guarantee schemes, the minimum guarantee level was established as €20.000. When the financial crisis 
hit in autumn of 2008, the E.U. Member States decided that the level of deposit protection should be increased 
in the EU. A Directive adopted in March 2009 required the coverage to be increased from a minimum of 
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 Önder and Özyıldırım (2008) found that the generous deposit insurance mechanism 
created moral hazard for banks during 1988 and 2000 in Turkey.415 They argue that the 
perception of complete insurance encouraged bank managers to engage in risky activities, 
especially after 1994. Capital to assets ratio decreased by 1.63% and non-performing loans 
increased by 11.8%, the ratio of liquid assets to deposits decreased by 43.29% and many 
banks decreased their capital adequacy ratio. These results suggest that banks took risks 
during the generous deposit insurance period in Turkey (Önder & Özyıldırım, 2008). The 
first-stage analysis of the empirical work conducted in Chapter II416 of this thesis shows that 
the average efficiency scores of Turkish banks have a declining trend between 1999 and 
2004. Taking also into account the negative impact of deposit insurance found in the second-
stage regression analysis, the above mentioned arguments provide support to my results 
suggesting that the moral hazard effect of deposit insurance might have negatively affected 
the performance of Turkish banks during the full coverage time period. 
  In May, 2008, the risk-based premium practice417 was adopted (BRSA, 2010).418 
With the introduction of this risk-based insurance premium tariff in 2008, banks paid 
insurance premiums according to the risk they create within the system so that they were 
encouraged to take fewer risks and comply with the prudential regulations (BRSA, 2010). 
According to the BRSA Report (2010), imposing a blanket guarantee at the proper time to 
prevent bank runs and revoking it when the crisis ended contributed to market discipline in 
the Turkish banking sector (BRSA, 2010). This argument provides support to the increasing 
trend in the efficiency scores of Turkish banks, found in Chapter II (Table 13) after the 
introduction of the limited deposit insurance system in 2004. 
 According to the 2012 IMF Report, the SDIF is authorized with sufficient resolution 
tools provided by the Banking Law to use least cost resolution tools such as mergers, insured 
                                                                                                                                                        
€20.000 to at least €50.000 by June 2010 and to a uniform level of €100.000 by the end of 2010. (European 
Commission Report on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, 2010: Review of Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes) 
415This argument is also supported by Bakır and Öniş (2010). 
416 See Chapter II, Table 13 
417 The idea in risk-based deposit insurance premiums is that the risk-based premiums will discourage insured 
banks from taking excessive risks because if a bank is subject to higher premiums, it will think twice before 
undertaking a risky activity. Banks that have a higher risk exposure will pay higher insurance premiums 
(Prescott, 2002). However, Prescott (2002) argues that the risk-based deposit insurance premiums alone cannot 
control moral hazard in deposit insurance. He points out that this argument requires the deposit insurer to be 
able to observe the risk characteristics of a bank’s investment portfolio. However, it is not easy for outsiders to 
evaluate a bank loan or a complicated portfolio of financial derivatives. Under these conditions, risk-based 
deposit insurance premiums are not enough to control moral hazard (Prescott, 2002). 
418 “The Regulation on Saving Deposit Subject to Insurance and Premiums to be collected by the Savings 
Deposit Insurance Fund” 
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deposit transfers, and bank liquidation processes while the deposit insurance framework is in 
line with the E.U. and international practices. The same report evaluates the banking 
resolution and deposit insurance systems in Turkey as well-designed. 
3.4.2. Deposit Insurance Scheme in the Russian Banking System 
 Following the 1998 crisis, in order to restore competition in the deposit market, 
promote financial stability and increase trust in the banking system, “the Federal Law on 
Insurance of the Deposits of Natural Persons” was introduced as of 23 December, 2003 as 
one of the reform initiatives following the 1998 crisis. The introduction of the deposit 
insurance system in Russia was one of the major reforms in the Russian banking regulation in 
the post-1998 crisis period (Tompson, 2004). 
  In January 2004, the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) was established as an 
independent entity and the first round of admissions into the deposit insurance scheme was 
completed at the end of March, 2005 (IMF, 2005; ECB, 2005). The primary functions of the 
DIA are to determine the deposit insurance premium, receive payments from registered 
banks, make reimbursements to depositors in case of bank failures and manage the Deposit 
Insurance Fund. In late 2004, the government made an amendment to the Law “On 
insolvency (bankruptcy) of credit institutions” and the DIA also became responsible for 
managing the bankruptcy proceedings to liquidate insolvent banks (Camara & Negret, 2006). 
 When the system first started, in order to prevent moral hazard in the insurance 
scheme, all deposits up to 100.000 RUB (approximately €2.480) were insured. However, this 
ratio was increased gradually in the next years. In August 2006, the coverage was expanded 
up to a maximum of 190.000 RUB (approx. €4.700) and in March 2007, the upper limit for 
reimbursement was raised to 400.000 RUB (approx. €9.910). In October, 2008 the CBR 
increased the coverage to 700.000 RUB (approx. €17.361) as an adjustment against the global 
crisis (Peresetsky, 2008; Barisitz, 2009). 
 During the 2004 crisis, the Russian government enacted a law providing temporary 
deposit insurance to all banks in order to mitigate depositors’ panic. Hence, irrespective of 
their qualifications, all Russian banks were guaranteed blanket deposit insurance for deposits 
up to 100.000 RUB (€2.480) from July 2004 until the end of 2006 (IMF, 2004). On one hand, 
the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme (DIS) increased the banking sector’s 
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reliance on depository funding. Private deposits have grown with the introduction of DIS 
(Camara & Montes-Negret, 2006). 
 On the other hand, the absence of effective consolidated supervision hinders the 
monitoring of connected-lending practices. Hence, a true assessment of the banks’ financial 
health is not possible. Although banks have to meet a number of prudential standards in order 
to be accepted into the deposit insurance system, institutions which account for nearly all 
deposits were eventually admitted into the system suggesting the weak enforcement of 
prudential standards (Barisitz, 2009). 
 There have been some changes in the resolution mechanism of failed banks and 
procedures for bank exits as of late 2008. The initiative to undertake resolution intervention 
still belongs to the Banking Supervision Committee of the CBR. As one of the legislative 
responses to the global crisis, major amendments to the powers and tools at the disposal of 
the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) for resolving failing banks were approved by the 
Russian Duma in October 2008. In practice, in cases of distress, both the CBR and the DIA 
are likely to evaluate the financial condition of particular banks that might be subject to 
resolution. The DIA has up to ten days to decide on its participation before engaging in a 
bank rescue operation. The CBR’s Supervision Committee must approve the DIA’s Action 
Plan within ten days of its submission (Melecky et al., 2010). 
 However, Vernikov (2007) argues that there are only minor additional benefits from 
introducing deposit insurance into a banking sector that is dominated by state-owned banks 
which enjoy de facto guarantees of performance from the state. He adds that when a 
comprehensive deposit insurance scheme was introduced in 2005, almost 70% of household 
deposits were held by major public sector banks.419 It had practically no disciplining effect on 
the market participants since the introduction of deposit insurance meant simply the 
conversion of an implicit state guarantee into an explicit protection, removing some agents 
from the household deposit market. The only change has been an inflow of deposits into new 
private accounts at national private banks offering high interest rates, suggesting a building 
moral hazard problem (Vernikov, 2007). The introduction of the deposit insurance scheme 
(DIS) may aggravate moral hazard problems in an environment that lacks transparency and 
                                                 
419 Such as Sberbank; Sberbank is government-owned and it is the largest bank in Russia. Central Bank of 
Russia is the majority shareholder of Sberbank. 
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sound governance standards. The DIS should only be adopted after the foundations of the 
banking system become solid (Camara & Montes-Negret, 2006). 
3.4.3. Discussion 
 The above-mentioned argument of Camara and Montes-Negret (2006) is supported by 
my empirical findings that deposit insurance affects banks’ efficiency negatively. Cross 
national research’s findings show that the seriousness of moral hazard depends on the 
institutional environment (Thompson, 2004). Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) also 
found that deposit insurance increases banking system fragility in countries with weak 
institutions. Followed by that, where the rule of law and regulatory quality is weak, 
implementation of deposit insurance is likely to contribute to financial instability (Thompson, 
2004). In fact, the World Bank governance indicators show a higher level in regulatory 
quality for Turkey compared to Russia (See Table 28). Regulatory Quality is an index based 
on worldwide governance indicators prepared by the World Bank. It reflects the perceptions 
of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations 
that permit and promote private sector development. The indexes show a lower level in 
Russia supporting the need for a sounder institutional environment compared to Turkey.420 
Table 28: Regulatory Quality in Turkey and Russia 
Years 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Turkey 0.301 0.075 0.048 0.102 0.278 0.293 0.323 0.282 0.304 0.382 
Russia -0.522 -0.293 -0.22 -0.114 -0.17 -0.447 -0.335 -0.453 -0.402 -0.395 
 
Source: World Bank Governance Indicators421 
 The qualitative analysis of this chapter’s suggestions is in line with this description of 
a poor institutional and regulatory environment in Russia and hence with the above-
mentioned argument. Based on my empirical findings on the negative effect of deposit 
insurance, the introduction of deposit insurance in Russia should be accompanied by the 
                                                 
420 Thiessen (2004) shows in his paper that the annual evaluation of financial sector reforms by the EBRD 
regarding the quality level of financial system supervision and regulation was relatively low even before the 
crisis and that it fell afterwards to very low standards until about 2002.  
421 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/faq.htm 
The estimate of governance ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. 
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improvements in the enforcement of law.422 Furthermore, following the introduction of the 
deposit insurance, the efficiency results of Russian banks show a declining trend after 2005 
(see Chapter II, Table 9). 
 Although during the 2008-2009 crises the DIA resolved a large number of banks, 
Melecky et al. (2010) argue that it is not clear whether the least cost measures were adopted. 
During the crisis, the Deposit Insurance Agency did not need to use the Deposit Insurance 
fund as a bank restructuring tool. The funds used during the crisis were either provided from 
investors, the CBR or the Federal Budget (IMF, 2011). Since the current system of deposit 
insurance is very new, it has been tested only in the latest crisis and hence it might be too 
early to decide on the performance of the DIA regarding the possible trade-offs between 
protection of depositors, protection of creditors and minimizing of losses and disruptions to 
the overall financial system (Melecky et al., 2010). 
  The difference between the trend of efficiency scores in Turkish and Russian banks 
(taking also into account the negative impact of deposit insurance on banks’ efficiency) 
suggests that a deposit insurance scheme should only be adopted after the foundations of a 
banking system become solid. In an environment with weak regulatory quality, connected 
lending practices, and a lack of reliable data such as there is in the Russian banking sector, a 
deposit insurance mechanism might aggravate the moral hazard problem. Besides, as argued 
above, the proper implementation of the deposit insurance mechanism in Turkey suggests 
that its negative impact on Turkish banks has been lower compared to Russian banks. 
3.5. Entry Requirements 
 Economic theory provides conflicting results about the impact of entry restrictions on 
banks’ efficiency. Keeley (1990) argues that banks with monopolistic power have greater 
franchise value, which would give them an incentive for prudent behaviour. On the other 
hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) do not support entry restrictions by emphasizing the 
positive effects of competition. Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and Min (1998) and Wang and 
Bayraktar (2006) support the view that the regulatory restrictions do have negative effects on 
competition in banking. Barth et al. (2004) found that the percentage of entry applications 
denied is greater for low-income countries than for high-income countries, and that 
                                                 
422 This argument is also supported by Thompson (2004). As he mentions: “The introduction of deposit 
insurance therefore needs to be accompanied – preferably preceded – by major improvements in bank 
transparency, prudential regulation and the administration of law”. 
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developing countries place more limitations on foreign bank ownership of domestic banks 
and foreign bank entry through branching than developed countries. 
 According to the results of my empirical analysis, regulations related to entry 
requirements have a negative effect on the efficiency of banks.423 Barth et al. (2002) classify 
entry restrictions among the competition regulatory variables. Although they include 
limitations on foreign bank entry, following Pasiouras (2008), the index424 I used measures 
only the specific legal requirements for obtaining a license to operate as a bank. The more 
information required by the regulatory authorities when deciding upon whether or not to issue 
a license, the more restrictive will be entry into banking (Barth et al., 2006a). Looking at 
Turkey and Russia, until 2005, Russia had higher stringency in entry restrictions. Starting in 
2005, they both receive the same degree of stringency in entry restrictions (see Table 29). 
Table 29: Indexes on Entry Restrictions in Turkey and Russia* 
Years 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Turkey 3 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Russia 8 8 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 
*This variable takes values between 0 and 8. 
3.5.1. Entry Requirements in the Turkish Banking Sector 
 In Turkey, the number of banks increased quickly after the financial liberalization 
process started in the 1980s. Weaknesses in granting licenses made entrance into the sector 
very easy. Firstly, bank licenses were issued based on political criteria. Secondly, political 
authority was under pressure from bank lobbies so that it refrained from taking adequate 
regulatory action (Özkan, 2003). The qualifications required in persons who wanted to 
become a bank owner were low, making entrance into the sector easy. Besides, the decision 
of license revocation was difficult, which made exit not easy. All these factors contributed to 
the increase in the number of banks (BRSA, 2010). 
 Following the 2001 crisis, the operating licenses of many banks were annulled or 
transferred to the SDIF due to their illegal operations. Before 2000, commercial banking 
                                                 
423 Chapter II, Section 6.2 
424 See Appendix A 
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licenses were given by the Ministry of Treasury. Starting in 2000, according to the Article 7 
of the Banks Act (1999),425 the establishment of a bank in Turkey or the opening up a branch 
in Turkey by a bank established abroad needs the permission of the BRSA, provided that the 
establishment conditions laid down in the Banking Law are fulfilled. 
 In order to obtain a licence to operate as a bank in Turkey, the submission of the 
following legal documents has been required since 1999: financial projections for the first 
three years, financial information on potential shareholders and sources of funds to be 
disbursed in the capitalization of new banks, draft by law, and background experience of 
future managers and directors. After 2005, the BRSA has brought more severe rules in 
granting licenses with amendments in legislation (BRSA, 2010). The amount of specific legal 
submissions required to obtain a banking license increased with the 2005 Banking Law 
(Article 6 and Article 7). Intended organization charts and market differentiation intended for 
a new bank were included in the entry requirements. Moreover, before 2000, there was not a 
specified amount for the minimum capital entry requirement. Starting in 2000, the minimum 
capital entry requirement was determined as twenty million YTL.426 In 2005, this amount 
became thirty million YTL (approx. €12.650.000).427 
 The results of my empirical analysis suggest that entry regulations have a negative 
impact on efficiency. As argued above, entry restrictions have a negative effect on 
competition. During the 2001 crisis, it was observed that there were extensive dominant 
partner abuses in the SDIF banks. This led the BRSA to follow a stricter policy in the 
licensing process in terms of the qualifications and the intentions of entrepreneurs, the 
capacity of institutions in risk management, internal processes and corporate management 
principles (BRSA, 2010). The negative effect of this regulation can be explained by the 
BRSA’s emphasis on financial stability at the expense of competition since as Kaymak 
(2009) argues; “competition brings risks” is still the underlying approach of the BRSA.428 In 
fact, Abbasoglu et al. (2007) found that the degree of competition had decreased between 
2001 and 2005. Looking at the period between 2005 and 2010, Macit (2012) found that the 
                                                 
425 Article 6 of the Banking Law (2005) 
426 YTL is the Turkish currency. 20 Million YTL corresponds to approx. €8.500.000. 
427 For more on the entry requirements, see Articles 6, 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 of the Banking Law (2005) under 
the section “Permissions for Establishment and Operation”. 
428 Kocaoglu (2010) also argues that banking issues have been more important for the BRSA rather than 
competition related matters. 
The competition-fragility view argues that competition encourages excessive risk-taking which would lead to 
less stability (Allen & Gale, 2004). For more on the “competition-fragility” strand of literature, see Weill and 
Fungacova, 2009; Allen & Gale, 2004 
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level of competition also decreased during this time period. Hence, the declining trend in 
competition in the Turkish banking sector can be explained as a negative effect of the entry 
restrictions.429 
3.5.2. Entry Requirement in the Russian Banking Sector 
 According to the Banking Law in Russia, the Central Bank of Russia is the licensing 
authority. Under the Federal Law of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the Bank of 
Russia (The CBR) is authorized to take decisions regarding the authorization of credit 
institutions, issuance of banking licences to credit institutions, and suspension and revocation 
of such licences in accordance with the procedures stipulated by the Federal Law “On Banks 
and Banking” (ECB, 2005). The registration of banks and the licensing of their activities is 
designated according to the Bank of Russia Instruction No. 75-I, dated July 23, 1998, “On the 
Procedure for Applying Federal Laws Regulating the Procedure for Registering Credit 
Institutions and Licensing Banking Activities”. Regarding the specific legal submissions, all 
of the requirements mentioned above are necessary to obtain a licence to operate as a bank 
during the period of analysis.430 The Federal Tax Authority has the responsibility to authorize 
credit institutions, following the decision of the CBR. It must be approved by the Federal 
Antimonopoly Authority regarding compliance with the anti-monopoly legislation 
requirements (ECB, 2005). 
 The Bank of Russia Regulation No. 218-P, dated March 2003, “On the Procedure for 
and the Criteria of Evaluating the Financial Condition of Corporate Founders of Credit 
Institutions” introduced a methodology for evaluating the financial condition of corporate 
founders of credit institutions through the use of a set of standard indicators. This regulation 
was amended in 2005 as “On the Procedure and Criteria for Evaluating the Financial Position 
of Individual Founders of a Credit Institution”.431 It applies to individuals who intend to 
acquire shares in a bank confirming the sources of funds paid by the individuals as a 
contribution to the authorised capital of a bank (CBR, 2005). 
 Bank of Russia Ordinance No. 1624-U amended the 2004 Regulation “On the 
Decision Making Procedure in Respect to the State Registration of Credit Institutions and the 
Issue of Banking Licenses” in order to improve the registration process of banks and the 
                                                 
429 the OECD Peer Review Report (2005) 
430 According to Barth et al. (2003) and (2008) survey, only “market differentiation intended for a new bank” 
was not obligatory between 2001 and 2004. Hence, I measured the index based on this finding. 
431 Regulation No.268-P 
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licensing procedure of banking operations.432 It contains a more detailed list of documents a 
credit institution is required to present to the Bank of Russia. In order to increase the 
transparency of the structure of founders when creating a new credit institution, the Law 
tightened the requirement by expanding the range of activities for which additional banking 
licenses are required (CBR, 2004). 
  Bank entry in Russia has been easy during the 1990s when the CBR issued a very 
large number of banking licenses. However, since the middle of the 1990s the number of 
banks started to decrease. The same argument discussed above for Turkish banks applies also 
to Russian banks where competition in the banking sector is also a problem.433 
3.5.3. Discussion 
 According to the qualitative analysis of this chapter, the number of barriers required 
as part of the licensing process is similar for both Turkish banks and Russian banks. Imposing 
basic requirements before a banking license is accepted or rejected would enhance the overall 
performance of the banking sector, because in that way only the banks with higher quality 
would be allowed to enter the banking sector (Barth et al., 2006a:111). In fact, considering 
both countries’ banking histories characterised by pervasive connected-lending and 
corruptive practices and abuses of banks’ sources by their governments, imposing entry 
restrictions to better assure the quality of entrants gains a particular importance. 
 On the other hand, the negative impact of this regulation on efficiency found in 
Chapter II suggests its distorting effect on competition. My analysis on entry regulations 
regarding both Turkish and Russian banks suggests that following the financial crises in their 
history, both countries chose to tighten their licensing procedures. However, empirical results 
revealed that this regulation had a negative impact on banks’ performance. Hence, it would 
be advisable for both countries to re-evaluate and improve their licensing policies in order to 
prevent the distortion of competition in the banking sector. 
                                                 
432 In 2006, the regulation “On the Procedure and Criteria for Evaluating the Financial Position of Individual 
Founders of a Credit Institution” was replaced by the Ordinance No. 1763-U “On Amending Bank of Russia 
Regulation No 268-P, dated April, 2005. In 2007, the Bank of Russia amended its Instruction No. 109-I, dated 
January, 2004, “On the Bank of Russia Decision-Making Procedure in Respect of the State Registration of 
Credit Institutions and Licensing Banking Operations”. 
433 See Meleckey et al. (2010) and Weill et al. (2010). 
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4. Government Ownership of Banks in Turkey and Russia 
 In many emerging markets, the key players in the banking industry are controlled by 
the state (Caner et al., 2007). This is also true for both Turkey and Russia where state banks’ 
involvement in financial intermediation is significantly high. Barth et al. (2001b) describe the 
presence of government-owned banks as the fraction of the banking system’s assets in banks 
that is 50% or more government-owned. According to the literature (such as La Porta et al., 
2000; Schleifer & Vishny, 1998; Barth et al., 2010), state ownership of banks is associated 
with lower levels of efficiency, and government intervention over the banking sector is 
associated with slower financial development, as well as lower growth and productivity. My 
empirical findings also suggest a negative relationship between the share of government-
owned banks and the banks’ performance. In fact, many researchers encourage policy makers 
in developing countries to privatize their holdings in the banking sector to improve the 
efficiency (Mahlberg et al., 2011).  
4.1. Government Ownership of Banks in Turkey 
 Before the 2000/2001 crisis, the Turkish banking sector was dominated by the state. 
In fact, according to Steinherr et al. (2004) state banks were the main contributor to the 2001 
crisis. For years, these state banks had been misused by politicians, who allocated them to 
different political parties and to certain favoured groups to provide subsidized credits for their 
political constituencies. However, these banks were not compensated for the losses incurred 
by such lending activities. Instead, they were forced to book these losses as claims on the 
government, called “duty” losses (Özkan, 2003; Akyürek, 2006; Bredenkamp et al., 2009; 
Steinherr et al., 2004). These claims provided little income and no cash flow. Hence, banks 
had to fund themselves increasingly short-term in the interbank market, which subjected them 
to liquidity risk and interest rate risk as the liabilities grew. Moreover, state banks were not 
required to provide reserves for bad loans, to comply with prudential regulations applied to 
private banks, and they were also not subject to any serious supervision. This situation 
created the basis for regulatory forbearance and allowed massive distortion in the banking 
system (Özkan, 2003; Bredenkamp et al., 2009). 
 Following the second pillar of the restructuring process after the 2001 crisis,434 state-
owned banks were recapitalized and restructured financially and operationally within the 
                                                 
434 See Section 3.1.1 
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Restructuring Program. Since 2003, the share of government-owned banks in the total 
banking sector shows a declining trend. In 2003, the share of government-owned banks was 
39.27 %. As of 2010, this ratio declined to 31.5% (BAT, 2010) (See also Table 30). 
4.2. Government Ownership of Banks in Russia 
 The Russian banking sector is dominated by state-owned banks. The continuing 
dominant position of state banks was one of the main weak areas in the post-crisis period. 
Following the 1998 crisis, the banking sector has not undergone an ownership transformation 
process regarding the state’s direct participation in the sector where these banks continued to 
dominate the market in terms of the volume of transactions and number of branches. In fact, 
the relative role of the biggest state banks435 increased following the crisis.436 The significant 
public share and the CBR’s ambiguous role as the supervisor and also as the main 
shareholder of the largest bank in Russia437 still continues (Mahlberg et al., 2011). 
 As shown in the second chapter438 of this thesis and supported by Barth et al. (2010), 
Caprio and Martinez (2000) and de Nicolo (2000), state ownership and intervention have a 
negative impact on banks’ efficiency and stability. The dominant position of the state has a 
distorting effect on credit allocation and competition. In Russia, state-owned banks benefited 
from privileged access to state funds, and exemption from some regulatory norms.439 These 
banks were continuously encouraged to fund personal projects and election campaigns for 
local authorities and to fund government deficit and finance unprofitable credits for state-
owned enterprises (Tompson, 2004). 
 As of the end of 2001, the loan share of larger state banks was 35% compared to 20% 
at the end of 1998. Sberbank held of 70% of household deposits and overall 23% of the 
banking sector assets (IMF, 2003). The government had a stake of around 25% in 400 banks. 
In 2003, the government took over VTB, the second largest bank in Russia, from the CBR 
instead of privatising it. The 2003 IMF Report emphasized the need to level the playing field 
between state and private banks and prevent the dominant position of Sberbank in the market. 
In 2003, the share of government-owned banks was 36% in the banking sector (CBR, 2003). 
                                                 
435 Particularly Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank 
436 As of August, 2011, the share of Sberbank’s assets in the banking sector’s total assets increased from to 
24.35 in 2007 to 27% in 2010 (Fungacova & Jakubik, 2012; CBR, 2006-2010). 
437 Sberbank 
438 Chapter II, Section 6.2 
439 For example, the government has established a number of corporations that have the special legal status of a 
non-commercial organization and that are not subject to Bankruptcy Law nor controlled by the Audit Chamber 
(OECD, 2009). 
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The state held majority stakes in 23 banks which accounted for 72% of retail deposits, 34% 
of capital, 38 % of assets, and 39% of outstanding credit to the private sector. However, the 
CBR continued to hold the majority stake at Sberbank which created several conflicts of 
interest by acting as the banking sector regulator and simultaneously as the largest single 
creditor and the owner of its biggest bank. 
 In 2004, the government was still the owner of the largest banks through Sberbank;440 
and the system in 2004 was still heavily dependent on state banks (Steinherr, 2006). No 
major bank privatization had occurred. The banking sector remains predominantly state-
controlled as of the end of 2010441 (Fungacova & Jakubik, 2012). In January 2010, the fifty 
largest banks were in control of 80% of the total assets in the banking sector. Among these 
fifty banks, the biggest five banks are government-owned and they control 48% of the total 
assets in the banking sector (IMF, 2011c). 
 The 2008-2009 crises in Russia revealed again the structural weaknesses of the 
Russian banking sector regarding the small- and medium-sized banks, which were affected 
by the crisis due to their weak deposit base, given the dominance of state-owned banks 
(Fidrmuc & Süss, 2009). At the start of the crisis, state-controlled banks already accounted 
for over half of the banking sector and the country’s five biggest banks were state-controlled. 
As one of the measures implemented to restore financial stability following the 2008-2009 
crises, the government took over troubled banks via these state-controlled banks, boosting the 
state’s presence in banking. These banks acquired other banks during the crisis and hence 
they increased their market share (Jakobik & Fungacova, 2012).442 The increase of the share 
of government-owned banks in the total banking sector assets was around 16.8% between 
2007 and 2010 (See Table 30). 
                                                 
440 CBR owns 57.6% of Sberbank (Fungacova & Jakobik, 2012). 
441 In October 2010, the Russian government approved a programme to sell shares in various large state 
enterprises over the next five years, including banks. In February 2011, VTB conducted a second public offering 
resulting in the sale of a further 10% stake. However, even so, the Russian state still owns about 75% of VTB. 
Similarly, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), which currently holds a 57.6 % stake in Sberbank, plans to retain 
a 50%-plus-one-share majority in the giant bank even after selling 7.6% of its shares in the near future. 
Although referred to as a “privatisation programme,” the state will maintain controlling voting shares in major 
banks and other “strategic” enterprises (Fungacova & Jakubik, 2012). 
442 Sberbank, Bank VTB, Gazprombank, Rosselkhozbank, VTB-24 
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Table 30: % of Government-Owned Banks in Turkey and Russia 
Years 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Turkey 34.60 34.20 32.70 39.36 39.27 38.35 33.27 31.00 30.25 30.38 32.20 31.56 
Russia 41.90 68.00 35.50 37.50 36.00 38.10 40.70 37.80 39.20 40.50 43.90 45.80 
Source: BRSA, BAT, CBR Annual Banking Supervision Reports (1999-2010) 
5. Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed the regulatory variables that cause the difference in the 
empirical analysis of Chapter II of this thesis, described across two geographical dimensions 
of variability, Russia and Turkey. The aim was to show that Turkey has implemented a 
stricter and more comprehensive banking reform than Russia in their respective post-crisis 
periods, that is, the post-2001 period for Turkey and the post-1998 period for Russia. 
Banking reforms implemented in Turkey involved stronger capital structures, stricter 
enforcement of the banking law through more disciplinary power granted to the regulatory 
authority and better risk management policy compared to the reforms implemented in Russia. 
 The analysis regarding the capital adequacy requirements suggests that asset quality 
remained a problem in the Russian banking sector due to weak accounting and enforcement 
standards compared to the strict enforcement of the accounting and supervision standards by 
the BRSA in Turkey. The average capital adequacy ratios have been higher in Turkey 
compared to Russia during the period of analysis. In fact, the capital adequacy ratios in 
Russia continuously declined between 2000 and 2006 (See, Table 19). Some Russian banks 
were not even able to meet the minimum requirement ratio. On the other hand, in Turkey, 
there has been no news of banks breaching the capital adequacy requirements imposed by the 
BRSA. 
 Regarding the official disciplinary power of the regulatory authorities in both 
countries, the analysis of this chapter shows that the Turkish banking regulatory authority is 
empowered with a wider range of authority than the Russian regulatory authority. Emerging 
markets suffer from enforcement problems (Vives, 2006). This argument suggests that the 
disciplinary power of supervisory and regulatory authorities and hence enforcement becomes 
an important issue in emerging markets. Aysan and Al (2006) argue that the BRSA 
experience proves that banking regulation and supervision requires more than enacting laws. 
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For an emerging country where corruption and connected-lending practices have become a 
way of doing business for such a long time, complying with the standards proposed by the 
regulatory authorities is extremely important. This argument applies well to both Turkey and 
Russia. 
 The analysis regarding the power of the Russian banking regulatory authority (the 
CBR) shows that the enforcement authority of the CBR is deficient in several areas compared 
to the Turkish regulatory authority. One major difference is that the CBR lacks the power to 
sanction directors personally for non-compliance. On the contrary, the enactment of Law Nr. 
5020 in Turkey provided a powerful basis for penalizing the persons who are responsible for 
endangering the stability of the financial system by mismanagement. In fact, compared to the 
Russian regulatory authority in the post-crisis period, the Turkish BRSA had a very strict 
stance in the enforcement of banking regulations.443 
 Several important steps have been taken in the risk management practices, including 
information disclosure requirements in both countries. However, the analysis of this chapter 
shows that the lack of quality data in the Russian reporting standards is still a problem. There 
are continuing deficiencies related to generous accounting and provisioning rules and more 
importantly, in related party transaction disclosure requirements. These shortcomings 
continue to distort the CBR’s ability to assess the quality of the assets and the adequacy of 
loan loss reserves. Hence, they increase uncertainty about the creditworthiness of Russian 
banks. Turkey has been more disciplined in implementing a comprehensive risk management 
system. However, the negative effect of this regulation might be due to its regulatory burden 
and costs caused by the amount of information disclosure requirements. In fact, Vives (2006) 
argues that reliance on transparency and disclosure requirements is limited in emerging 
markets. It may be problematic for them to move towards a disclosure approach in regulation 
since information problems are more acute and the production of information is more 
problematic in these countries. Hence, competitive pressures and market discipline should not 
be set at the same level as in developed countries (Vives, 2006). 
 The empirical findings of Chapter II show that deposit insurance affects banks’ 
efficiency negatively due to moral hazard by banks. Tompson (2004) argues that the extent of 
moral hazard depends on the institutional environment. The qualitative analysis of this 
                                                 
443 According to the interview of Kaymak (2009) with the BRSA officials, one factor with the positive effect on 
BRSA’s performance was the strong chair-man profile of the BRSA. The strong leadership made the BRSA the 
decisive authority of the banking sector. 
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chapter is in line with the concept of a poor institutional and regulatory environment in 
Russia and consequently, it supports the above-mentioned argument. Deposit insurance is a 
new system in Russia. However, in an environment with weak regulatory quality, and lack of 
reliable data such as in the Russian banking sector, a deposit insurance mechanism might 
aggravate the moral hazard problem. Compared to Russia, a deposit insurance system has 
existed in Turkey since 1983 and the qualitative analysis shows that it is better designed in 
Turkey. Since moral hazard depends on the institutional environment, the solid environment 
in Turkey reduces the negative effect (moral hazard) of deposit insurance on Turkish banks. 
  Finally, regarding entry restrictions, according to the qualitative analysis of this 
chapter, the number of barriers required as part of the licensing process is similar in both 
Turkish banks and Russian banks. My analysis on entry regulations regarding both Turkish 
and Russian banks suggests that following the financial crises in their history, both countries 
chose to tighten their licensing procedures. In fact, considering both countries’ banking 
histories which are characterised by pervasive corruptive practices, the imposition of entry 
restrictions to ensure a higher quality of entrants, gains particular importance. However, the 
negative impact of these regulations on banks’ efficiency suggests that its adverse effect on 
competition prevails. 
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Conclusion 
 Conclusion  
This dissertation analysed the impact of regulatory variables on banking performance in 
two emerging countries, Turkey and Russia, with the aim of understanding which 
banking regulations might contribute to financial stability so that the policymakers in 
emerging countries can work on these regulatory policies. 
 The first chapter of this dissertation analysed the function of banking regulation 
in supporting financial stability. For this purpose, it reviewed the basic concepts in 
banking, the economic rationale of banking regulation and their role for the financial 
stability. Due to the banks’ role as financial intermediaries in the economy, bank failures 
are viewed as the most serious failures compared to other industries. Contagion of these 
failures occurs quickly, spreads more broadly within the industry and, results in large 
losses to depositors of these banks. More importantly, a bank failure contagion spreads 
beyond the banking industry and damages the whole financial system and economy. 
Therefore, the major goal of banking regulation and supervision is to prevent banks from 
engaging in overly risky activities so that the depositors, other savers and the economy at 
large are protected from systemic failures. 
 An efficient banking system is the key to financial stability. Regulation aims to 
improve the efficiency of a banking sector and hence support financial stability. 
However, the theoretical discussion in Chapter I indicated that the efficiency of certain 
solutions regarding banking regulation is open to debate. The literature finds conflicting 
results about the impact of regulations related to capital adequacy requirements, the 
power of regulatory bodies, information disclosure requirements, deposit insurance and 
entry regulations on banks’ performance and hence, financial stability. Some of the 
regulations contribute to banks’ performance by preventing the risk-taking incentive of 
banks and thereby supporting financial stability, whereas some of them might have a 
detrimental effect on financial stability. Besides, banks react differently to regulation 
under different institutional settings. This implies that conclusions that hold for two 
emerging countries, particularly Turkey and Russia in the present study, might not apply 
to advanced countries. 
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 With this fact in mind, Chapter II of this dissertation presented an empirical 
analysis to understand whether different regulatory practices implemented in Turkey and 
Russia had any impact on their banking sectors’ performance during 1999 and 2010. I 
have employed a two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The first stage DEA 
findings indicate that the performance of Turkish banks had an increasing trend from 
2005 until 2010 whereas Russian banks’ efficiency was declining gradually from 2005 to 
2010. The second-stage regression analysis examined the differences in these efficiency 
scores between Turkish and the Russian banks. I investigated whether the regulations 
related to capital adequacy requirements, the power of regulatory bodies, the information 
disclosure requirements, deposit insurance and the entry regulations had any significant 
impact on banks’ performance. The findings of the regression analysis suggest a strong 
link between these regulations and the differences in the trend of efficiency scores 
between Turkish and Russian banks. 
 The empirical analysis provides support for stricter capital adequacy standards 
and for the development of powerful regulatory/supervisory agencies, but not for a 
private monitoring approach based on information disclosure. There is also no empirical 
case for deposit insurance schemes and entry regulations, at least as far as the two 
countries of interest – Turkey and Russia – are concerned. This implies that the banking 
regulatory authorities in emerging markets should focus on maintaining high levels of 
capital adequacy requirements and on developing powerful supervisory agencies for the 
sake of the enforcement of regulations. These results are suggestive of more general 
policy implications on which regulations might be important for emerging countries and 
why. The policymakers in emerging countries could possibly concentrate on these items 
of banking regulation. 
 Emerging countries typically suffer larger exogenous shocks than developed 
countries. They have weaker institutional settings and weaker financial shock absorbers 
than advanced countries. The discussion in Chapter III suggests that the policy responses 
should be tailored according to the needs of emerging countries. Specifically, regarding 
their lack of capacity for policy commitment, having capital buffers in the banking 
system and a strong authority capable of enforcing regulations can contribute to financial 
stability in emerging markets. On the other hand, the results of Chapter II indicate that 
the entry restrictions implemented in these countries have a negative effect on efficiency. 
This can be attributed to the negative effect of entry restrictions on competition in the 
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banking sector. Considering this negative effect, it would be advisable for both countries 
to re-evaluate their licensing policies in order to prevent the distortion of competition in 
the banking sector. 
 The negative effect of higher requirements for private monitoring can be 
associated with increasing costs to meet information disclosure requirements such as 
consolidated accounts, disclosure of off-balance sheet items to the public and to the 
supervisors, disclosure of risk management procedures to the public, audits by certified 
auditors and obtaining credit ratings from rating agencies. This increase in costs might 
undermine the performance of banks. In fact, these results regarding entry requirements 
and private monitoring suggest that -as argued by Vives (2006)- the level of competition 
and market discipline should not be set at the same level in emerging countries as in 
advanced countries. 
 Finally, the negative effect of deposit insurance supports the argument of 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999), who argue that the deposit insurance 
mechanism is likely to increase banking system fragility in countries with weak 
institutions. At least, the blanket guarantees provided by the state should be temporary 
and should be cancelled when a crisis is over. 
 The contribution of this thesis is fourfold. Firstly, the literature incorporating the 
regulatory environment in the factors influencing a bank’s efficiency is in its infancy. 
This dissertation tries to fill a gap by providing evidence on the regulatory factors that 
have an impact on banks’ performance. Secondly, international comparisons of banking 
performance have not been discussed extensively in the existing literature. This 
dissertation contributes to the literature by providing international evidence on the 
impact of regulations. Thirdly, to the best of my knowledge, there is no work which 
compares Turkey and Russia’s banking performance from a law and economics 
perspective. Most studies which concentrate on banking focus on sectorial differences 
rather than the regulatory differences. This dissertation carries out an economic analysis 
of the differences in performance between two countries’ banking sectors based on the 
differences in the legal environment where the banks operate. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study that applies this methodology to Turkey and Russia. 
 Finally, this study mainly relies on the database of regulatory indicators of the 
World Bank survey “The Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey”. This dataset allows 
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the international comparison of various features of the bank regulatory environment. 
However, the regulatory data for the Turkish banking sector is integrated by unique 
interviews made with the officials of the banking regulatory authority. The data for the 
Russian banking sector is based on the World Bank survey as well. In order to provide an 
updated version of the latest survey of the World Bank regarding the years 2009 and 
2010 in Russia, an interview was also carried out with the officials of the banking 
regulatory agency in Russia. 
 This study has a number of limitations, which could be fruitfully addressed by 
future research. To begin, this dissertation has used a non-parametric method for the 
efficiency analysis of banks. Parametric and non-parametric techniques have advantages 
and disadvantages. Due to the limitations of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), -which 
is the core empirical methodology employed in this dissertation– some researchers prefer 
to apply both parametric and non-parametric methods in their analyses. In the future, in 
order to establish the consistency or inconsistency among the parametric and 
nonparametric findings, an application of a parametric linear programming technique 
such as Stochastic Frontier Approach might provide another perspective and another set 
of results for discussion. A further study on the comparison of results would provide 
stronger support for the findings while suggesting some insights on the advantages and 
the drawbacks of the different models. 
 In contrast to parametric frontier models, the incorporation of environmental 
variables in DEA models is still being researched and it offers a wide variety of 
proposals to be considered, for instance, risk-adjusted efficiency measures. An analysis 
by Pastor (2002) applies a three-stage sequential technique, based on the DEA model and 
on the decomposition of risk into its internal and external components, for obtaining 
efficiency measures adjusted for risk and the environment. It seems that this technique 
allows the incorporation of environmental variables in DEA analysis. The 
implementation of this technique on the subject of this dissertation might allow for more 
detailed empirical investigations in the future. 
 With this work, I tried to identify the characteristics of a regulatory framework 
that would support the efficient performance of banks. A major finding of this research is 
that banking regulation needs to be adapted to the needs of emerging countries, 
particularly in the case of Turkey and Russia. This might be instructive for the 
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policymakers of these countries. My analysis is based on a specific list of questions 
following the literature regarding each regulatory variable of interest. However, the 
original World Bank survey contains a more detailed list of questions for a few more 
regulatory variables. By applying the survey for each of these questions, one could 
obtain more information about the regulatory policies in Turkey and Russia and hence 
provide a more comprehensive analysis. This too would be an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A 
 
Variable Category Description 
Regulatory Variables 
CAPTREQ Capital 
Requirements 
This variable takes values between 0 and 9, with 
higher values indicating grater stringency. It is 
determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to 
questions 1–7 and 0 otherwise, while the opposite 
occurs in the case of questions 8 and 9 (i.e. yes=0, no 
=1). (1) Is the minimum required capital asset ratio 
risk-weighted in line with Basle guidelines? (2) Does 
the ratio vary with individual bank’s credit risk? (3) 
Does the ratio vary with market risk? (4–6) Before 
minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of 
the following are deducted from the book value of 
capital: (a) market value of loan losses not realized in 
accounting books? (b) unrealized losses in securities 
portfolios? (c) unrealized foreign exchange losses? 
(7) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital 
verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? (8) 
Can the initial or subsequent injections of capital be 
done with assets other than cash or government 
securities? (9) Can initial disbursement of capital be 
done with borrowed funds? 
OFFDISCPLINE Official 
Disciplinary 
Power 
This variable takes values between 0 and 10, with 
higher values indicating higher power of the 
supervisory authorities. It is determined by adding 1 
if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one of 
the following ten questions: (1) Can the supervisory 
authorities force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure? (2) Are there any 
mechanisms of cease-desist type orders whose 
infraction leads to automatic imposition of civil & 
penal sanctions on banks directors & managers? (3) 
Can the supervisory agency order directors/ 
management to constitute provisions to cover 
actual/potential losses? (4) Can the supervisory 
agency suspend director’s decision to distribute 
dividends? (5) Can the supervisory agency suspend 
director’s decision to distribute bonuses? (6) Can the 
supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to 
distribute management fees? (7) Can the supervisory 
agency supersede bank shareholder rights and declare 
bank insolvent? (8) Does banking law allow 
supervisory agency to suspend some or all ownership 
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rights of a problem bank? (9) Regarding bank 
restructuring & reorganization, can supervisory 
agency remove and replace management? (10) 
Regarding bank restructuring & reorganization, can 
supervisory agency remove and replace directors? 
PRVTMONITOR Private 
Monitoring 
This variable takes values between 0 and 10, with 
higher values indicating policies that promote private 
monitoring. It is determined by adding 1 if the answer 
is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one of the following 
ten questions: (1) Does accrued, though unpaid 
interest/principal enter the income statement while 
loan is non-performing? (2) Are financial institutions 
required to produce consolidated accounts covering 
all bank and any non-bank financial subsidiaries? (3) 
Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 
(4) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to public? 
(5) Must banks disclose their risk management 
procedures to public? (6) Are directors legally liable 
for erroneous/misleading information? (7) Is an 
external audit compulsory? (8) Are there specific 
requirements for the extent of audit? (9) Are auditors 
licensed or certified? (10) Do regulations require 
credit ratings for commercial banks? 
DEPOSITINSUR Deposit 
Insurance 
Scheme 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is 
an explicit deposit insurance scheme and zero 
otherwise. 
ENTRY Eentry 
Requirements 
This variable examines whether there are specific 
legal submissions required to obtain a license to 
operate as a bank. It is determined by adding 1 if the 
answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one of the 
following eight questions: (1) Draft by law? (2) 
Intended organization chart? (3) Financial projections 
for first three years, (4) Financial information on 
main potential shareholders, (5) Background 
experience of future directors, (6) Background 
experience of future managers, (7) Sources of funds 
to be disbursed in the capitalization of new banks, (8) 
Market differentiation intended for new bank? 
Control Variables 
Bank-specific Characteristics Source/Database 
EQAS Capital strength Equity/Assets Bankscope & 
BAT* 
ROE Profitability Pre-tax 
profit/Equity 
Bankscope & 
BAT* 
EXPTA Expenses 
Management 
Non-interest 
expenses/average 
assets 
Bankscope & 
BAT* 
LOANTA Loan Activity Loans/total assets Bankscope & 
BAT* 
Macroeconomic Conditions 
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GDP Overall economic 
conditions 
Real GDP Growth GMID, OECD 
Market Structure 
OFGOVBANKS Presence of 
government-
owned banks 
Fraction of the 
banking system’s 
assets in banks that 
are 50% or more 
government-owned 
CBR & BRSA 
Institutional environment 
GOVNTINTERV Government 
intervention in the 
economy 
This is an index of 
government 
intervention in the 
economy. It 
measures 
government’s direct 
use of scarce 
resources for its 
own purposes and 
government’s 
control over 
resources through 
ownership. The 
index takes values 
between 1 and 5, 
with higher values 
indicating higher 
levels of 
government 
consumption in the 
economy and 
higher share of 
revenues received 
from stateowned 
enterprises and 
property. 
Heritage 
Foundation 
REGQUALITY Regulatory 
Quality 
This is an index 
reflecting the 
perceptions of the 
ability of the 
government to 
formulate and 
implement sound 
policies and 
regulations that 
permit and promote 
private sector 
development. The 
index takes values 
between 1 and 10, 
with higher values 
WB Governance 
Indicators 
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indicating higher 
levels of regulatory 
quality. 
NOTES: WB: World Bank 
 
CBR: Central Bank of Russia 
 
BRSA: Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency 
 
BAT: The Banks Association of Turkey 
 
WB Governance Indicators: World Bank governance indicators prepared 
by D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay & P. Zoido-Lobaton 
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APPENDIX B 
Robustness Test: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test 
 Each DEA sample for both countries consists of two groups of banks: domestic banks 
and foreign banks. Constructing frontiers specific to each of these groups provides more 
flexible, homogenous and thus more appropriate findings than estimating a single size 
frontier (see Bauer et al., 1993 and Isik and Hasan, 2002). Before calculating the efficiency 
scores for each country, it is necessary to test statistically the difference between the two 
groups of domestic and foreign banks in terms of efficiency. The aim is to test their 
comparability. The result will enable us to pool domestic bank and foreign banks together 
when calculating their efficiency scores. In order to fulfil this purpose, the rank-sum test 
developed by Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney can be used to identify whether the differences 
between two groups of domestic banks and foreign banks are significant (Cooper et al., 
2006:221-224). If the test concludes that the two groups of domestic and foreign banks 
belong to the same population, both groups of banks’ DEA scores will be estimated by 
pooling both groups for each country. 
For each country, I represent the data in two groups by D= {d1, d2,…,dm}which refers to 
domestic banks, and F = {f1,f2,…,fn} which refers to foreign banks. By ranking the data, we 
arrive at a variable called S statistic which follows an approximately normal distribution with 
mean m(m+n+1)/2 and variance mn(m+n+1)/12. By normalizing S, we have: 
  T=
𝑆−𝑚(𝑚+𝑛+1)/2
�𝑚𝑛(𝑚+𝑛+1)/12 
where T has an approximately standard normal distribution. T serves to test whether the 
hypothesis that the two groups belong to the same population or whether they differ 
significantly. The hypothesis will be rejected if T ≤ -Tα/2 or T ≥ Tα/2, where Tα/2 
corresponds to the upper α/2 percentile of the standard normal distribution. 
 The T statistic for the group of Turkish banks is –1.27. If we choose the significance 
level α= 0.05 (5%), then it holds that T0.025= 1.96. Since T= -1.27 > -1.96, we don’t reject 
the null hypothesis at the significance level 5%. We arrive at the same conclusion for Russian 
banks where T is equal to 0.49. Since 0.49 < 1.96, we don’t reject the null hypothesis that the 
two groups of domestic and foreign banks belong to the same population. Hence, the 
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common frontier approach will be used in the calculations of efficiency scores for both types 
of banks with the assumption that they use the same production technology. 
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APPENDIX C 
List of Failed Banks 
Bank Name Acquired By Involvement Date 
Svyat bank VEB Direct state bailout 23/09/2008 
KIT Finance Alrosa State Controlled 10/10/2008 
Soyuz Gazenergoprombank State Controlled 11/10/2008 
Globex VEB Direct state bailout 17/10/2008 
VEFK* DIA Direct state bailout 21/10/2008 
Sobinbank* Gazenergoprombank State Controlled 15/10/2008 
Severnaya Kazna * Alfa Bank DIA 09/12/2008 
Russky Bank Razvitiya Otkritie DIA 13/12/2008 
Russian Capital Bank Nat. Reserve Bank CBR support 14/01/2009 
Elektronika* Nat. Reserve Bank DIA 01/12/2008 
Gubernsky Bank* Sinara Group DIA 11/11/2008 
Nizhegorodpromstroybank * Sarovbusinessbank DIA 17/11/2008 
Bank 24.ru * Probusinessbank DIA 07/12/2008 
Yarsotbank * Promsvyazbank CBR support 21/10/2008 
Potenzial * Solidarnost Bank DIA 10/11/2008 
Gasenergobank * Probusinessbank DIA 14/11/2008 
Bashinvest * Binbank DIA 24/11/2008 
Moscow Zalogovy Bank Bank of Moscow DIA 29/12/2008 
Moskovsky Kapital Nomos Bank DIA 19/12/2008 
Nizhniy Novgorod * Promsvyazbank DIA 28/11/2008 
Russian Develop. Bank DIA DIA 06/11/2008 
Investment Bank Trust * National Bank Trust Merger 20/11/2008 
APR Bank * Onexim Group Merger 24/11/2008 
MDM Namk * URSA Bank Merger 03/12/2008 
Tharkhany Bank Morskoy DIA 22/12/2008 
Kauri Bank License revoked License revoked 10/02/2009 
Econats Bank License revoked License revoked 22/12/2008 
Peace Bank License revoked License revoked 22/12/2008 
Bank Eurasia Center License revoked License revoked 22/12/2008 
Sakhalin Vest * License revoked License revoked 22/12/2008 
West Bank Premier License revoked License revoked 22/12/2008 
Lefco Bank License revoked License revoked 12/11/2008 
Sibcontact License revoked License revoked 06/02/2009 
ZelAK Bank License revoked License revoked 18/01/2009 
Bank Sochi License revoked License revoked 17/11/2008 
Setevoi Neftyanoy Bank * License revoked License revoked 16/12/2008 
Agrokhimbank* License revoked License revoked 30/12/2008 
Baltcreditbank License revoked License revoked 19/12/2008 
Net Oil Bank License revoked License revoked 19/12/2008 
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Inkasbank *  License revoked License revoked 19/02/2009 
Sudcombank * License revoked License revoked 19/02/2009 
Prikamye Bank License revoked License revoked 19/01/2009 
Uraykombank License revoked License revoked 10/02/2009 
Integro * License revoked License revoked 27/11/2008 
Kurganprombank * License revoked License revoked 27/11/2008 
Gazinvestbank License revoked License revoked 17/12/2008 
Source : Fidrmuc and Süss, 2009 
* Banks whose equity is below 5 million EUR. 
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SUMMARY 
The importance of the banks and financial markets relies on the fact that they 
promote economic efficiency by allocating savings efficiently to profitable investment 
opportunities. A well-functioning financial system contributes to the economic growth of 
a country. More importantly and as this dissertation emphasizes, other than contributing 
to economic growth, an efficient banking system is a key determinant for the financial 
stability. A stable banking system is capable of withstanding financial shocks and 
imbalances, thereby alleviating the disruptions in the financial intermediation process. 
The importance of financial stability became evident during the 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis. The financial crisis that started in the U.S. subprime mortgage market in 
2007 spread quickly to Europe and became a global crisis. However, compared to 
advanced countries, emerging market economies displayed remarkable resilience and 
maintained robust rates of economic growth. Given the lessons from the crises of the past 
15 years, developing countries have adopted measures to become less vulnerable to 
external shocks that are likely to emerge from more developed countries. 
Following the detrimental economic and financial consequences in the aftermath 
of the crisis, academics and policymakers started to focus their attention on the 
construction of an appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework of the banking 
sector. The theory of market failure forms the basis for understanding financial 
regulation. During the 2007-2009 global crisis, banks were engaging in excessive risk-
taking. Prudential banking regulation and supervision aim at curbing excessive risk 
taking of banks because engaging in excessive risky transactions is the ultimate source of 
instability. Hence, banking regulation is needed to deal with the failure of markets to 
police banks’ risky behaviours. 
This dissertation aims at understanding the impact of regulations and supervision 
on banks’ performance focusing on two emerging market economies, Turkey and Russia. 
It aims at examining the way in which regulations matter for financial stability and 
banking performance from a law and economics perspective. A review of the theory of 
banking regulation, particularly as applied to emerging economies, shows that the 
efficiency of certain solutions regarding banking regulation is open to debate. Some of 
the regulations contribute to banks’ performance by preventing the risk-taking incentive 
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of banks and hence supporting financial stability, whereas some of them might have a 
detrimental effect on financial stability. Besides, banks react differently to regulation 
under different institutional settings. Therefore, in the context of emerging countries, 
whether a certain approach is efficient or not will be presented as an empirical question 
to which this dissertation will try to find an answer. 
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DUTCH SUMMARY 
 Het belang van banken en financiële markten is gebaseerd op het feit dat ze 
economische efficiëntie promoten door spaargelden efficiënt te alloceren naar winstgevende 
investeringsmogelijkheden. Een goed functionerend financieel systeem draagt bij aan de 
economische groei van een land. Belangrijker, en zoals dit proefschrift benadrukt, behalve 
bijdragen aan economische groei, is een efficiënt banksysteem een essentiële determinant 
voor financiële stabiliteit. Een stabiel banksysteem is in staat financiële schokken en onbalans 
te doorstaan, zodat verstoringen in het financiële bemiddelingsproces worden verlicht. 
 Het belang van financiële stabiliteit werd duidelijk tijdens de mondiale financiële 
crisis van 2007-2009. De financiële crisis die startte in de subprime hypotheekmarkt in de 
Verenigde Staten in 2007 breidde zich snel naar Europa uit en werd een mondiale crisis. 
Echter, in vergelijking met ontwikkelde landen, lieten groeimarkteconomieën een opvallende 
veerkracht zien en behielden zij een robuuste groei. Gelet op de lessen uit de crises van de 
laatste vijftien jaar hebben ontwikkelingslanden maatregelen getroffen om minder gevoelig te 
worden voor externe schokken die naar alle waarschijnlijkheid voort kunnen komen uit meer 
ontwikkelde landen. 
 Volgend op de schadelijke economische en financiële consequenties in de nasleep van 
de crisis, zijn wetenschappers en beleidsmakers begonnen hun aandacht te richten op het 
construeren van een geschikt regulerings- en toezichthoudend raamwerk voor de banksector. 
De theorie van marktfalen vormt de basis om de financiële regulering te begrijpen. Tijdens de 
mondiale crisis van 2007-2009 waren banken betrokken bij het nemen van buitensporige 
risico’s. Prudentiële bankregulering en toezicht richten zich op het ombuigen van het nemen 
van buitensporige risico’s door banken, omdat het betrokken zijn bij het nemen van 
buitensporige risico’s de ultieme bron van instabiliteit is. Regulering van banken is dus nodig 
omdat de markt faalt bij het aan banden leggen van risicovol gedrag van banken. 
 Dit proefschrift richt zich op het begrijpen van de impact van regulering en toezicht 
op de prestaties van banken, met een focus op twee opkomende markteconomieën, Turkije en 
Rusland. Het onderzoekt, vanuit een rechtseconomisch perspectief, de wijze waarop 
regulering van belang is voor financiële stabiliteit en de prestaties van banken. Een 
bespreking van de theorie van de regulering van banken, in het bijzonder zoals toegepast in 
opkomende economieën, laat zien dat de efficiëntie van bepaalde oplossingen met betrekking 
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tot de regulering van banken openstaat voor discussie. Sommige van de 
reguleringsmaatregelen dragen bij aan de prestaties van banken door de prikkels van banken 
om risico’s te nemen te voorkomen en ondersteunen derhalve financiële stabiliteit, terwijl 
andere een schadelijk effect op de financiële stabiliteit zouden kunnen hebben. Daarnaast 
reageren banken verschillend op regulering in verschillende institutionele settings. Daarom 
zal, in de context van opkomende economieën, de kwestie of een bepaalde benadering 
efficiënt is of niet als een empirische vraag worden gepresenteerd, waar dit proefschrift een 
antwoord op zal proberen te vinden. 
